THE ETHICS OF AL-GHAZALI

A COMPOSITE ETHICS IN ISLAM

ABUL QUASEM

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
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
THE ETHICS OF AL-GHAZALI

A COMPOSITE ETHICS IN ISLAM

by

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TO MY PARENTS

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

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FOREWORD

There is as yet no comprehensive history of Islamic ethics, as was noted by Richard Walzer in the article on Akhlaḳ in the new *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* Much of the field was covered, but in uneven fashion, by Dwight M. Donaldson in his *Studies in Muslim Ethics* (1953), and some subsequent works have dealt with various aspects of the theme. For the Western scholar, however, there are serious difficulties in tackling the subject. Europe for many centuries had a distorted image of Islam which placed obstacles in the discernment of any moral ideals in Islamic culture. Later, as the distortion was corrected, it was found that Islamic moral values, except with regard to marriage, were so similar to Jewish and Christian values that they hardly deserved separate attention. A further difficulty was that Islamic scholarship had no discipline corresponding to ethics as known in Europe and America. What is only beginning to be realized is that Muslim scholars did in fact discuss ethical problems, but did so as part of the apparently different discipline of *uṣūl al-fiqh,* 'principle of jurisprudence'. When this last discipline has been sufficiently explored by historians of ideas, it should be possible to envisage a more adequate history of Islamic ethics.

In the meantime this book on al-Ghazālī's ethics may be commended to those interested in the field. It is not, of course, a history of Islamic ethics, though it sets al-Ghazālī in his historical context. But it offers the most comprehensive account to date of the ethical thought of one of the leading Muslim writers, who combined in himself something from each of the traditional, the philosophical and the sufistic tendencies. It has also various special virtues. It studiously avoids references to any of the numerous works ascribed to al-Ghazālī whose authenticity has been doubted. At the same time, however, the author has read widely in the generally accepted works, and has studied some seventeen of these in addition to the

magisterial *Iḥyā'*. He is also familiar with contemporary ethical discussions in the West.

The ordinary reader in Europe and America finds al-Ghazālī one of the easiest of Muslim writers to approach, mainly because of the openness and almost 'modern' outlook of his autobiographical work, the *Munqidh*. The clarity of his style and limpidity of his thought make him a good author through whom to introduce Islamic ethics both to the West and to modern-minded Muslims.

W. Montgomery Watt

PREFACE

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505 A.H./1111 A.D.) was one of the greatest thinkers and reformers in the history of Islam. There is a Tradition (*ḥadīth*) that the prophet Muḥammad (may peace be upon him!) said that at the beginning of every century God will send someone to revive and revitalize the faith of the Islamic community. Al-Ghazālī is generally considered to be the reformer (*mujaddid*) of the fifth century of the Islamic era. He himself was convinced that he was the man chosen by God for this purpose. Muslims have given him the titles of "the Proof of Islam (*ḥujjat al-Islām*)" and "the Ornament of Religion (*zayn ad-dīn*)". Many have even gone so far as to accept him as the greatest religious authority after the Prophet. Endowed with an encyclopaedic knowledge and a saintly character, al-Ghazālī extended his accomplishments over various fields of learning such as ethics, logic, dogmatic theology, and Islamic jurisprudence. The creative part of his life can be broadly divided into an early period, and a later period when he became a mystic. In many of his early works ethics was given some consideration, but it was not the central problem. In only one of his early works, the *Mīzān al-'Amal*, was ethics his sole concern, but some parts of this work have been shown by a scholar to be spurious, while some of the other parts are thought to have been abandoned by al-Ghazālī during the mystical period of his life. (The present writer, however, considers the *Mīzān* in its entirety as a genuine work by al-Ghazālī.) Most of his later works are exclusively ethical in nature, and deal with that morality which will ensure ultimate happiness. Some of the ethical works ascribed to his later period, however, are of doubtful authenticity.

The present study aims at presenting al-Ghazālī's moral theory in as complete a form as possible within the compass of a single volume, by drawing only upon material from those works which have been unanimously accepted as authentic. Most of these works

belong to the later part of his life, when his ethical views reached their culmination and took their final shape. This study does not draw upon material from the *Mīzān al-'Amal*, since there is controversy about the authenticity of parts of this work. The problems discussed in this study are treated fairly elaborately. The intention is to provide scholars with a more complete knowledge of al-Ghazālī's ethics, and also to help those who intend to practise this ethics which is an amalgam of ṣūfī ethics, Islamic religious teachings on morals, philosophic ethics, and also al-Ghazālī's own moral thoughts and experiences. Efforts are made to present the general principles underlying the ethical teachings of al-Ghazālī and the psychological conceptions on which his ethical ideas are based. The development and modification of his ethical thought on some important points during the mystical period of his life is also noted. Since many scholars have made observations on a number of crucial points of al-Ghazālī's ethics, on the basis of their partial studies of it, it has been considered necessary to assess and examine these observations. It is hoped that the present work will give readers a true and more complete knowledge and understanding of al-Ghazālī's teaching on a wide variety of moral problems.

This work is a revised version of a Ph.D. thesis presented to the University of Edinburgh in November 1972. In this revision a few points have been added and the third chapter has been rearranged. I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Professor W. Montgomery Watt for supervising the thesis, and to Mrs. Phyllis Graham, Mr. D. Adamson and Fr. J. Garland for their help in its revision. My gratitude is further due to Professor M. Hamidullah of the National Centre of Research, Paris for carefully going through the manuscript and making some valuable suggestions before it was sent to the press.

Abul Quasem

Edinburgh, June 1973

ABBREVIATIONS

The works of al-Ghazālī referred to in this study are abbreviated as follows:

A — *Al-Arba'īn fī Uṣūl ad-Dīn*
A.W. — *Ayyuhā l-Walad*
B — *Bidāyat al-Hidāya*
D — *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*
I.'A. — *Iljām al-'Awāmm 'an 'Ilm al-Kalām*
I.I. — *Al-Imlā' 'alā Ishkālāt al-Iḥyā'*
I.I'. — *Al-Iqtiṣād fī l-I'tiqād*
J — *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*
K — *Kīmiyā-i-Sa'ādat*
M — *Mishkāt al-Anwār*
M.A. — *Al-Maqṣad al-Asnā Sharḥ Asmā' Allāh al-Ḥusnā*
M.'A. — *Mīzān al-'Amal*
M.B. — *Al-Maḍnūn bihi 'alā Ghayr Ahlih*
M.D. — *Al-Munqidh min aḍ-Ḍalāl*
M.F. — *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*
M.'I. — *Mi'yār al-'Ilm fī Fann al-Manṭiq*
M.U. — *Al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*
N — *Nasīḥat al-Mulūk*
Q — *Al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm*
T — *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*

The abbreviations listed below are used for the journals and encyclopaedias referred to in this work.

AJSLL — *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*
BSOAS — *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
DI — *Der Islam*
EI — *Encyclopaedia of Islam*
ERE — *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*
GUOST — *Glasgow University Oriental Society Transactions*

ABBREVIATIONS

IC	— *Islamic Culture*
IS	— *Islamic Studies*
JAOS	— *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JRAS	— *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*
JSS	— *Journal of Semitic Studies*
MW	— *Muslim World*
ORIENS	— *Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research*
PAPS	— *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*
PF	— *The Philosophic Forum*
MIDEO	— *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'Études orientales du Caire*
SI	— *Studia Islamica*
VBQ	— *The Visra Bharat Quarterly*
ZDMG	— *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*

THE ETHICS OF Al-GHAZĀLĪ

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I

THE NATURE OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S ETHICS

The ethical theory which al-Ghazālī set forth in those works on which the present study is mainly based, was the outcome of his later years, when he was living the life of an ascetic and mystic. In that period, he had a state of mind and an attitude towards life and the world which he had not had previously. This state of mind determined, to a great extent, the nature of his teachings on different moral problems, and the sources from which he derived his views. Before stating the nature of his ethical theory, it seems necessary to discuss briefly the intellectual stages through which he passed. It is only then that a clear appreciation of his ethical theory will be possible.

AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S INTELLECTUAL EVOLUTION

The earliest spiritual training which al-Ghazālī received was under the guardianship of a ṣūfī friend of his father. At this time he studied the Qur'ān and Tradition, stories of the saints and their spiritual states and committed to memory some poems telling "of passionate love and lovers".[1] This was followed by study consisting mainly of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) in his native town of Tus under Aḥmad ar-Rādhkānī, and then at Jurjan under Abū Naṣr al-Ismā'īlī, from whose lectures he took notes which he memorized in the three years after his return to Tus.[2] In these three years he seems to have studied Islamic mysticism (ṣūfism) under Yūsuf an-Nassāj, and to have become acquainted with the spiritual states of the righteous and the stations of the gnostics (*'ārifūn*). He also seems to have undertaken exercises for the purification of his character.

Al-Ghazālī then went to Nishapur in 1077[3] A.D. and studied

theology, dialectics, natural science, philosophy and logic under al-Juwaynī, known as the Imām al-Ḥaramayn, who was the most distinguished Ash'arite theologian of the day and a renowned professor at the Niẓāmiyya College at Nishapur. It seems probable that under the Imām he studied mysticism too, for the Imām, who had been a pupil of the famous ṣūfī Abū Nu'aym al-Iṣfahānī, is said to have brought tears to the eyes of all present when dealing with the ṣūfīs and their states.[4] It was the Imām who introduced al-Ghazālī to logic and philosophy. The main subject of his study under the Imām, however, was doubtless dogmatic theology (*kalām*), a subject on which he does not seem to have been instructed by any of his other teachers. In these days as a student at Nishapur he also learnt more about the theory and practice of mysticism from a professor, probably of jurisprudence, named al-Fārmadhī, who was a leader of the ṣūfīs there. Under his guidance al-Ghazālī practised rigorous ṣūfistic exercises, but he did not reach that stage of mysticism where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from on high.[5] He therefore neglected mysticism and turned to theology and philosophy. (In his spiritual crisis of 1095 A.D. however, he came back to mysticism, and remained a mystic as well as an Ash'arite theologian until his death.)

During these days as a student, as in the years that immediately followed, al-Ghazālī was greatly concerned with the quest for absolutely certain knowledge, by which he meant such knowledge as was infallible and left no room for doubt. In his earliest youth he had abandoned naïve and second-hand belief (*taqlīd*) finding it the greatest hindrance in his search for truth.[6] While a disciple of the Imām al-Ḥaramayn he developed the habit of examining theological questions and controversies; the result of this was a sceptical tendency which, however, was to be restrained by the influence of his teacher, who was a man of great depth of character. But this sceptical tendency further developed during the time he was in the camp-court of the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk;[7] he came here on the Imām's death in 1084 A.D., and here he spent the next six years, in great favour with the vizier. About the time of his move to Baghdad[8] to take over the chair of jurisprudence, (not of theology,[9] as is generally maintained) at the Niẓāmiyya College in 1091 A.D., an absolute scepticism took hold of him. He investigated the various kinds of knowledge that he now had and found all, except sense perception and necessary truths, lacking the characteristic of infallibility which was his criterion of sure knowledge. On serious

reflection, however, he found even these two kinds of knowledge to be unreliable: first he doubted sense perception on the grounds that when judged by the intellect it very often proves false. Then he doubted those intellectual truths which are first principles or derived from first principles, reasoning that behind intellectual apprehension there might be another judge who, if he manifested himself, would show the falsity of the intellect, just as when intellect manifested itself it showed the falsity of the senses. The fact that such a supra-intellectual apprehension has not manifested itself is no proof that it is impossible. There might come a state when the suppositions of the intellect would prove to be empty imaginings; that state might be death, or the ecstatic state of the ṣūfīs in which things appear in a different way from that understood by the intellect. Thus al-Ghazālī had no principle which might enable him to regulate his thought; he even had no faith in religion. Such a state of complete scepticism lasted two months. At length, God out of mercy, enlightened his mind so that he found himself able to accept the necessary principles of the intellect — he saw intuitively that these principles were true. He now regained his power of ordered thought and resolutely applied himself to a quest for sure truth. He found those engaged in the search for truth divided into four groups — theologians, philosophers, ta'līmites and ṣūfīs — and, believing that the truth must have been attained by one of them, began to study their views with extreme care and earnestness.[10]

Al-Ghazālī began with the science of dogmatic theology, a discipline which was founded by al-Ash'arī and in which he had been thoroughly trained. He found that the aim of the theologians consisted in defending dogmas against heretical aberrations and innovations and that they fulfilled this aim of theirs very effectively. They also made attempts to meet the students of philosophy on their own ground, but these failed because they could not meet the demands of Aristotelian logic, which was the basis of the teachings of the philosophers. Thus al-Ghazālī was dissatisfied not with the doctrines but with the method of dogmatic theology; the doctrines of the theologians he found to be sound, but their method could not give him the certainly he was trying to achieve.[11]

Al-Ghazālī then turned to philosophy in order to see whether or not absolute truth lay in this discipline. He was at Baghdad at that time teaching religious sciences, chiefly jurisprudence, to over three hundred students, writing treatises and giving legal opinions. By reading works on various branches of philosophy in his spare time

and without any teacher, he mastered the philosophy of his day in less than two years. He spent nearly another year reflecting assiduously on what he had assimilated until he comprehended how far it was true and how far false.[12] He divided the philosophers into three groups, namely, the materialists (*dahriyyūn*), the naturalists (*ṭabī'iyyūn*) and the theists (*ilāhiyyūn*). The first group, consisting of the earliest philosophers, denied the Creator and Disposer of the world and believed that it had been in existence from all eternity, of itself. Al-Ghazālī looked upon them as irreligious. The naturalists, struck by the wonders of creation and aware of a continuing purpose and wisdom in the scheme of things, admitted the existence of a wise creator but denied the spirituality and immateriality of the human soul. They explained the soul in naturalistic terms as an epiphenomenon of the body and believed that the death of the latter led to the complete non-existence of the former. Belief in paradise, hell and judgement they considered as old women's tales or pious fictions. Because they denied the future life, al-Ghazālī considered them, too, as irreligious. The theists were the more modern philosophers and included Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Although they attacked the materialists and the naturalists and exposed their defects very effectively, they retained, in al-Ghazālī's opinion, a residue of their unbelief and heresy. He, therefore, looked upon both them and those Muslim philosophers who followed them as unbelievers. Among their followers he found al-Fārābī and Avicenna to be the best transmitters of Aristotle's philosophy into the Islamic world. Some parts of all that they had transmitted he reckoned as sheer unbelief, some as gross heresy and others as absolutely undeniable.[13]

Being dissatisfied with philosophy, al-Ghazālī came to examine the teachings of the ta'līmites, the party of 'authoritative instruction' (*ta'līm*) also known as Ismā'īlites and Bāṭinites. His skill in logic exposed many of their grave inconsistencies and weaknesses. He saw that though they professed to abandon reasoning and to depend on the instruction of a living infallible Imām for the truth of anything, they could not avoid surreptitiously making use of reason, and he found that it was practically impossible to consult the Imām or his representative in every case. Besides such grave inconsistencies, he also noticed the shallowness of their thought, for he found nothing beyond their accustomed formulae.[14] At this time of his quest for certain truth, he did not attack their conception of esoteric meaning (*bāṭin*) which was the complement of their doctrine of authoritative

instruction.

Lastly, al-Ghazālī turned to the way of mysticism, being convinced that the mystics and they alone, among the seekers after truth, had really attained their purpose. By studying the works of some eminent mystics, he gained a complete understanding of the intellectual aspect of this discipline and realized that what was distinctive in it could not be apprehended by study, but only by immediate experience (*dhawq*), by ecstasy or by moral change. He realized very clearly that the mystics were men not of words (*aṣḥāb al-aqwāl*), but of real experience (*arbāb al-aḥwāl*), and that what was necessary for him was to live their lives, to practise their practices and to forsake the world.[15]

It was just at this time that al-Ghazālī, who had already regained a steadfast belief in God, prophethood and the last day, was overtaken by an extreme fear. This fear was not of the assassination of the Bāṭinites, as suggested by Jabre, nor was it of ill-treatment by the new Seljūq ruler with whom he had bad relations, as Macdonald is inclined to suggest.[16] His fear was of the day of judgement. He thought that he would certainly be punished in hell if he did not live a pious life. What was necessary for such a life was, he perceived, to sever the attachment of his soul to worldly things by leaving this world, and to advance to God; this could only be achieved by abandoning wealth and position and fleeing from all time-consuming entanglements. He looked at his present life, his writing and his teaching, and found that these things were of no value in the face of the great facts of heaven and hell; they were pursued for the sake of vain glory and not for pleasing God. If he was to hope for the eternal happiness of the life to come, he must serve God completely, as a true ṣūfī. He therefore abandoned his professorship and his whole career as a jurist and theologian, divested himself of all his wealth except what was necessary for his own support and that of his children, and, finding himself unable to live an upright life in the worldly society of Baghdad, left for Damascus in November 1095.[17]

Converted to mysticism, al-Ghazālī now completely devoted himself to mystical practices in perfect solitude and retirement. He busied himself in purifying his soul from vices, beautifying it with virtues, and occupying it with the recollection of God, in accordance with the knowledge he had previously acquired by studying the writings of some eminent mystics. In the ten years of vigorous moral training which he spent successively in Damascus, Jerusalem, Hebron, the Hijaz, Iraq and Tus,[18] he advanced far along the

mystic path. Many unfathomable mysteries were revealed to him during these years, and he became fully convinced that the mystic way (*ṭarīqa*) was the best way of life for man to follow:

> "I learned with certainty that it is above all the mystics who walk on the path of God; their life is the best life, their method the soundest method and their character the purest character. Indeed, were the intellect of the intellectuals, the learning of the learned and the scholarship of the scholars, who are versed in the profundities of revealed truth, brought together in the attempt to improve the life and character of the mystics, they would find no way of doing so; for to the mystics all movement and all rest, whether external or internal, brings illumination from the light of the lamp of prophetic revelation; and behind the light of prophetic revelation there is no other light on the face of the earth from which illumination may be received."[19]

This attitude of al-Ghazālī towards ṣūfism remained unchanged to the end of his life.[20]

THE NATURE OF THE MORAL THEORY GIVEN IN THE WORKS OF THE MYSTICAL PERIOD

During this mystical period of al-Ghazālī's life which lasted from his departure from Baghdad until his death on the 18th of December 1111 he is said to have composed a number of ethical works most of which are accepted by scholars as wholly authentic. Some are accepted only in part, and a few are rejected in their entirety.[21] The nature of the moral theory set forth in the works of this period, and other related problems, can be better appreciated if the central problem discussed in them is first determined. From the preceding section it is plain that throughout his student life, al-Ghazālī received some instruction in mystical theory and practice in addition to his study of other subjects; then he neglected mysticism for some time, but in the course of his examination of the four groups of seekers after truth, he returned to it and found in it the sure truth he had been searching for so diligently. His thorough study of the works of eminent ṣūfīs produced in his mind an extreme fear of punishment in the hereafter, which led him to a life of solitude fully occupied with religious and mystical practices. Thus, on the practical side his problem during the mystical period was to prepare

himself to escape from punishment in hell and to achieve happiness in paradise, or more accurately, to avoid abandonment by God and to gain nearness (*qurb*) to Him. On the intellectual side his problem was to convey his thoughts and experiences to others, so that they too might reach the same goal; he believed that most men lived in depths of moral degradation which would certainly cause them misery in the life to come. In the introduction to the *Iḥyā'*[22] and in the *Munqidh*[23] he briefly described this moral degradation, with its causes, and also expounded his main problem. Speaking of this problem at the time of his departure to Nishapur in July/August 1106 he wrote:

> "... now I am calling men to the knowledge whereby worldly influence (*jāh*) is given up and its low position in the scale of real worth is recognized. This is now my intention, my aim, my desire; God knows that this is so. It is my earnest longing that I may make myself and others better."[24]

Thus the main concern of his life and thought during the ṣūfī period was well-being in the hereafter.[25] This concern determined various aspects of his moral theory. It made his ethics religious and mystical, unlike secular ethics which is exclusively concerned with human good in this life.

In keeping with his central problem, al-Ghazālī calls his ethics the science of the path of the hereafter (*'ilm ṭarīq al-ākhira*), or the path trodden by the prophets and righteous ancestors (*as-salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ*). He also calls it the science of practical religion (*'ilm al-mu'āmala*). In the works composed during the mystical period he does not seem to have used the phrase *'ilm al-akhlāq* for ethics. Thus, al-Ghazālī gives two names to his ethics, and in this he seems to have followed the ṣūfīs.[26] Ethics, in his opinion, is a study of certain religious beliefs (*i'tiqādāt*), and of rightness and wrongness of action for the purpose of practice, and not for the sake of mere knowledge. Study of action includes the study of actions directed towards God, of actions directed towards one's fellow-man in family and in society, of purification of the soul from vices and of its beautification with virtues. Thus the scope of al-Ghazālī's ethics is very wide, and this is a characteristic of ṣūfī ethics. This may be made clearer by considering the scope of the Muslim philosophers' ethics which he reproduced in his *Maqāṣid*.[27] He says that they divided the science of wisdom (*al-'ilm al-ḥikmī*), into two parts. One deals with man's action and is called practical science (*'ilm 'amalī*). By it a man can

know the types of action which are means to his well-being in this life as well as in the next. The other part is that science by which a man can know existences as they really are, and is called theoretical science (*'ilm naẓarī*). Practical science is divided into three parts. One is the science which regulates a man's dealings with others in society in such a way that they may cause him well-being in this life, and also in the next; it finds its perfection in political science. The second is the science of man's behaviour to the members of his family (*ahl al-manzil*); by it he knows how he should live with his wife, children, servants and so on. "The third is ethics (*'ilm al-akhlāq*) dealing with that which man should achieve so that he may be good and virtuous in his character-traits and qualities." Thus the Muslim philosophers, in al-Ghazālī's view, regarded ethics as a practical study dealing only with the qualities of the soul, i.e. virtues and vices; man's conduct in his family life, in social relationships and in the sphere of politics, falls outside the scope of their moral theory. He also speaks of the narrow scope of their ethics in the *Munqidh*.[28] This view of al-Ghazālī on the subject matter of their ethics is in accordance with that of Avicenna, since it was he who divided sciences in this way. Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's classification of sciences is different; he regarded ethics not as a separate subject but as included in politics.[29]

Al-Ghazālī separates politics from the scope of his ethics, and in this he is following his ṣūfī predecessors and also Avicenna, who differed from the great Greek moralists and from al-Fārābī on this question. Al-Ghazālī gives reasons for his view. He says that ideal government in the Islamic community is based upon the rules of Islamic jurisprudence; these rules are derived, through man's reason (*'aql*), from the four roots (*uṣūl*) of the Sharī'a,[30] so that the ideal Islamic community has a divinely-given character and it is through the membership of such a community that a man attains salvation. The rules of jurisprudence exist for the good ordering of secular affairs; the jurisprudents are the learned men of this world (*'ulamā' ad-dunyā*).[31] They supply the ruler with canons with which to govern the people in such a way that justice and peace prevail in the country; however, the rules of government have no concern with man's well-being in the life to come, the central problem of ethics. The judgements of the jurisprudents as to the rightness or wrongness of actions directed towards God and towards men, are based upon whether these actions have fulfilled the formal requirements of the Sharī'a, and thereby rendered their doers immune from punishment

by the ruler. Consideration of these actions from the viewpoint of otherworldly well-being is outside the domain of jurisprudence and, consequently, of politics; it belongs solely to ethics. Thus the canons of politics (*qawānīn as-siyāsa*), which are the same as the rules of jurisprudence, are separate from moral rules. They are, however, useful to morality in the sense that by the good ordering of worldly affairs they facilitate the cultivation of morality and religion. This is why al-Ghazālī often repeats Niẓām al-Mulk's dictum, 'religion and state are twins'. In this way politics and jurisprudence have only an indirect connection with ethics. In themselves they are subjects separate from ethics, as is clearly explained in a passage of the *Iḥyā'*.[32]

Al-Ghazālī's separation of politics from ethics is linked up with the individualistic nature of his ethics. In Ancient Greece, the Greek city state formed the background of moral life, and the man who performed his duties as a citizen was regarded as a good man; morality was thus a fundamental part of politics. This outlook changed in the mediaeval period; the breaking up of the Greek city states in the fourth century B.C. and the development of spiritual religions such as Christianity and Islam aided an advance towards an individualistic outlook. These religions emphasised the individual, for it is the individual soul which is destined for personal immortality. They taught that man looks on outward appearances, but the Lord looks on the soul. Thus more attention was to be given to the inward aspect of the individual; it was the soundness of this aspect that fitted him for the life of paradise. Influenced by such religious teachings, the ṣūfīs, al-Ghazālī among them, presented individualistic systems of ethics.[33] This kind of ethics encourages a personal interest in morality with the purpose of the purification of the individual soul. Moral standards are not accepted in it as parts of the moral atmosphere of society. Virtue is thought to be an individual matter. Of this individualistic nature of al-Ghazālī's ethics more will be said in the seventh chapter.

Al-Ghazālī conceives the purpose of ethical study as being related to the central problem of his ethics. There are three chief theories about the purpose of studying ethics: (a) ethics is a purely theoretical study, seeking to understand the nature of morality but with no purpose of affecting the conduct of the man who studies it. (b) The chief purpose of ethics is to influence actual conduct. (c) While ethics is primarily a theoretical subject which is concerned with discovering the truth about moral matters, there must be in ethical

investigation a constant criticism of existing standards of morality, so that ethics becomes a practical subject almost in spite of itself. Al-Ghazālī agrees with the second theory. He says that the study of 'the science of practical religion' is meant for practice; the aim of practice should be to improve the state of the soul so that well-being may be achieved in the hereafter.[34] This study has value only because without it good and bad cannot be perfectly sought or avoided.[35] Moral principles are to be learnt with a view to applying them to practical life. Al-Ghazālī even goes so far as to say that knowledge which is not acted upon is no better than ignorance.[36] In so strongly emphasizing practice as the purpose of ethical study, al-Ghazālī is influenced by Qur'ānic verse and prophetic tradition, which he quotes in support of his contentions.

Al-Ghazālī's ethics may also be described as teleological for it evaluates acts by referring to their consequences. It teaches that man has a supreme end, which is happiness in the hereafter, and that acts are good if they produce such an effect on the soul as would lead to that end, and bad if they prevent the soul from attaining it.[37] Even devotional acts such as ritual prayer and divine tax are good because of their consequences for the soul.[38] The degree of goodness or badness of various acts differs because of differences in the effects they produce in the souls of their agents.[39] Indeed al-Ghazālī's emphasis upon 'consequence to the soul' is so great that his ethics may be regarded as an ethics for the soul, in the same way as it may be called a theory of happiness, as distinct from hedonism in which pleasure is regarded as the supreme good. Thus acts are considered as good or bad according to whether their effects are conducive or detrimental to an end; in themselves they have no autonomous intrinsic moral value. Such a theory is called teleological, which is identical with the consequence theory of ethics. Hedonism, *eudaimonism*, i.e. the happiness theory, and perfectionism all fall under this category. In his view of ethics as teleological, al-Ghazālī agrees with the philosophers. Aristotle's concept of teleology in ethics is well-known. He was followed by Muslim philosophers like Avicenna,[40] al-Fārābī and Miskawayh who all judged the goodness or badness of an act in terms of its consequences in promoting or preventing happiness (*sa'āda*). Al-Ghazālī is against the Mu'tazilites who maintained that goodness and badness are values intrinsic to moral acts, and that the Sharī'a commands or prohibits acts because they are in themselves good or bad. Such a doctrine is called the deontological theory as against the

teleological. Al-Ghazālī agrees with the Ash'arites in denying the intrinsic worth of an act, and in relating it to an otherworldly aim and to the command or prohibition of God.[41] As a moralist, however, he lays much more stress upon the effect of acts than did his Ash'arite predecessors, who were mainly theologians.[42] One aspect of the problem of the moral worth of an act is the manner of knowing its worth, and this leads us to the study of the place of reason, revelation and intuition in ethics.

Al-Ghazālī recognizes the value of reason, revelation and mystical intuition in his ethics. In the first 'book'[43] of the *Iḥyā'* he puts it in his division of the sciences. He classifies them into religious (*shar'iyya*) and non-religious (*ghayr shar'iyya*) sciences. A religious science is received from the prophets. A non-religious science is learned by reason as in mathematics, or by experimentation as in medicine, or by hearing as in language. Non-religious sciences are divided into those commendable, e.g. medicine and mathematics, those reprehensible, e.g. magic and talismanic sciences, and those permissible, e.g. history and poetry. The praiseworthy religious sciences are of four kinds, namely, the sciences of the roots (*uṣūl*), sciences of the branches (*furū'*), sciences of the preludes (*muqaddamāt*) and sciences of the supplements (*mutammimāt*). The roots are four—the Qur'ān, the Sunna or the Prophet's standard practice, the Muslims' consensus (*ijmā'*) and the Companions' Traditions (*āthār aṣ-ṣaḥāba*). The branches are derived from these roots, not literally, but by apprehension of their meaning through reason (*'aql*). Thus their meanings are widened until a meaning differing from the literal is indicated. An example of this is that the Prophet said, "The judge should not sit in judgement while angry". Reason says that this Tradition also means that he should not sit in judgement while constipated or hungry or suffering from a painful disease. This is cited in the *Mustaṣfā* as an example of analogy (*qiyās*).[44] The sciences of the branches are two, namely, jurisprudence and that which deals with well-being in the hereafter. This latter is the science of good and evil character-traits, and the conduct proceeding from them[45] Thus, ethics is described as a religious science derived, through reason, from the teachings of the Sharī'a. The function of reason is only to understand their meaning.

In the third part of the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī again speaks of the sciences and how they can be known. He here divides them into the rational (*'aqliyya*) and the religious (*shar'iyya*). The former are defined as those learned by reason and are divided into necessary

sciences (*al- 'ulūm aḍ-ḍarūriyya*) and acquired sciences (*al-'ulūm al-muktasaba*). Rational sciences are again divided into this-worldly sciences, e.g. medicine, mathematics and astronomy, and otherworldly sciences dealing with good and evil character-traits and the conduct proceeding from them, and with the knowledge of God, His attributes and works. Religious sciences are defined as those derived from the prophets and revealed books accepted as authority (*taqlīd*). By means of these sciences man can purify his soul from vices and achieve perfection. Thus, ethics is described here as a rational science and also as a religious science. Al-Ghazālī reconciles these two views by saying that reason and the Sharī'a are complementary to each other; reason alone is insufficient in moral life and so is revelation; both need to be combined:

> "Rational sciences are insufficient for the health of the soul although it is in need of them, in the same way as reason is insufficient in continuance of the means of health of the body, but needs to know the properties of medicines and drugs by learning from physicians; for mere reason cannot guide to these, but their understanding after hearing is not possible except by reason. So hearing is indispensible for reason and reason is indispensible for hearing. One who urges pure reliance (*maḥḍ at-taqlīd*) in complete isolation from reason is ignorant, and one satisfied with mere reason independent of the lights of the Qur'ān and the Sunna is deluded. Take care not to be in one of these groups, and be a reconciler of the two principles, for rational sciences are like foods and religious sciences are like medicines, and a sick man is harmed by food when medicine is absent. Similarly, the cure of the diseases of the soul is not possible except by the medicines derived from the Sharī'a... One who... becomes satisfied with the rational sciences is harmed by them as a sick man is harmed by food. The imagination of one who imagines that rational sciences are contrary to religious sciences and that reconciliation of them is impossible, is an imagination proceeding from blindness in the eye of intelligence."[46]

Having thus described ethics as a religio-rational science, al-Ghazālī explains the method of knowledge in mysticism, and relates ethics to it. He says that the kind of knowledge which is not 'necessary' is achieved sometimes by learning and at times as a gift from God. If it is a gift it may be given through the intermediary of an angel or without any intermediary. The former is called revelation

(*waḥy*) which comes to the prophets, and the latter is inspiration (*ilhām*) or mystical intuition (*kashf*). Only those people can attain knowledge by mystical intuition who have completely purified their souls from vices and beautified them with virtues,[47] for at this stage there develops in the soul a power by which it "sees" the truth; it knows the truth directly without any reflection or reliance upon authority. Even before the completion of purification, some knowledge of good and bad and of the unseen world is directly achieved. The mystic sometimes knows directly about the rightness or wrongness of individual actions, sometimes about a class of action, and sometimes about some individual moral rule by which actions can be judged. Intuition does not simply state the moral worth of an action, but also elaborates on this matter.

In the *Iḥyā'*, then, al-Ghazālī recognizes the place of reason, revelation and mystical intuition in moral life. In the *Munqidh*, too, be approves of all of them: concerning his realization of various moral truths during the period of his retirement from the world, he says that he realized them (a) partly by immediate experience, (b) partly by demonstrative knowledge and (c) partly by acceptance in faith.[48] Regarding the philosophers' ethical teachings he says, "If they are reasonable in themselves and supported by proof, and if they do not contradict the Book and the Sunna, then it is not necessary to reject them."[49] Here he is approving both reason and the Sharī'a (revelation). The function of reason in understanding revelation is repeated in this work: the prophets are the healers of spiritual diseases or vices. The way in which ritual prayer and other positive precepts of the revealed Law effects purification of the soul is known to them not by reason, but by the light of prophecy, which is higher than reason. One must accept their statements as true. The only function of reason is to inform men that the prophets are healers of spiritual diseases, for being unable to apprehend what is knowable by the eye of prophecy, reason entrusts us to prophetic revelation. It cannot proceed further. In what lies beyond, it has no part, save the understanding of what the prophets communicate to it.[50] Regarding knowledge of good and evil by direct experience al-Ghazālī says that the prophets have had a direct insight into the truths conveyed through revelation; should any other person walk along their way, he too will come to know something of truth by direct vision.[51]

Thus in a work (i.e. the *Iḥyā'*) whose composition started in the beginning of the ṣūfī period of al-Ghazālī's life, and in a book (i.e.

the *Munqidh*) composed a year or two before his death, he speaks of the place of reason, revelation and mystical intuition in morality.[52] A similar view is found in the works of the mid-ṣūfī period.

From some of the points discussed above there emerges a fact about al-Ghazālī's ethics, namely, its dependence upon religion. This point can only be touched on at the present stage of this study but it will become clear later. As noted above, the study of Islamic religious beliefs is an aspect of al-Ghazālī's ethics. Characteristically religious acts such as ritual prayer, fasting and so on form a necessary part of his moral theory. Actions directed towards one's fellow-men, which are usually regarded as moral acts, are included in his ethics mainly as duties commanded by God and His Prophet. All good actions should aim at the improvement of the soul so that it may attain well-being in the *hereafter*. These and other similar ideas of al-Ghazālī (e.g. the necessity of both reason and the Sharī'a as sources of moral obligation) integrate his ethics with religion. Moral acts are not distinguished from religious acts. The more religious an individual is, the more moral he will also be.

THE COMPOSITE CHARACTER OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S MORAL THEORY

An important feature of al-Ghazālī's moral theory is its composite nature. This can be shown by an investigation into the sources of his ideas. Such an investigation can by no means be exhaustive, yet his own statements about these sources, and also the study of his thought, enable one to see clearly the composite character of his theory. The chief source of al-Ghazālī's ideas is the writings of his ṣūfī predecessors, which he studied just before his conversion to ṣūfism. He mentions them as al-Makkī's *Qūt*, al-Muḥāsibī's works, various scattered statements (*mutafarriqāt*) of al-Junayd, ash-Shiblī and Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī, and other discourses of leading mystics.[53] The *Qūt* seems to be one of the sources through which al-Ghazālī became acquainted with these scattered sayings,[54] for this work contains more sayings of mystics and saints than any other of the above-mentioned books. Although al-Ghazālī does not mention al-Qushayrī's *Risāla* and al-Ḥujwīrī's *Kashf* as his sources, it is certain[55] that he is influenced by these also. It is also certain that al-Ghazālī is influenced by Abū Nu'aym's *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, as in the *Iḥyā'* he recommends the study of it.[56] All these books were

primarily concerned with well-being in the hereafter. Al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī aimed at presenting a complete system of ethics dealing with this problem. They sought to bring about a perfect reconciliation between ṣūfism and the tenets of Islam. Al-Ghazālī is influenced by them in two ways, namely, in the main trend of most of his teachings, and in the ideas and illustrations which he uses in his works: very often their teachings form only the basis of his thought and sometimes they are directly borrowed to serve his own purposes. Their ethics, however, was, in al-Ghazālī's view, incomplete in scope and defective in exposition.[57] He therefore sets out to construct a complete system of morals, free from defects, but on the lines suggested in the works of his ṣūfī predecessors. The special characteristics of his greatest ethical work, the *Iḥyā'*, is described as follows:

> "It is true that men have written several works on some of these matters, but this one differs from them in five ways. First, by clarifying what they have obscured and elucidating what they have treated casually. Second, by arranging what they have disarranged and organizing what they have scattered. Third, by condensing what they have elaborated and correcting what they have approved. Fourth, by deleting what they have repeated and verifying what they have set down. Fifth, by determining ambiguous matters which have hitherto been unintelligible and never dealt with in any work, for although all have followed one course, there is no reason why one should not proceed independently and bring to light something unknown..."[58]

Al-Ghazālī sometimes makes these improvements by drawing upon materials from revealed books and the Sunna of the Prophet (may peace be upon him!). The revealed scriptures by which he is influenced are the Qur'ān, the Gospel, the Torah, the Psalms and the Leaves of Abraham. Statements quoted from the last three are few.[59] References to the Gospel are many. Al-Ghazālī's occasional statement "I saw in the Gospel that..." proves that he read the Arabic translation of the Gospel text.[60] Of all the revealed books it is the Qur'ān on which he depends most. As for the detailed knowledge of the Sunna he seems to have acquired it from the Ṣūfīs' works, especially the *Qūt* of al-Makkī — which contains a large number of prophetic traditions[61] — and also from his study of a few books on Tradition. It is true that al-Ghazālī is not a great scholar in the science of Tradition, but in his days as a student he studied al-Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Abū Dāwūd's *Sunan* and also Aḥmad Shaybānī's

work on the Prophet's birth.[62] There are also indications in the *Iḥyā'* that, while composing this work, al-Ghazālī consulted the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī and the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim. A systematic study of the two latter works, however, was not undertaken until the closing days of his life.[63] The ethical teachings of the Qur'ān and Tradition are sometimes kept intact, but frequently they are explained by reason and also given mystical colour.

Al-Ghazālī also seems to have derived ethical ideas from philosophical works on morals. In his time two kinds of these works were available in the Islamic world. One was the Arabic translations of Greek works on moral philosophy, and the other was the works of the Muslim philosophers and of a few Christian translators and commentators, such as Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī and Qusṭā Ibn Lūqā. Al-Ghazālī seems to have had direct acquaintance with the ethical works of Plato and Aristotle for in the *Munqidh* he speaks of Aristotle's criticism of Socrates and Plato and his difference from them,[64] and this indicates that al-Ghazālī studied their works. There is no proof of his direct acquaintance with the later Greek works on moral philosophy but he seems to have known them through the works of the Muslim thinkers.[65] As for the ethical works of the Muslim philosophers it seems certain that he studied most of them. He himself said that he thoroughly studied the works of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. He speaks precisely about the content of the *Rasā'il* of the Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā.[66] Sometimes he criticizes ar-Rāzī's view. Some passages of his works have their parallels in the works of al-Kindī and Miskawayh. All this suggests that he studied the ethical works of these Muslim philosophers.

Many of al-Ghazālī's ethical ideas are similar to those in philosophical works. The similarity is mostly in meaning, and in a few cases textual. Because of these similarities, one tends to say that al-Ghazālī derived materials from these works. Some of his contemporaries did in fact maintain this view. He replied to them saying:

> "They think that these statements[67] are taken from the works of the ancient philosophers (*al-awā'il*), whereas the fact is that some of them are the product of reflections which occurred to me independently — it is not improbable that one foot should fall upon another foot-print — while others come from the revealed Scriptures, and in the case of the majority the sense [though perhaps not the actual words] is found in the works of the mystics.

Suppose, however, that the statements are found only in their [philosophers'] books. If they are reasonable in themselves and supported by proof, and if they do not, contradict the Book and the Sunna, then it is not necessary to reject them. If we open this door, if we adopt the attitude of rejecting every truth that the mind of a heretic has apprehended before us, we should be obliged to reject much that is true".[68]

In the first half of this passage al-Ghazālī denies that he took any of his statements from the philosophers' works. In the second half he is only expressing his view on the parallels of these statements in these works, i.e. on those ethical statements in them which are true, in an obvious effort to remove people's misconception that any statement, whether good or bad, which occurs in philosophic writings, should be rejected. This is also clear from the context of the passage. This attitude he explains in other passages, saying that their ethical works contain true and false principles. The true principles have their sources in the teachings of the prophets and the mystics; the false principles are the philosophers' own, and they mingled those with the true principles from an evil motive, namely, to deceive men of weak intelligence, to make them readily accept their own false views. All this he puts in the following passage:

"... all their [philosophers'] discussion of it [ethics] consists in defining the qualities and character of the soul, and mentioning the various genera and species of these qualities, and the method of remedying and mortifying them. This they have borrowed from the teaching of the mystics, ... In their spiritual striving these mystics have learnt about the virtues and vices of the soul and the defects in its actions, and what they have learnt they have clearly expressed. The philosophers have taken over this teaching [of the mystics] and mingled it with their own disquisitions, furtively using this embellishment to sell their falsehood more readily. Assuredly there was in the age of the philosophers, as indeed there is in every age, a group of those godly men of whom God never denudes the world."[69]

Because of this amalgamation, al-Ghazālī says, the sound elements in philosophic works have not become unsound, nor have the unsound become sound. No harm is done, so long as one accepts the sound elements and rejects the unsound. It is only scholars who can do this. Common men make two mistakes when they read the works

of the philosophers; (a) sometimes, because they see the true ethical statements first in these works and they have the impression that philosophers preach false theories, they consider true statements as false and reject them. They fail to realize that philosophers are false not on account of these true statements, but on account of other statements in their works on ethics and on other disciplines. (b) Sometimes, having seen true ethical statements derived from prophets and mystics in the philosophers' works, common men form a high opinion of these works and accept all that is in them, even statements that are false. Common men must therefore be prevented from reading these books. There is, however, no harm if scholars study them and, separating truth from falsehood, accept the former and convey it to those who need guidance. But scholars must refrain from reading them in the presence of common men lest they may imitate them "just as the snake charmer must refrain from touching the snake in front of his small boy because he knows that the boy imagines that he is like his father and will imitate him, and must even caution the boy by himself showing caution in front of him".[70]

Thus al-Ghazālī finds no harm in accepting those ideas which are sound in the philosophers' works.[71] As a scholar of the highest order, he could be expected to be able to distinguish between the true and the false. The question now arises as to whether he really adopted the views from their works. In a passage quoted above he answers in the negative; he says (a) the majority of those of his ethical teachings which are similar to philosophers' views come from the works of the ṣūfīs. This statement may be true if such teachings are also present in those works which he thoroughly studied. In fact, if one carefully studies the works of al-Makkī and al-Maḥāsibī, one finds in them the majority of these teachings. The only difference is that in these works the teachings are not as clear, elaborate and systematic as in al-Ghazālī or in the philosophers. (b) Al-Ghazālī also says that some of his views which are similar to the philosophers' ideas were taken from the revealed books. There can be no doubt about this, for philosophic doctrines such as that of the mean are also taught by the Qur'ān and the Sunna. There are, however, some teachings of al-Ghazālī which are found, in a more or less similar form, only in the works of the philosophers. Examples of these are his conceptions of the faculties of the soul, the root virtues and their sub-divisions and so forth. (c) He may have claimed that such views were the product of his own reflections, and that their similarity to philosophers' ideas was only accidental. To ascertain

the truth of this claim it is necessary to mention the nature of independent reflection in the case of moral matters.

At the level of reflection, the moral law is not regarded as something outside man, as beyond his understanding. Morality is not a law imposed upon him by God or His apostle or even by his fellow-men; it is a law that he himself can understand and choose for guidance because he sees that it makes good sense to do so; he himself discovers the rightness or wrongness of an action through reason. Various factors influence the mind in this task; perhaps indirect supernatural guidance, certainly the customs and ethos of his own society and the sympathy which is a part of man's natural mental equipment. The customs of his own group are the data on which his reason works, for even the most original moralist does not begin a new moral system from the start; he begins by criticism of what is there already. In his reflection he is likely to make discoveries of different kinds. He will discover that certain customs which were formerly useful are now no longer so but may even be detrimental to the welfare of his society. So by his insight and reflection he rejects some of the accepted rules of morality. Even when the individual at the level of reflection does not himself make an active examination of the standards of his group, and does not deliberately choose to accept or reject them, he still feels that he can, when he chooses, decide for himself in moral matters. If the above is the nature of independent reflection in the case of moral problems, it may be said that while thinking independently al-Ghazālī made an active and deliberate examination of the customs of his time. Indeed, his works abound with criticisms of the moral rules given by the various groups of intellectuals. Existing moral thoughts and practices formed the data of his reasoning. In his examination of the ethical works of the philosophers he found many ideas contained in them to be true and useful to man's final aim, happiness in the hereafter. (a) Many of these true ideas agreed with those in the writings of the ṣūfīs; so he took them from these writings. (b) Some agreed with the teachings of the revealed scriptures; and he took them from these books. He preferred these mystical and religious sources because he was a ṣūfī and an extremely religious man. (c) Some were not present in the ṣūfīs' works or in the revealed books but were upheld by his reasoning; so he took them as the product of his own thinking and could say that their similarity with philosophers' views was only accidental. Some ideas in the philosophers' works, however, he found to be detrimental to man's well-being in

the hereafter, and he rejected them as false. It can be said, therefore, that he took[72] some ideas, i.e. those falling under (c), from the philosophers' works on ethics, but that he took them on the authority of his own reason. Thus he was correct in claiming that some of his teachings which agreed with philosophic ethics were the outcome of his independent reflection.

Thus al-Ghazālī derived his ethics from the three sources mentioned above. There may be some other source or sources from which he took ideas, but these three may be regarded as his main sources, as discoverable from his own statements and from the contents of his teachings. These materials he added to his own thoughts and experiences. It is not that the ideas taken from various sources exist side by side unorganized; they are not mutually contradictory in their nature (for only those principles in philosophic works are accepted which are in harmony with religion and reason; the mystical ideas do not contradict the religious ideas, for mysticism is only an extension of religious teachings). On the contrary, with his extraordinary genius, al-Ghazālī was able to mingle the various elements and systematize them into a well-ordered and consistent whole. In the process of systematization every element underwent changes and received something of the special characteristics of every other element: the philosophic element became more religious and also mystical; the religious element was enriched and enlivened with life-giving mystical spirit; the mystical element became clearer, more rational, conceptual and organized.[73] On the whole, however, this mystical element remained dominant and hence al-Ghazālī's ethical theory may be characterized as primarily mystical in nature. In this way his ethics achieved a composite nature.[74]

NOTES

1. M. Riḍā, ***Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī,*** Cairo, 1924, p. 52.
2. Tāj ad-Dīn as-Subkī, ***Ṭabaqāt ash-Shāfi'iyya l-Kubrā,*** Cairo, 1324/1906, III, 36, IV, 103.
3. Margaret Smith, ***Al-Ghazālī, the Mystic,*** London, 1944, p. 15; W. Montgomery Watt, ***Muslim Intellectual,*** Edinburgh, 1963, p. 21.
4. Ibn Khallikān, ***Wafayāt al-A'yān wa Anbā' Abnā' az-Zamān,*** ed. by Muḥammad Muḥyī ad-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, n.d., II, 342.
5. Subkī, ***Ṭabaqāt,*** IV, 109.
6. ***M.D.,*** pp. 20—22.
7. Duncan B. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Ghazzālī with especial reference to his religious experiences and opinions", ***JAOS,*** XX (1899), 78, 82.

8. Watt, *Intellectual*, p. 51; "Al-Ghazālī", *EI* [2], II, 1039.
9. George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-century Baghdad", *BSOAS*, XXIV (1961), 40; Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Fātiḥ Qarībāllah, "The Influence of al-Ghazālī upon Islamic Jurisprudence and Philosophy with special reference to the period 1100—1400 A.D.", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1969, pp. 66—71.
10. *M.D.*, pp. 22—27.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 27—29.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 29—30.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 30—32.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 44—45.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 54—55.
16. Farid Jabre, "La Biographie et L'oeuvre de Ghazali reconsidérées à la lumière des Tabaqat de Sobki", *MIDEO*, I (1954), 91—94; Macdonald, "Life", pp. 88, 98; Al-Ghazzālī", EI, II, 146.
17. *M.D.*, pp. 56—59; Watt, *Intellectual*, pp. 43, 140—143; "The Study of al-Ghazālī, *ORIENS*, XIII—XIV (1960—61), 129—130. Watt argues against Jabre and Macdonald and his arguments seem to be valid.
18. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, Edinburgh, 1963, p. 116; "Al-Ghazālī," p. 1039; *Intellectual*, pp. 145—46.
19. *M.D.*, pp. 60—61.
20. Ibn Taymiyya in his *Muwāfaqat Ṣaḥīḥ al-Manqūl li-Ṣarīḥ al-Ma'qūl*, ed. by 'Abd al-Ḥamīd and Ḥamīd, Cairo, 1951, I, 94 maintains that during his closing days al-Ghazālī abandoned mysticism and turned to the Traditionists. He bases his view on the fact that al-Ghazālī died while studying the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī. Zakī Mubārak in his *al-Akhlāq 'ind al-Ghazālī*, Egypt, 1968, p. 290, regards this opinion as probably correct on the grounds that al-Ghazālī did not adhere constantly to one view. However, al-Ghazālī's real object in studying Tradition at this time seems to have been to perfect his ṣūfism, for in the *D*, I, 19 he stated that ṣūfism could not be perfect without a thorough knowledge of Tradition. It is well-known that he was not a great scholar in this field. That he was a ṣūfī until his death is evident from *I.'A.*, pp. 18—19, 80 where he extoled the mystics; this book was completed only a few days before his death. Sometimes it is also maintained that in the short period between the composition of *M.D.* and his death, al-Ghazālī abandoned Ash'arism in favour of Neoplatonism. Watt ("A Forgery in al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt", *JRAS*, 1949, pp. 17—18, 21; "The Authenticity of the Works Attributed to al-Ghazālī", *ibid.*, 1952, pp. 28—29, 32; "Study", pp. 124—25; *Intellectual*, p. 150) examines the alleged instances of Neoplatonism in al-Ghazālī's works of this period, and finds him keeping to the Ash'arite system in its broad lines, although on certain minor points he passes from Ash'arism to ṣūfism. The most powerful proof of this conclusion is that in the *I.'A.*, whose composition was completed only a few days before al-Ghazālī's death, the Ash'arite view of theological problems is given. In denying Neoplatonism in al-Ghazālī's later works, Watt refers to those theological doctrines which were regarded as peculiar to Islamic Neoplatonists (see "Forgery", pp. 21, 14, 17); he does not deny their influence upon al-Ghazālī on other problems such as those of the soul, heart, etc. (see *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15; "Authenticity", pp. 31—32). Jabre, who has researched widely in al-Ghazālī's works, also maintains (*La notion de certitude selon Ghazali, dans sez origines psychologiques et historiques*, Paris, 1958, p. 171) that al-Ghazālī was an Ash'arite throughout.
21. For the names of the authentic works of the mystical period, their chronological order and those parts of some of them whose authenticity has been doubted see Watt, "Authenticity", pp. 24—25; "Forgery", pp. 5—22; George F. Hourani, "The Chronology of Ghazālī's Writings", *JAOS*, LXXIX (1959), 225—33; 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Badawī, *Mu'allafāt al-Ghazālī*, Cairo, 1961. Badawī gives in detail his views concerning the books and manuscripts attributed to al-Ghazālī.
22. I, 2—3.
23. pp. 71, 74, 76.
24. p. 76.
25. This is also recognized by A.J. Wensinck in his *Semietische Studien uit de Nalatenschap*, Leiden, 1941, p. 167, and by Watt in his "Study", p. 128, where he argues against Jabre, who holds that the central problem of al-Ghazālī's life and thought was certitude, or how to attain certain truth about the main truths of Islam. This, as explained in the preceding section, was certainly his central problem immediately after his first intellectual crisis; in regarding this as the main problem of al-Ghazālī's whole life, Jabre seems to have over-emphasised al-Ghazālī's earlier thought and neglected his ideas during the mystical period.
26. Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-Qūlub*, Cairo, 1961, I, 8—9; al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, Eng. trans. by R.A. Nicholson, Leyden, 1911, pp. 86, 115. In the *M.'A*, p. 54, al-Ghazālī used *'ilm al-akhlāq* for ethics. Here he seems to have followed Avicenna, since the classification of the practical science given here agrees with Avicenna's division of the practical sciences in his *ash-Shifā'*: Introduction, ed. by Ibrāhīm Madkūr, 1952, pp. 12—14, and in his *Fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya* in *Tis' Rasā'il fī l-Ḥikma wa ṭ-Ṭabī'iyyāt*, Cairo, 1326/1908, pp. 105, 107—108. *M.'A.* contains much philosophic ethics. There are reasons for holding that the time of its composition is before al-Ghazālī's conversion to ṣūfism. This date is also regarded as correct by Watt in his *Intellectual*, p. 150 and by Havazurah lazaruth-Yafeh in his article "The Writings of al-Ghazālī" (which is an adapted chapter of his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "The literary Character of al-Ghazālī's Writings: studies in the language of Al-Ghazālī)" *SI*, 1966, p. 112, *n. 2.* Hourani ("Chronology" p. 228) thinks it very likely that al-Ghazālī set out to write a *M.'A.* in Baghdad in 1095 but that the writing was probably postponed; it was written after he had become a ṣūfī. The reasons he gives for this suggestion are not convincing. Hikmat Hachem in *Critère de l'action*, Paris, 1945, xii—xv, argues for a date after *M.D.* Hourani ("Chronology", p. 229) regards this date as improbable, and Watt ("Authenticity", p. 38) proves that the genuine parts of *M.'A.* cannot belong to this stage, and that it is only the spurious passages which must be subsequent to the *D*.
27. pp. 134—36.
28. p. 38.
29. *Iḥyā' al-'Ulūm*, 2d ed. by 'Uthmān Amīn, Cairo, 1949, pp. 102—103; *al-Milla wa Nuṣūṣ Ukhrā*, ed. by Muhsin Mahdi, Beirut, 1968, pp. 69—70.
30. *D*, I,1 5; cf. Watt, "Reflections on al-Ghazālī's Political Theory *GUOST*, XXI, 14, 17, 18, 22.
31. However, those jurisprudents, who do not devote themselves exclusively to the

science of jurisprudence but are employed in the science of the soul and the observance thereof, are regarded as learned men of the hereafter (*'ulamā' al-ākhira*). The five well-known and widely followed Muslim jurisprudents — Abū Ḥanīfa, ash-Shāfi'ī, Mālik, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and Sufyān ath-Thawrī — are included among them; see *D,* I, 22—26.

32. *D,* I, 16—18; *J,* p. 24; *A,* p. 65; cf. Watt, "Reflections" pp. 17, 18, 23; Macdonald, "Al-Ghazzālī", p. 147.
33. *D,* I, 120, 146; cf. Watt, *Intellectual,* pp. 132—33.
34. *D,* IV, 272, 273, III, 343; *K.* p. 746.
35. *D.* III, 334, IV, 119, II, 215.
36. *D,* III, 8.
37. *D,* IV, 139. This has also been recognized by Mubārak and M. Umaruddin. See Mubārak, *Akhlāq,* pp. 118, 116, 108; Umaruddin, *The Ethical Philosophy of Al-Ghazzālī,* 2d ed. Lahore, Pakistan, 1970, pp. 262, 209.
38. *A,* p. 227; *D,* IV, 314—15.
39. *D,* IV, 119—21.
40. On the basis of *M.'I.*, ed. by S. Dunyā, Cairo, 1961, pp. 193—94 Michael Marmura ("Ghazālī on Ethical Premises", *PF* (N.S.), I (1969), 393—403) correctly shows al-Ghazālī's agreement with Avicenna in denying acts' intrinsic moral value. He, however, is not accurate in saying (*ibid.*, pp. 394—95) that al-Ghazālī's ethis is not teleological and hence that it differs from Avicenna's which is teleological in nature. Indeed, not only al-Ghazālī's ethical theory but also his view of nature is teleological, for he believes that God created every object so that it may serve some end or purpose; see *D,* IV, 78.
41. *I.I'.*, p. 75; *M.U.*, I. 56—60.
42. Cf. Hourani, "Two Theories of Value in Mediaeval Islam", *MW,* L (1960), 270—71.
43. The *D* is divided into four parts each of which is called a "quarter" (*rub'*). Each part or "quarter" is sub-divided into ten parts called "books". For the reasons for a four-fold division of this work see *D,* Preface; Nabih Amin Faris, "The Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn of al-Ghazāli", *PAPS,* LXXI (1939), 17.
44. *M.U.*, I, 9.
45. *D,* I, 15.
46. *D,* III, 15, 14. The same point is made, but much more briefly, in *I.I.'*, p. 89 and *M.U.*, I, 62—63. In this latter work (I, 5—6, 62—63) ethics is included in religious sciences (*'ulūm dīniyya*); the value of reason in ethics, however, is clearly recognized.
47. *D,* III, 15.
48. *M.D.*, pp. 68—71.
49. *M.D.*, p. 41.
50. *M.D.*, pp. 69, 70, 77—78, 79, 80, 83.
51. *M.D.*, pp. 81, 83.
52. Cf. D.C. Moulder, "The First Crisis in the Life of al-Ghazālī", *IS,* XI. No. 2 (1972), 120—22; Hourani, "The Dialogue between al-Ghazālī and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World", *M W,* XLVIII (1968), 310—11; Watt, *Intellectual,* pp. 68, 150; Macdonald, "Al-Ghazzālī", p. 146.
53. *M.D* ., p. 54.
54. Cf. Ali Hasan Abdel-Kader, *The Life, Personality and Writings of al-Junayd,* London, 1962, p. 55.

55. Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt,* IV, 126, where he says that al-Ghazālī made much use of the *Risāla.*
56. *D,* IV, 355; *infra,* p. 90.
57. Cf. Smith, "The Forerunner of al-Ghazālī", *JRAS,* 1936, pp. 65—78 where she discusses al-Ghazālī's indebtedness to al-Muḥāsibī; she says that al-Muḥāsibī was the most prolific writer of all the ṣūfīs whose works al-Ghazālī studied and that al-Ghazālī owes more of his teachings to him than has been generally realized. A.J. Arberry, *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam,* London 1950, p. 68 where he says: "... the book [al-Makkī's *Qūt*] is of primary importance, as being the first — and a very successful — attempt to construct an overall design for orthodox sufism; like al-Muḥāsibī, Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī was carefully studied by al-Ghazālī and exercised considerable influence on his mode of thought and writing."
58. *D,* I, 4.
59. Nowhere does al-Ghazālī mention that he has ever read the Leaves of Abraham. He has learnt about them from Dāwūd Ibn Hilāl (*D* [a], III, 199), from the Qur'ān (87:19, 53:36—37), and also from the works of his ṣūfī predecessors, especially the *Qūt*, In the *Qūt* (I, 192, 280, II, 167, 331, 348) references to the previous revealed books start with such expressions as "It is related to us in some Traditions that ...", "They narrated to us in the *Isrā'īliyāt* ...", "And in the *Isrā'īlī* account ...", and so on.
60. *A.W.*, p. 58; *D,* IV, 62. S.M. Zwemer in his "Jesus Christ in the Ihya of al-Ghazali", *MW,* VII (1917), 144 says that it is uncertain what version of the Gospel text al-Ghazālī read, but that there is little doubt that it was the Gospel according to Matthew from which he quoted. Smith (*Mystic,* pp. 115—22) suggests other Gospels. Contrary to al-Ghazālī's own statement, Constance E. Padwick says "... although some of them [al-Ghazālī's references to Christ] approach the text of St. Matthew, and two ... use the actual words of that Gospel, these are not the citations of a scholar with the Gospel before him"; see her art. "Al-Ghazali and the Arabic Versions of the Gospels", *MW,* XXIX (1939), 130.
61. Since his ṣūfī predecessors used to support their teachings by Traditions, without examining their validity, many Traditions in their works were spurious. cf. Rashid Ahmad, "Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushairī as a Theologian and Commentator", *IQ,* XIII (1969) 56—57, 65—66. Because al-Ghazālī copied from their books, many Traditions in his books also are in fact false. Moreover there are evidences that he had the habit of writing Traditions from memory (cf. Macdonald, "Life", p. 76; Qarīballah, "Influence", p. 4); in doing this he could not escape from error altogether. The spurious Traditions in his *D* are collected in Subkī's *Ṭabaqāt,* IV, 145—82.
62. Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt,* IV, 109, 105, 110—111, 127.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 111.
64. pp. 32, 53; also see *T,* pp. 4—5.
65. Simon van den Bergh in his two articles, "The 'Love of God' in Ghazali's *Vivification of Theology*", *JSS,* I (1956), 305—21 and "Ghazali on 'Gratitude towards God' and its Greek Sources", *SI,* VII (1957), 77—98, claims to have found the sources of some of al-Ghazālī's mystical thought in the ethical works of the Stoics and the Neoplatonists. In "Sources", p. 88, he states that "Ghazali was acquainted either directly or more probably indirectly with these

works". It is true that some of these works in their Arabic translations were available in the Islamic world in al-Ghazālī's time, but he never mentioned any of the later Greek works on morals in any of his books, so that there is no indication of his being directly acquainted with them. Badawī in his article, "Al-Ghazālī wa Maṣādiruhu l-Yūnāniyya" in *Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī fī dh-Dhikrā al-Mi'awiyya at-Tāsi'a li-Milādihi*, ed. by Zakī Najīb Maḥmūd, Cairo, 1961, pp. 221—37, tried to relate al-Ghazālī's thought on a mystical virtue with Hermetic wisdom. Here too there is no proof of his direct acquaintance with it; see *infra*, p. 176, n. 101.

66. *M.D.*, pp. 41, 53.
67. These statements are described in *M.D.*, p. 40 as "... some of the statements made in our published works on the sciences of the secrets of religion (*ba'ḍ al-kalimāt al-mabthūtha fī taṣānifinā fī 'ulūm asrār ad-dīn*) ..." The works mentioned here obviously refer to al-Ghazālī's ethical writings. That by 'these statements' he means ethical statements is evident from the fact that he speaks of them when commenting on the philosophers' ethics.
68. *M.D.*, pp. 40—41.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 38. Al-Ghazālī's belief about the sources of the good elements in the philosophers' ethical works seems to be true only partially. These works doubtless contain citation from pious men's sayings. He mentions in *M.D.*, p. 41 how the Brethren of Purity cited in their treatises a great number of Qur'ānic verses, prophetic tradition, early Muslims' accounts and mystics' sayings. In his *Tahdhīb*, Miskawayh, besides citing Qur'ānic verses, quoted or reproduced prophetic traditions in fifteen places, Abū Bakr's saying in two places, and al-Ḥasan's statement in one place; he mentioned the prophets Abraham and Adam in one place, the Companion 'Alī in four places; he appealed to the Sharī'a in twenty-three places and to the Sunna in one. Thus the philosophers took many of their ideas from the prophets and the mystics. But their works contain at least a few ideas which are sound even in al-Ghazālī's opinion (for these are found in his works also) but are not found in the ṣūfīs' books. Hence his view that all that is good in the philosophers' writings comes from this source is not wholly correct. Nevertheless since many of the good principles in the philosophers' works are indeed taken from prophets and mystics, one may disagree with the statement of T.J. De Boer in his "Ethics and Morality (Muslim)", *ERE*, V, 508 that al-Ghazālī is wrong in saying that the philosophers took ethical theories from the prophets and the mystics. As for al-Ghazālī's view of the philosophers' intention in incorporating in their books conceptions from prophets and mystics, it is not in agreement with the general opinion which is that the philosophers' intention was to reconcile the Islamic tenets with the theories they received from the Greeks.
70. *M.D.*, pp. 39—43.
71. Al-Ghazālī seems to have made a distinction between philosophic ethics and philosophers' works on ethics. These works contain theories concerning the qualities of the soul, and their mortification and so on, and also other theories associated with them. By philosophic ethics he seems to have meant only the first category of theories; thus his view concerning the scope of philosophic ethics is rather narrow (see *M.D.* p. 38; *M.F.*, pp. 134—36).The first category of theories is true according to al-Ghazālī. True ideas in philosophers' works on ethics, especially in Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb*, are much more than the false ones.

For a discussion of this see Abul Quasem, "Al-Ghazālī's Rejection of Philosophic Ethics", *IS*, XIII, No. 2 (1974), 111-27; "Al-Ghazālī and Philosophic Ethics" (forthcoming).

72. Al-Ghazālī accepted as true a great part of the material in the ethical works of the philosophers, especially in Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb;* he, however, took this material (for his own system as given in his later works) from other sources such as ṣūfīs' writings and so on. A small part of the contents of the philosophers' works he rejected as false. R. Walzer and H.A.R. Gibb have said ("Akhlāķ", *EI*[2], I, 326, 328) that al-Ghazālī in the *D fully* accepted philosophical ethics in the form given to it by Miskawayh. This statement is not accurate for careful comparison shows that even where al-Ghazālī agrees with the philosophers he does not agree with them on all that they have said. The ideas set forth in the second 'book' of the third part of the *D* are in closer agreement with philosophers' works on ethics than those set forth in other places. Agreement is greater between the tenth section of this 'book' and the ninth section of the second discourse of Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb*, both dealing with children's training in good character. Even here too one only finds al-Ghazālī's partial agreement with Miskawayh. Comparison of the entire *Tahdhīb* with the *D* will show that approximately one-third of the material in the former work was unacceptable to al-Ghazālī. Mubārak (*Akhlāq*, pp. 64—71), Shiblī Nu'mānī (*Al-Ghazālī*, Lahore, Pakistan, n.d. p. 125), De Boer ("Ethics", p. 508) and Dwight M. Donaldson (*Studies in Muslim Ethics*, London, 1953, pp. 127, 136) maintain that *some* important ethical ideas in the philosophers' works on morals are incorporated in al-Ghazālī's *D*. Watt denies the characteristically Neoplatonic theological doctrines in al-Ghazālī's later works. Concerning ethics he maintains ("Al-Ghazālī", 1040; "Authenticity", p. 45) that al-Ghazālī, after becoming a ṣūfī, rejected *much* of what he had written in the *M.'A.* following philosophic ethics. In his *Intellectual*, pp. 67—68, 150, 192, n. 62) he says that al-Ghazālī *completely* rejected the genuine part of this work which was an attempt to develop the Aristotelian conception of virtue as a mean, These views of Watt do not seem correct. The fact is that only a small amount of the material in the *M.'A.* is rejected by al-Ghazālī. The rest is retained, mostly after some improvement or amendment, but sometimes even intact. The doctrine of the mean which Watt supposes to have been completely rejected is, in fact, central in al-Ghazālī's later works. Comparison of Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb* with the *D* will show that approximately two-thirds of the contents of the former work were acceptable to al-Ghazālī. (For a discussion of the views of Watt and Walzer see Abul Quasem, "Rejection", pp. 111—27; "Al-Ghazālī and Philosophic Ethics" (forthcoming); also see *infra*, chap. iii, sec. 1, especially p. 85). Commenting on al-Ghazālī's relation to philosophy in general during his mystical period, Ibn Taymiyya says that he was influenced by philosophy, and that he expressed philosophical ideas in mystical and religious terms; see his *Naqd al-Manṭiq*, ed. by Ḥamza and aṣ-Sāni', Cairo, 1951, p. 56; *ar-Radd 'alā al-Manṭiqiyyīn*, ed. by al-Kutubī, Bombay, India, 1949, p. 195. In his *Muwāfaqat*, I, 2 he quotes the comment of Abū Bakr Ibn al-'Arabī, a friend and one-time student of al-Ghazālī, that al-Ghazālī had deeply immersed himself in philosophy, and that when he wanted to reject it he could not. This is exactly what Badawī in his "Maṣādiruh" expressly tries to prove by showing the traces of Greek philosophy in al-Ghazālī's mystical writings.

73. Cf. Badawī, "Maṣādiruh", pp. 236—37.
74. A composite theory of ethics is also presented by a contemporary of al-Ghazālī, ar-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1108 A.D.) in his *Dharī'a ilā Makārim ash-Sharī'a.* This theory is mainly an amalgam of philosophic ethics, Islamic religious teachings and a few ṣūfī ideas; the first element, however, seems to be dominant in it. Ẓahīr ad-Dīn al-Bayhaqī in *Tārīkh Ḥukamā' al-Islām,* ed. by Kurd 'Alī, Damascus, 1946, p. 112 described him as a philosopher and theologian. The composite nature of al-Ghazālī's ethics seems to be influenced by this theory. The textual similarity between his *M.'A.* and al-Iṣfahānī's *Dharī'a* is very great; sometimes, however, similar material is put in the two books in two different contexts, to make different points. Because of this striking resemblance 'Abd al-Qādir al-'Aydarūs in his *Ta'rīf al-Iḥyā' bi-faḍā'il al-Iḥyā',* Cairo, n.d., p. 9 wrongly spoke of the *Dharī'a* as a work by al-Ghazālī. Ḥājjī Khalīfa in his *Kashf aẓ-Ẓunūn,* ed. by Sharaf ad-Dīn and Rif'at Bilge, Istanbul, 1941, 1, 827, says that al-Ghazālī made use of the *Dharī'a* so much that he used to carry it with him always. This is also said by C. Brockelmann in his "Al-Rāghib Al-Iṣfahānī", *EI,* III, 1098. The textual similarity between the *Dharī'a* and the *D* and the *K* is also obvious in some places. But in these two works similar material is often found in an elaborate and much more religious and mystical form. Although neither of the two writers mentions the other, and the details of their relationship are not yet known, careful comparison of al-Ghazālī's later ethical works with the *Dharī'a* leaves no doubt that, in combining the good elements in philosophic works on ethics with the Sharī'a, he depends mostly upon this work. Qarīballah in "Influence", pp. 233—34 is wrong in maintaining the contrary, i.e. al-Iṣfahānī's dependence upon al-Ghazālī. He has tried to prove this only by showing a similarity between the former's *Tafṣīl* and the latter's *T, Q, M.'A.* and *M.D.* He is aware of the *Dharī'a* and of Brockelmann's comment on it, but he makes no mention of these.

II
MAN'S NATURE AND AIM

The starting point of al-Ghazālī's ethics is neither virtue and vice as dispositions of the soul, nor the good and evil acts of the body which proceed from them, but the core of man[1] which is the soul. The study of the soul from the moral viewpoint includes the study of its nature, its origin, its return after man's death, the purpose of its creation, the reason for its union with the body, its powers, and the nature of its happiness and misery.[2] The problems of man's nature and his moral aim, which are of utmost importance in al-Ghazālī's ethics, are included in his consideration of the aspects of the soul. His views on these subjects form the basis of his theories of character, virtue and vice, and good and evil acts. Clear understanding of these problems is also indispensable before the commencement of self-training in morals.[3] It is for these reasons that their study is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the beginning of ethics, and such a study is made in the long introduction to the *Kīmiyā'.* In the *Iḥyā',* however, these are discussed, not in the beginning, but in all its four parts (especially in the last two parts, and more particularly in the third, where al-Ghazālī begins the treatment of man's inward self); he adopted this method, despite asserting knowledge of the soul in its different aspects to be the basis of ethics,[4] probably because the learned men for whom it was mainly composed[5] were believed to be capable of gathering together the scattered ideas; but this procedure was abandoned in the *Kīmiyā',* which is addressed to common man.[6] Although the ideas scattered in the *Iḥyā'* and in a few other works are systematically presented in the introduction to the *Kīmiyā',* they require rearrangement under new captions, so that they may be briefly considered here and at the same time serve as the background to subsequent chapters.

THE SOUL AND BODY AND THEIR RELATIONS

Man, al-Ghazālī believes, is created by God as a being composed of a soul, which is known by spiritual insight and of a body. The soul, which is the core of man, is a divine spiritual entity of great subtlety (*laṭīfa rabbāniyya rūḥāniyya*). The terms used by al-Ghazālī for it are *qalb, rūḥ, nafs* and *'aql*. Each term is given two meanings, one meaning is 'the soul', and the other is different for each term.[7] He proves the existence of the soul[8] and condemns the materialists who believe that man is merely a higher type of animal with no lasting spiritual being.[9] The problem of the inmost reality (*sirr*) of the soul was discussed by philosophers; al-Ghazālī, however, avoids its discussion, because this is not permitted by the Sharī'a (on the grounds that it is inapprehensible to most people, and because its knowledge is not necessary for the practice of morality.[10]) He discusses the difference between the soul and the body, and this has a direct bearing on his ethical ideas. The soul, in his view, is a substance (*jawhar*) and not an accident (*'aaḍ*), so that it exists by itself. It is the body which depends upon the soul for its existence and not vice versa. The soul differs from the body in another way: the former belongs to the world of the spirit, while the latter pertains to the material world. Since the characteristics of a material object are not to be found in the soul, it cannot be the subject of the question 'how' or 'what'; the answer to the question of 'what the soul is like' or 'how it exists' is that the soul is not the subject of howness or whatness. The view that the soul is a substance is held by all the ṣūfī doctors, and most orthodox Muslims.[11] Al-Ghazālī observes that the Muslim philosophers also rightly held this view — rightly because religion lends support to it — but they wrongly claimed that they can know this by reason alone and that, therefore, religion is not needed in this respect. By exposing the weaknesses in their rational proofs he concludes that these only give problematic, and not certain, knowledge concerning the soul.[12]

The soul, al-Ghazālī believes, is of the same origin as the angels. Its origin and nature are divine. It is not pre-existent as Plato and others maintained. Each individual soul is created by God in the upper world, the world of the spirits (*'ālam al-arwāḥ*), at the moment when the human seed enters the womb,[13] and the soul is then connected with the embryonic body. This view agrees with that of Avicenna.[14] Having come into being the soul is everlasting. After death the body perishes but the soul survives. The concept of the

everlasting nature of the soul is vital in al-Ghazālī's ethics. To prove that the soul is not affected by death, except that it loses that in which it resides, he explains in many passages the meaning of death and its effect on the body. The naturalists are condemned by him as atheists for their view that the soul dies and does not return to life, and that there is no future life.[15] Muslim philosophers, he observes, rightly believed in the everlasting existence of the soul, but they were wrong in asserting that by reason alone they could know this with certainty. By examining their rational proofs[16] he finds that reason can only prove its possibility; sure knowledge of immortality is only given by religion.[17]

The reason for the soul's coming to the world of the body is not to suffer punishment. Christianity teaches that Adam fell from paradise because of his sin, and that this fall was designed as a punishment for him; owing to his sin there is a taint of sin in every individual, whose place on earth is caused by this sin.[18] Such ideas are not to be found in al-Ghazālī. In one place he only states that Adam's disobedience to God brought to him the misfortune of being expelled from paradise.[19] In another place he states that what caused Adam to fall was something accidental and foreign to his soul, i.e. an act of disobedience; this made him unfit for living near to God, i.e. in paradise, which had been suitable for him in accordance with his essence, which was divine. In order to enable him to acquire that fitness or desert through guidance, God sent him down to this world.[20] This is evident, al-Ghazālī says, from the Qur'ānic verse, "We said: get you down out of it, all together; yet there shall come to you a guidance from Me, and whosoever follows My guidance, no fear shall be upon them, neither shall they sorrow". Every individual soul descends against its nature to this world in order to acquire fitness for paradise, or provision (*zād*) for the hereafter.[21] Its lack of this fitness is not owing to Adam's faults, but because it is created imperfect. This concept of the acquisition of provision and perfection is a Qur'ānic idea which is emphasized by the ṣūfīs. Al-Ghazālī elaborates it in accordance with his theory of the basic natural disposition (*aṣl al-fiṭra*) or basic nature (*ṭab'*) of the soul: since the soul is divine in nature, inclination towards good and aversion from evil are innate in it.[22] At birth, it is a clean and pure substance with the essence of the angels. Inclination towards evil (which is produced in it after the creation of desire) is against its original nature. It is devoid of all knowledge but possesses a capacity for it; this is the characteristic of every human soul. Since its origin

is divine and it is of angelic nature, it has a longing for the upperworld, and to accompany the angels; it feels this world alien to it; (this inclination is, of course, often subdued by an accidental attribute, namely, worldly desire).[23] Thus although the soul is created free from both knowledge and character-trait, it is capable of having both, and in order to acquire them it descends to this world.[24] The question of the instrument of their acquisition leads al-Ghazālī to a discussion of the relationship between the soul and the body, from a moral viewpoint.[25]

Every soul is given a body so that with its help it may acquire provision for its eternal life. The soul is the core of man and the body is merely its instrument for acquiring 'provision' and perfection; the body is very necessary for the soul, and care must be taken of it.[26]

> "It is the soul which knows God, draws near to Him, works for Him, strives towards Him and reveals what is with and before Him; and verily the members are followers, servants, and instruments which the soul employs and uses as a master uses his slave, as a shepherd makes use of his sheep, and a workman his tool. The soul is that which is received by God...; it is that which is veiled from Him...; it is that which is sought, that which is addressed and that which is censured. It is the soul which becomes happy..., and successful...; it is the soul which is disappointed and miserable..."[27]

The soul uses the body as its vehicle. Although a separate substance, it is united with the body through the physical heart. The heart is the first channel of the soul's free use of the body; the relation between the heart and the soul need not be discussed for it has no concern with ethics.[28] Besides assisting the soul as its vehicle, the body also serves it by containing the means to acquire 'provision', consisting of knowledge and action. Everything in the body is the 'assistant' of the soul. Some of these assistants are visible, e.g. the hands, the legs and all other external and internal parts. Others are invisible and are three in number: (a) that which is the source of motive and impulse; motive for attaining what is useful is called desire, and motive to repel what is harmful is named anger. (b) That power (*qudra*) which moves the limbs towards the objects of desire, or against the objects of aversion; it is diffused in all the limbs, particularly in muscles and nerves. (c) That which perceives. This has two divisions; one consists of the five senses and the other of

the five powers located in the five parts of the brain. These powers are imagination (*takhayyul*), i.e. representation, retention (*taḥaffuẓ*), reflection (*tafakkur*), remembrance (*tadhakkur*) and *sensus communis* (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*). The way in which these five powers assist the soul in its preparation for the hereafter is described by al-Ghazālī,[29] and his description is similar to that of Avicenna and al-Iṣfahānī. All these senses and powers are also found in the lower animals. However, there is a power which is peculiar to the human soul, namely, the power of knowledge, which is reason. It knows those realities of this world and the next which are imperceptible to the senses. It also knows the consequences of actions; when the result of an act is perceived as good, the will to do this is produced in the mind.[30] Thus reason assists the soul in two ways. These two functions of reason are almost identical with the functions of the philosophers' theoretical and practical reason,[31] although al-Ghazālī does not divide it in exactly the same way. His opinion on the invisible assistants of the soul is also influenced by the philosophers. In the *Tahāfut* he briefly discusses their theory of animal, human and vegetative souls and approves it on the grounds that these are observable facts not contrary to religion.[32] But his views as expressed in his later works reveal some differences. In these works he calls the limbs, etc. 'the soldiers of the soul' (*junūd al-qalb*) implying thereby that in considering them thus he is following the Qur'ān where the term 'soldiers' occurs; like al-Iṣfahānī, he also quotes a Tradition in which uses of the body for the hereafter are stated.[33] His difference from the Muslim philosophers, who also regarded the body as an instrument used by the soul,[34]. lies in his emphasis upon the body as the instrument of preparation for the hereafter, not for happiness in this world.[35]

Besides the above-mentioned relationship between soul and body, al-Ghazālī speaks of another relationship which is, in essence, the same as interactionism. He says that although soul and body are distinct entities, they affect each other and determine their courses mutually. Applying this idea to ethics, he maintains that every act produces an effect on the soul, provided it is performed deliberately, and this effect forms the quality of the soul. After an act has been repeated for some time, its effect on the soul becomes established. An act performed without conscious deliberation cannot create any effect on the soul. This is the reason why involuntary action has no relevance to ethics. As bodily action influences the soul, so the soul influences the body: if a quality is established in the soul, relevant

bodily action necessarily proceeds from it. Willingness or reluctance in the execution of an act depends on the strength or weakness of the quality. All this is the traditional interaction theory applied to morals. Al-Ghazālī adds to it something more which is very significant: a deed creates some effect on the soul; this effect causes the body to repeat the same deed; this deed again produces some effect on the soul; this effect is added to the previous effect which is now strengthened — the circular (*dawr*) process goes on indefinitely. This theory was employed by Aristotle in his conception of moral virtue.[36] Al-Ghazālī applies it to his whole ethics, for it underlies all basic problems, e.g. the need for devotional acts and avoidance of sin, getting rid of vices by means of opposite deeds, acquisition of virtues through habit-formation, the reason for the occurrence of good and evil acts, and so on. Al-Ghazālī even goes so far as to say that it is for this interaction that the soul is brought to the lower world so that it may acquire perfection by means of bodily acts. Because of the importance of this theory he discusses it in many of his works.[37] Without taking this theory into consideration one cannot properly appreciate al-Ghazālī's ethical ideas; some of them will even appear self-contradictory to those who are unaware of his view on the circular relationship. The interaction theory also underlies al-Makkī's mystical ethics;[38] he, however, neither explained it nor applied it to his ethics in the manner of al-Ghazālī. Since, according to this theory, all acts and qualities, good and bad, proceed from a few basic elements in man's constitution, al-Ghazālī describes these elements in detail.

THE ELEMENTS IN MAN'S CONSTITUTION

In man's constitution there are certain basic elements which determine his nature and from which proceed all his bodily acts and mental qualities. These elements are blended in his constitution (*khilqa, tarkīb, ṭīna*) in such a way that complete freedom from them is impossible; it is only from their evils that man can be free, through moral effort and struggle. Every element has an effect on the constitution, and since the elements are four, the same number of natures exists in every man. This nature is not the same as his *original* nature, for the latter refers to the condition of the soul at the time of its creation, while the former is its condition after birth. The four elements develop not at once, but one after another at different

stages of growth. The element produced first is animality (*bahīmiyya*) which is desire (*shahwa*). Its purpose is to seek the means by which the body, the vehicle of the soul, will remain in sound health and the human species will be preserved. It is responsible for the animal qualities of man, e.g. eating, sleeping and copulating. The second element is bestiality (*sab'iyya*) which is anger (*ghaḍab*). Its purpose is to ward off all that is harmful to the body. Because of this element man possesses the qualities and acts of the ferocious animals, e.g. envy, violence and dispute. If not controlled these two elements cause moral destruction. In some people, however, these are created moderate; this is a gift of God to them. After this, at the age of discrimination (*tamyīz*) which is about seven, a diabolic (*shayṭāniyya*) element is produced. It consists in making use of discrimination to search out the ways of wickedness, and to satisfy anger and desire through guile and deception. This element is responsible for such acts and qualities of man as enmity, guiding people to evil, ostentation, and so on. It is repressed in those who were created with only a moderate degree of desire and anger. This is the reason why the Prophet said that the devil in him submitted to him. Besides the diabolic element in man's constitution, there is also the existence of a devil who is outside man, but who leads him to evil by exciting desire and anger and by giving him evil suggestions.[39]

Last of all is manifested the lordly (*rabbāniyya*) element, the source of the qualities of love of praise, of sovereignty, and of knowledge of various sciences. This element is present in the soul from the time of its creation, by virtue of its being a divine entity; now this element merely becomes manifest. The four elements are set forth in two passages of the *Iḥyā'*; in one of them there is no mention of reason (*'aql*),[40] and in another, although reason is mentioned in addition to these elements, it appears to be identical with the lordly element.[41] In the *Arba'īn*,[42] however, it is clear that reason is a separate power which develops after the manifestation of this element; reason begins to appear at the age of discrimination, gradually develops at the age of maturity (*bulūgh*) and becomes perfect at forty, when man becomes fully man. Al-Ghazālī calls it the sixth sense existing in the soul. It is the essence of the soul, while desire and anger are its accidental states. Reason is a quality of the angels. By following the philosophic tradition he proves that reason is man's essence: the essence of each species is that which is peculiar to it; what is peculiar in man is reason; so it must be his essential nature.[43] Its task is to know realities outside the senses, and the

consequences of actions.

The four elements, then, are responsible for four kinds of nature in every man. They are the principles of all man's inward qualities and outward behaviour. Al-Ghazālī's concept of the lordly element and the diabolic element is parallel to that of al-Makkī in his *Qūt;* the other two elements are only implicit in this book,[44] but are very explicit in the works of the philosophers. Two consequences follow from the above-mentioned ideas of al-Ghazālī. One is that man lies between the lower animals and the angels, since he possesses the natures of both. The more one neglects one's angelic nature, the closer one becomes to the ranks of the lower animals and the devil; this is indicated in Qur'ānic verses. The more one develops it, the more one resembles the angels. To resemble them and thus to be near to God is the goal of moral struggle. This view of al-Ghazālī on man's place agrees with that of al-Iṣfahānī.[45] The other consequence is that the principles of good and evil are present in man's very constitution. None can be free from sin even though he be a saint; to be free from it is only possible for the angels, for they have no carnal desire or anger. This idea is one which al-Ghazālī consistently applies in his ethics.

Closely related to al-Ghazālī's conception of the elements in man's constitution is his theory of the faculties of the soul. The Greek philosophers believed the soul to consist of parts or faculties or powers, and in this they were followed by the Muslim philosophers and by al-Ghazālī. On the question of the number of the faculties, however, the Greeks were not unanimous. Plato conceived of three faculties, and most of the Muslim philosophers accepted this view. Al-Ghazālī adds a fourth faculty, so that in his opinion the parts or faculties (*quwa*) or non-material elements (*ma'ānī*)[46] are four in number. They are the faculty of desire, the faculty of anger, the faculty of knowledge, i.e. reason and "the faculty of justice among these three faculties (*quwwat al-'adl bayna hadhihī th-thalāth*)".[47] The first two faculties taken jointly are often referred to as passion (*hawā*), a term frequently used in the Qur'ān and Tradition. Their combination is also called the carnal soul (*nafs*). Though created in man for his benefit, they are also the sources of evil in him; they are regarded by al-Ghazālī as the touch-stone of evil, i.e., every act to which they are inclined must be regarded as evil.[48]

The reason why justice is introduced by al-Ghazālī as a fourth faculty of the soul is very clear. Plato and the Muslim philosophers regarded justice not as a faculty, but as a virtue which is the

combination of the virtues corresponding to the faculties of reason, desire and anger; al-Ghazālī also calls it a virtue, but regards it, not as a combination of other virtues, but as a virtue corresponding to the faculty of justice.[49] He is led to postulate this faculty by his conception of the nature of passion or the carnal soul, i.e. desire and anger. He believes that they serve the good purposes for which they are implanted in man only when they are within proper limits (to be described later); but their nature is such that they always tend to exceed these limits; they are very rebellious and are purely irrational;[50] in addition, they are often excited by the devil whose business it is to lead man to evil through them — this is why they are called the devil's agent (*ḥizb ash-shayṭān*). It is reason which knows the proper limits and the evil consequences of exceeding them; its task is to order passion to remain within these limits — this is why it is called God's agent (*ḥizb Allāh*) and also God's balance scale on earth; in so doing it will help to prepare the soul for the hereafter.[51] But reason has no power to prevent passions from exceeding their limits. When it develops in man at the time of his maturity, it finds passions very strong in the soul, since they developed much earlier and are strengthened by their repeated satisfaction.[52] Since they are completely irrational they themselves cannot be amenable to reason and the Sharī'a. There must be a faculty capable of enforcing upon them the dictates of these two and keeping them under control (*ḍabṭ*), and this faculty is justice.[53]

> "As for the faculty of justice, its function lies in controlling desire and anger according to the instructions of reason and the Sharī'a...The faculty of justice is a power; it is like an executor who passes on the instructions of reason, while anger is that to which the instructions are passed."[54]

This controlling function of justice and the purely cognitive task of reason are more clearly stated in the *Kīmiyā'*.[55] A human being is given a separate faculty of justice, with the power of keeping passions under control. The lower animals lack this faculty, and the use of reason, and hence they are always guided by their passions. Justice, as a faculty, or power, is sometimes called by al-Ghazālī the motive of religion (*bā'ith ad-dīn*), while the demands of desire and anger he terms the motive of passions (*bā'ith al-hawā*). The two motives are at war with each other in the soul of every sane adult human being.[56] The latter motive can only be weakened by self-training. The reason why Aristotle did not formulate a faculty like

that of justice is linked with his conception of the nature of the appetitive soul. Unlike al-Ghazālī, he believed that although distinct from and often opposed to the rational soul, it has an inner urge to be amenable to reason; hence there was no need to assume any such faculty that would force it to obey reason.[57] Perhaps the same line of thought concerning the natures of appetitive and irascible souls was the cause of Plato's postulating no fourth faculty. The introduction of the faculty of justice by al-Ghazālī is important, for it has a bearing on his theories of root virtues, of mortification and of moral responsibility; concerning moral responsibility he says that since the faculties of justice and reason are not present in children and the insane, they do not know good and evil and cannot control their passions; so they are incapable of refraining from evil, and those who are incapable fall outside the domain of ethics. Even at the age of discrimination, which is about seven, children are not morally responsible to God, because their faculty of guidance has not yet become capable of telling them what is harmful in the next life. However it can tell them what is harmful in this life — this is why they feel ashamed of wrong-doing; — hence at this age they are morally responsible to men.[58]

Besides these four faculties, al-Ghazālī also speaks of another which is higher than reason, and whose effect is immediate experience (*dhawq*). Its chief concern is with the non-sensuous matters of this world and the next, and especially with divine affairs; it also has to do with the deeper meaning of ethical problems.[59] By it man experiences these matters, i.e. knows them directly, without the help of reason and without hearing about them from others. This faculty unlike reason, which is present in all sane adult human beings, develops only in the prophets and those saints who have completely purified their souls. This is the highest power in man.[60] True, it is not mentioned in any of the passages on the four faculties. The reason is that the four faculties are mentioned as the basis of man's root virtues, as that from which these virtues proceed, whereas the faculty of immediate experience is not the basis of any virtue; rather it develops after acquiring all the virtues and getting rid of all the vices. Al-Ghazālī's recognition of this faculty is like that of al-Makkī,[61] while his views on the other four faculties, especially the first three, is in line with that of the philosophers. If these faculties are trained to function properly, they assist man in the pursuit of happiness.[62]

THE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS

Al-Ghazālī's conception of happiness has two aspects, negative and positive. The negative part deals with what is not happiness; its discussion logically comes first, for it prepares the ground for the positive part, which concerns the real nature of happiness. He first attacks the general hedonistic view that the aim of human life is to enjoy the pleasure (*ladhdha*) and delight (*na'īm*) of this world. He considers this view wrong for two reasons. (a) The pleasure of this world lasts for a limited period of time, i.e. until man's death. The duration of this world is not a thousandth part of that of the next, and is indeed incommensurable with it, for it is eternal; eternity is such that if the world is full of grains and a bird picks up one every million years, the grains will all be gone at last, but eternity will suffer no diminution. The life of one hundred years in this world is even less than three days in comparison to the life in the next. Delight for so short a time cannot be man's aim in life.[63] (b) The pleasure of this world is impure; every form of it is imperfect and mixed with pain. Such has been its nature up to the present time, and such will its nature be until doomsday. Pleasure, therefore, cannot be the goal of life.[64] This, however, does not mean that all forms of pleasure are to be condemned in al-Ghazālī's view. On the contrary, he values the pleasures of knowledge,[65] of conversation with God, of intimacy with Him produced from constant remembrance of Him, and of the performance of other good deeds; he regards the pleasure of knowledge of God, His attributes and His wisdom as the greatest of all forms of pleasure. He also approves of the pleasures of lawful sexual intercourse, and of the necessary amount of food, clothing and shelter. What he condemns is seeking the pleasures of this world, physical or intellectual, as the goal of life.[66]

Al-Ghazālī also rejects five other views, each of which regards some particular worldly thing as the goal of life. The first is the view of those peasants and artisans who lack firm roots in religion. They believe that man's object is only to live in this world for some time; so they work hard to acquire food, which they take so that they may get strength to work for it again; this goes on as a routine until their death. (2) The sensualists maintain that man's goal is happiness, and this happiness consists in the gratification of desires for food and sex; the more these are satisfied the greater is the happiness. This view is wrong because it reduces man to the rank of the lower animals and even below it, for some of them can eat and copulate

more than man. (3) Some people say that happiness, the aim of life, lies in possessing enormous wealth; the wealthier one is the happier one becomes. (4) Some people believe that happiness consists in widespread fame. This they acquire by such means as fine clothing and splendid vehicles, or by embellishing the outer walls of their houses. (5) Others believe that happiness lies in respect and influence; so efforts should be made to gain political power for this is the greatest means of commanding respect and gaining influence.[67] In rejecting these views as false al-Ghazālī may have been influenced by al-Fārābī to a certain extent, but Aristotle's influence is more apparent. Aristotle discarded wealth, fame, etc. as happiness, but retained them as unconditional aids to it;[68] al-Ghazālī holds the same opinion, with the only difference that in regarding them as aids he sets a condition to them, namely, that they should not be used more than is necessary.

While in the above views happiness is regarded as something obtainable in this life, there are two views which hold it to be obtainable only in the hereafter. Although al-Ghazālī also looks upon happiness as otherworldly, he rejects these views as wrong. One of these views is that this world is a place of affliction and toil, while the hereafter is the abode of happiness for everyone, whether or not he prepares for it in this life; thus the right thing for man is to kill himself in order to escape from the toil of this world. This belief is ascribed by al-Ghazālī to certain devotee (*'ubbād*) of India who destroy themselves by fire. This is rejected by him because it contradicts the teaching of the Sharī'a that without the relevant works, happiness is impossible to attain; destroying oneself, moreover, is a grave sin which bars man from happiness. The other view is that it is not enough for a man just to kill himself; rather he should first completely get rid of his human qualities (*ṣifāt bashariyya*). With a view to uprooting his faculties of desire and anger he must engage in vigorous mortification. Al-Ghazālī says that as a result of this some men die, while others become insane or fall ill, so that worship becomes impossible. This view is also wrong according to al-Ghazālī because uprooting of desire and anger is neither necessary nor possible. Besides the above-mentioned views on happiness there are, he says, many others; indeed the total number of them is over seventy, but only one is true,[69] and this true view forms the positive aspect of his theory of happiness.

The true view is that the aim of man is otherworldly happiness (*as-sa'ādat al-ukhrawiyya*), which can be obtained if the necessary

preparation for it be made in this life, by controlling the human qualities and not by uprooting them.[70] There are some this-worldly goods which serve as means to otherworldly happiness, and al-Ghazālī says that these can be called forms of happiness (*sa'ādāt*) only metaphorically. Man's conduct will be considered good if it is conducive to happiness in the hereafter.[71] This happiness was the central theme of the teachings of all the prophets, and it is to encourage people to it that all the scriptures were revealed; this is known from the Sharī'a and also from the spiritual insight of the ṣūfīs.[72] Greatness in God's sight lies in achieving otherworldly happiness; those who fail to attain it are worse than the lower animals, for the latter will perish while the former will suffer misery.

Otherworldly happiness has four characteristics, namely, continuity without end, joy without sorrow, knowledge without ignorance, and sufficiency (*ghinā*), after which nothing more is needed for perfect satisfaction.[73] This view al-Ghazālī takes from al-Iṣfahānī, with slight modification. In accordance with the Qur'ān and Tradition he believes that the abode of such happiness is paradise while that of misery is hell. Each man's fate will be declared on the day of resurrection, but the effect of happiness and misery begins immediately after their death. When the deceased is laid in the grave his soul is returned to his body so that he may answer interrogation concerning God's unity and prophethood; on the day of resurrection it will again be returned to *a* body; the resurrected man will thus have both body and soul and be immortal in this form.[74] Bodily resurrection is advocated in those works of al-Ghazālī which were composed after his conversion to ṣūfism, and also in his *Tahāfut* where the philosophers are condemned as atheists[75] for their denial of it; in this work their rational arguments for its impossibility are refuted.[76] Happiness and misery are, according to him, both physical and spiritual. The physical aspect will not fully appear until man enters paradise or hell.[77] Bodily punishment in the grave in the form of bites of snakes and scorpions, as spoken of in Tradition, he explains in the *Kīmiyā'* and the *Arab'īn* as mental pain caused by evil qualities of the soul, whose spiritual form (*mathal rūḥānī*) appears to the deceased's mind.[78] Bodily happiness and misery al-Ghazālī discusses following the Qur'ān and Tradition, for he believes that these can only be known from the Sharī'a. Spiritual happiness he regards as superior to physical happiness; the Sharī'a did not describe spiritual happiness and misery in detail because most people fail to understand them.[79]

Religious scholars did not speak of them for the same reason, or because they themselves could not comprehend them. The philosophers denied bodily happiness and misery, and their rational proofs have been refuted by him.[80] However, they affirmed the existence of happiness and misery as spiritual states, and most of their views about these states he accepts as true; he opposes only their claim that reason alone can give final knowledge of these things; to him these are known with certainty from the Sharī'a.[81] In the works composed during the ṣūfī period of his life, however, he appeals mainly to the spiritual insight (*mushāhada-i-bāṭinī*) of the ṣūfis, including himself[82] — an insight which is higher than reason.[83] A true ṣūfī sees the conditions of the hereafter in his visionary experience (*dhawq-i-mushāhada*); this view he discusses in a separate section entitled "The Vision of Paradise and Hell in This World."[84]

The cause of happiness is not God's pleasure in the virtuous, nor is misery caused by His anger towards the vicious. Al-Ghazālī believes that God is free from change; He is not angry with man's disobedience to Him or pleased with his act of obedience;[85] God's anger and pleasure are spoken of in the Sharī'a in keeping with men's capacity of understanding; the fact is that happiness and misery are caused by the conditions of the soul. If unbelief or vicious qualities are in a man's soul at the time of his death, these bring misery, as necessarily as poison causes death or magnets attract iron. This is the reason for al-Ghazālī's great emphasis upon the improvement of the soul; all virtuous actions are done for the good of the soul.[86]

In accordance with the states of their souls, people in the hereafter will be split into four groups.[87] One group, 'the destroyed', will suffer everlasting misery in hell. This is the technical meaning of destruction (*halāk*) in al-Ghazālī's ethics. But this term is usually used in it in a loose sense of great suffering for a long time. Al-Makkī used it for any suffering in hell, temporary or permanent.[88] The use of destruction to mean the annihilation of being — an anti-Islamic idea — is absent in al-Ghazālī but present in al-Fārābī, who believed that the souls of the ignorant (*bulh*) will perish.[89] Another group, 'the punished', will suffer misery in hell but will later be transferred to paradise. Neither happiness nor salvation (*najāt*) refers to these people's final entry into paradise. A third group, consisting of infidels' children, the insane, and those unaware of religion will be neither in hell nor in paradise, but in *A'rāf*, a place

between these, where there will be no reward or punishment. They are 'the saved'. Salvation technically refers to their condition, i.e. absolute escape from hell but entitlement to no reward. Al-Ghazālī's concept of *A'rāf* is Qur'ānic.[90] In philosophers like Avicenna and al-Fārābī, this concept seems to be absent. However, a state of neither happiness nor misery, but of ease (*rāḥa*) through God's mercy, is recognized by Avicenna for the souls of those ignorant people who are not wicked in this life. Such a state was not recognized by al-Fārābī; he believed that these souls will perish. A fourth group, 'the successful', will pass into paradise without first entering hell. Thus success (*fawz*) consists of two elements, namely, absolute escape from suffering in hell and achievement of reward in paradise. Success is identical with happiness.[91] The term prosperity (*falāḥ*) is also used as synonymous with it.[92] The word salvation in its strict sense as given above is different from all these; al-Ghazālī makes this clear when he says, "By salvation I mean only safety and not happiness or success".[93] But he loosely uses salvation to mean what the other terms mean, and in this he agrees with al-Makkī.[94]

Happiness in paradise has two major grades, lower and higher. The former consists in the sensual pleasures of foods, drinks, company of houris, beautiful clothes, palaces and so on. This grade is appropriate to the lower class of the virtuous referred to as the pious (*abrār, ṣāliḥūn*), the fearers of God (*muttaqūn*) and the people of the right (*aṣḥāb al-yamīn*). The sensual pleasures will perfectly satisfy them, for it is for such pleasures that they prepare in this life. The higher grade of hapiness consists in nearness to God, and gazing upon His glorious face for evermore. The pleasure of vision (*ru'ya*) of God or encounter (*liqā'*) with Him is the highest happiness, the ultimate good and the last of all forms of God's bounty. Nothing in paradise will be as pleasure-giving as this vision. The sensual pleasures are worthless when compared to the pleasure of contemplating the divine beauty. The former resemble the pleasures enjoyed by grazing animals, while the latter is the spiritual pleasure referred to in the 'holy (*qudsī*) Tradition', "I reserved for My virtuous servants what no eye ever saw, no ear ever heard and which never occurred to any man's mind,"[95] and in the Qur'ānic verse, "So no soul knows what is in store for them of that which will refresh the eyes: a reward for what they did.[96] This grade is appropriate to the higher class of the virtuous consisting of prophets and those who are near to them. These latter are usually mentioned as the saints (*awliyā'*), the gnostics (*'arifūn*), the most truthful (*ṣiddīqūn*), those

brought near to God (*muqarrabūn*), the lovers (*muḥibbūn*) and the sincere (*mukhliṣūn*). Each grade of happiness has innumerable sub-grades; the lowest sub-grade of the higher grade touches the highest sub-grade of the lower grade. [97] Most of al-Ghazālī's ideas on the grades of happiness have their source in the Qur'ān and Tradition; in linking them with ṣūfism, however, he is indebted to al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī. [98]

THE MEANS TO HAPPINESS

Happiness is attainable in the hereafter should the necessary preparation for it be made in this life. Making this preparation is equivalent to the acquisition of the 'provision' for which the soul descended to this world of water and clay. There are several forms of good by which a man can prepare for happiness, and these are called means (*wasā'il*). These means are divided by al-Ghazālī into four categories, each of which includes four forms of good; the total number of the means thus amounts to sixteen. Not all the means are of equal importance for happiness: some of them are absolutely necessary and others are only useful; some are very near to happiness while the relation of others to it is comparatively remote. [99] The four groups of means are:

The 'goods' of the soul (*al-faḍā'il an-nafsiyya*)
The bodily 'goods' (*al-faḍā'il al-jismiyya*)
The external 'goods' (*al-faḍā'il al-khārijiyya*)
The 'goods' of divine grace (*al-faḍā'il at-tawfīqiyya*)

The means included in each group are called *faḍā'il*, the plural of *faḍīla*. This term is not used here in its technical sense (which refers to the four root virtues of the soul, together with their sub-divisions) for it is also applied to the last three categories of means, and these are not virtues of the soul. The *faḍīla* is used here in its ordinary sense, expressible by such words as merit, worth, goodness and the like; it simply means good things, worthy things by which man can attain to happiness. Nor is *faḍīla* used here as synonymous with *faḍl* which means *free* gift or gratuity, bounty or grace, [100] although both terms have the same verb-root; the reason is that this meaning, though correct for the last group, is incorrect for the others (since these are not *free* gifts but gifts only in the sense that they are ultimately from God.) The fact that they are all gifts, however, is expressed by using for them another word, *ni'am* (gifts) and by

discussing them in the "Book of Gratitude to God". The first three categories are gifts of God in the sense that they come ultimately from Him; the last group is a *free* gift inasmuch as in three of its four forms it is not in man's control. This view — that the means to happiness are gifts — is significant, for it makes happiness in part a divine gift. This point will become clear from the discussion of all the classes of means.

The goods of the soul are, according to al-Ghazālī, faith (*īmān*) and good character (*ḥusn al-khuluq*). Faith is divided into 'knowledge of revelation' and 'knowledge of practical religion'. Thus faith is regarded here as a synonym of knowledge. Good character is divided into temperance and justice. The former is repression of desire and anger, and the latter is their repression to the extent that neither are all their demands rejected, nor are all fulfilled, but moderation is observed. This is a loose description of good character as opposed to its strict sense, in which it consists of four root virtuous qualities of the soul — wisdom, courage, temperance and justice — together with their sub-divisions. It is described here as consisting of the last two qualities in order to keep the number of the soul's goods four, but by it is meant here not only all these four qualities, together with their sub-divisions, but also all other good qualities of the soul. [101] The description of good character as temperance and justice includes all the virtuous qualities of the soul, because temperance and justice involve the repression of desire and anger, and it is upon this repression that acquisition of all the virtuous qualities depends. The four goods of the soul, then, are reducible to (a) faith or knowledge and (b) all the praiseworthy qualities of the soul. These two are the nearest means to happiness. [102] Since improvement of the soul through good qualities is achieved by means of action (*'amal*), the nearest means to happiness emerge as knowledge (or faith) and action. Indeed, this is what al-Ghazālī emphasizes in all his ethical works. Even when discussing the last three groups of means, he refers to the goods of the soul sometimes as knowledge, good character and action, and at other times as knowledge and action.

The bodily goods too are regarded as essential means to happiness, for without them the goods of the soul cannot be acquired perfectly. Although both groups are essential, the rank of the latter is below that of the former. The bodily goods are health, strength, long life and beauty. The way the first three serve as means to happiness is obvious: what are most needed for happiness are the

goods of the soul which, in final analysis, are found to be knowledge and action, and these two cannot be pursued without sound health and adequate physical strength. A long life enables man to make better preparation for happiness: this is why the Prophet once described happiness as a long life spent in obedience to God. The need for beauty, however, is less but not entirely nil: a handsome man, who is naturally liked by others, can pursue his worldly affairs more easily than a man ugly to look at; he can thus have more time and opportunity to acquire knowledge and to do good deeds. By beauty al-Ghazālī means not that which excites the sexual urge, but a tall figure with harmoniously developed limbs, and such facial appearance as creates a good impression on others.[103]

The goods exterior to the body are wealth, influence, family and noble birth. These are not essential for happiness but only useful to it. Their status is below the status of bodily goods. Wealth serves as a useful means in many ways: it makes its possessor free from the care of the necessities of life, and thus enables him to devote more time and attention to knowledge and action. Influence is a useful means in the sense that he who lacks it is always humiliated, and insecure from enemies who may disturb his acquisition of knowledge; one who has some influence can repel such enemies and prepare for happiness safely and securely. Wife, children, friends and relatives are all useful, inasmuch as they help man in his worldly affairs in various ways, and thus give him a better opportunity to prepare for happiness. Thus, safety, health, sufficiency and some influence in this world are conducive to morality. For most people, external goods are useful only when these are of a moderate amount; more than this is an impediment to happiness, and hence desires for a great abundance of goods are regarded by al-Ghazālī as 'destructive qualities of the soul' (to be described in a later chapter). This conception of wealth, influence, and so on, is not inconsistent with what has been said earlier, for there it was denied that these 'advantages' constitute happiness in themselves, and here they are only regarded as means to happiness. By noble birth al-Ghazālī means a birth, not in a rich family, but in a religious family cultivating knowledge and piety. One born in such a family inherits traits of good character from his ancestors, and in this way noble birth constitutes a means to happiness.[104]

The goods of divine grace (*tawfīq*) are divine guidance (*hidāya*), divine direction (*rushd*), divine leadership (*tasdīd*) and divine strengthening (*ta'īd*).[105] Grace here means accord between God's

decree and man's will on what is right. The function of these goods is to combine the bodily goods and the exterior goods with those of the soul. Indeed, without these goods, the former two groups are of no use in producing the latter — which is why goods of grace are regarded as essential means to happiness. On guidance everyone is dependent, since without it no one can know the path to happiness. Guidance has three grades. The first is general guidance, which enables man to distinguish between good and bad. It is called general because it is given to all people. Some of it (*ba'ḍahu*) is given through reason and some through the prophets and the books revealed to them.[106] Despite this guidance, people sometimes do not do good because the desire for worldly pleasure is dominant in them. The second grade is special guidance given to those who are practising mortification in accordance with general guidance; to such people "the path of wisdom" is gradually opened. The most special guidance is given to the prophets and also to the saints and ṣūfīs who have completed their mortification.[107] Thus one good of grace, i.e. guidance in its three forms, is concerned with one half of the soul's goods, namely, knowledge. The other three goods of grace have to do with the other half — action.

While through guidance man knows good and evil, direction is a divine providence (*al-'ināyat al-ilāhiyya*) for which an urge or will to proceed towards the good is produced in the mind. Those who have not been given direction cannot proceed to the good, although they may know it as such. Divine leading is a grace by which the limbs move towards the good in such a way that a man reaches it easily and in a short time. Thus the result of guidance is knowledge of good and evil; that of direction is will or inner urge to strive towards the good; that of leading is power (*qudra*) and movements of the limbs to reach the goal in a short time. Divine strengthening is an aid from the unseen world by which the inward insight of the good becomes clear, and the outward power of grasping with the hands, and of movement with the organs is increased. Similar to this aid is divine prevention which is an aid to protect man from doing evil, and whose source is also unknown.[108]

Thus, divine grace is associated with both knowledge and action, which are the nearest means to happiness. The question now arises as to whether there is any means of obtaining divine grace. It is clear from the above that there is no means of securing general guidance. The method of the other three forms of guidance is purification of the soul. Since devotional acts, among other things, effect puri-

fication, they may be said to be a means of only these forms of guidance. Divine direction, leadership and strengthening seem to have no direct or indirect causes; these are bestowed upon those whom God wills — a view consistent with the Qur'ānic verse, "That is the free gift of God; He gives it to whom He wills" [109] Their results are will, and power, and there are explicit statements in al-Ghazālī's work (a) that these attributes are given to some people as *free* gifts (*'aṭāyā*), as something for which they did nothing, and (b) that God gives — and He gives with justice — to other people attributes leading to evil, even though they did not commit any crime. One man may receive special favour "without any preceding desert", "without any means of it"; another man may be deprived of favour "without any previous crime". [110] A passage from the *Kīmiyā'* on this view runs thus:

> "Your act is by your power; rather your act is impossible without power, will and knowledge. So the key of your act is these three and all these three are free gifts of God... Then be astonished at His bounty, for He gave you the key for the treasure of the act of obedience (*ṭā'at*) and deprived all the wicked of it. He gave the key of disobedience (*ma'ṣiyat*) to others' hands and closed to them the door of the treasures of acts of obedience, *without any crime* of theirs; rather with His justice He did this. He favoured you *without any service* from you; rather he did this of His bounty. This will never be a matter of conceit to one who knows the reality of divine unity (*tawḥīd*)". [111]

It seems wrong to suppose that devotional acts (*'ibādāt*) are the indirect means of these three goods of grace. The reason for this is that these forms of grace are prior to the acts (for, as shown above, it is from these goods that will, etc. for the acts proceed) so that they are means of acts and not vice versa. Indeed devotional acts are said by al-Ghazālī himself to be dependent upon grace. [112] In the above passage too, will, etc. for good acts are asserted to be created without any prior devotional act. It is the layman, and not al-Ghazālī, who believes that the purpose of devotional acts is to please God and thereby to draw forth His assistance. In al-Ghazālī's view their aim is to remember God, and to purify the soul and make it beautiful, so that love of God and the hereafter may be produced in it, and love of this world may be removed. This will be discussed in the sixth chapter. Since acts are only performed through the goods of grace

they cannot be the means of the latter. That goods of grace are bestowed without any means is also suggested by their genesis: Aristotle was the first man to have spoken of goods of fortune as an element of happiness; he, however, did not relate them to any divine being. [113] Miskawayh followed him almost completely. [114] Al-Iṣfahānī accepted their view that goods of fortune are also means of happiness, and linked it with the Islamic idea by calling them "the goods of divine grace" and describing them as four forms of God's aid to man, [115] as mentioned in the Qur'ān. Al-Ghazālī accepts most of his ideas, elaborates them and makes them more Islamic and ṣūfistic. [116] Now neither Aristotle, nor Miskawayh nor al-Iṣfahānī believed that this group of goods could be obtained by our efforts. This might suggest that al-Ghazālī also had the same opinion and the suggestion is confirmed by his explicit statements that will, etc. for good actions, which result from the goods of grace, are given without any prior merit. [117] Now if the goods of grace on which acts are dependent are arbitrarily given by God, the acts become involuntary, making rewards for them irrelevant; in al-Ghazālī's view, it is only to the voluntary actions (*al-af'āl al-ikhtiyāriyya*) that reward and punishment are relevant. [118] To defend his concepts of voluntariness and moral responsibility he resorts to the well-known Ash'arite doctrine of acquisition (*kasb*).

By including goods of grace in the means of happiness al-Ghazālī points to the Islamic idea that otherworldly happiness is in part a mercy of God. The same was also the view of al-Iṣfahānī, which he made explicit by quoting the relevant Qur'ānic verses and prophetic traditions; he declared that no one was independent of grace in any condition, that happiness was not attainable without the goods of the soul and that there was no way of achieving these without divine grace. [119] Al-Ghazālī says almost the same: the primary means of happiness are the goods of the soul, and man can only acquire them — with the help of bodily goods and external goods — should he be given the goods of grace. He will acquire them through effort and action, i.e. through constant practice and habituation, and also through association with the virtuous — two methods to be described later — but the element of divine grace will be mingled with these. Goods of grace are neither opposed to the goods of the soul in which all virtuous qualities are included, nor independent of them, but are complementary to them; they help the acquisition of goods of the soul through effort and habituation. It is true that while explaining habituation and association as the methods of acquiring

virtues, al-Ghazālī does not mention divine grace; nevertheless he does mention it while explaining training in individual virtues and good acts. Since the means which are most directly related to happiness are knowledge and action, it is necessary to explain the meaning of these, and the effect they produce on the soul.

KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION AS THE TWO PRIMARY MEANS TO HAPPINESS

Since the goods of the soul are, according to al-Ghazālī, the primary means to happiness and since these are reducible to knowledge (*'ilm*) and action (*'amal*), these constitute the primary requirements of happiness. Without knowledge and action happiness cannot be attained. This view was maintained by al-Ghazālī throughout his life: it is set forth in his works composed both before and after his conversion to ṣūfism. [120] Since this opinion is found in the *Iljām*, a work completed just a few days before his death, it is plain that he retained it until his death. It cannot, therefore, be said that this view was held by him under the influence of philosophy before his conversion, and rejected after it. The philosophers, he complains, did not emphasize action; they believed that knowledge alone is the means to their salvation, and that action is not needed; he calls them deluded in this belief. [121] He also criticizes a class of religious scholars who busily acquire knowledge, but fall short in action, and do not avoid sins; they think that in knowledge they have reached a stage when they will not be punished for neglecting action. [122] The need for knowledge and action is, for al-Ghazālī, the fundamental teaching of the Qur'ān, for both are mentioned in most of the verses containing references to paradise; in a few such verses only knowledge or faith (*īmān*) is mentioned, but he says that action also is implicit in them. In the *Jawāhir* he classifies Qur'ānic verses into those concerned with knowledge and those concerning action. [123] He believes that by means of knowledge and action man ascends from the rank of lower animals to that of those who behold the beauty of God's glorious face. [124]

The meaning of knowledge and action is clear in al-Ghazālī's ethics. The ordinary man in the Islamic community tends to understand by good actions only the specific devotional acts (*'ibādāt*) prescribed by the Sharī'a. In the Qur'ān and Tradition action means any kind of good deed, whether related to man's outward (*ẓāhir*) or

inward (*bāṭin*) self; the latter, however, is less elaborately described because not all people can accomplish it; the former is regarded as extremely comprehensive, since it includes the devotional acts as well as all the good deeds done in different areas of life — domestic, social and political. Muslim jurisprudents, in al-Ghazālī's view, emphasized the acts of the outward self with total disregard of the inward. The ṣūfis gave equal emphasis to both kinds of action, except only with regard to politics; they elaborated the action of the inward self as briefly treated in the Sharī'a, and developed it into a compact theory, linking it with their conception of otherworldly happiness. The word 'action' in al-Ghazālī's ṣūfī ethics, therefore, has a very wide connotation: it includes actions of the outward self (*al-a'māl aẓ-ẓāhira*) and actions of the inward self (*al-a'māl al-bāṭina*). Each of these has two sub-divisions. The two divisions of the former are devotional acts directed towards God (*'ibādāt*), and the good acts to be performed in one's family life, and in society (*'ādāt*) but not in politics, for politics is outside the domain of al-Ghazālī's ethics. The two sub-divisions of the latter are the action of purifying the soul (*tazkiyat al-qalb*) from evil character-traits, and the action of making the soul beautiful (*taḥliyat al-qalb*) with good qualities. These four kinds of actions form the whole of the practical aspects of al-Ghazālī's ethics, [125] and these will be treated separately in the present study.

Each kind of action is often described by al-Ghazālī in terms of grades whose number sometimes rises to five, but which can be reduced to two i.e. a lower and a higher grade. The lower grade of teaching is intended for the lower category of the virtuous, who will attain the lower grade of happiness. The higher grade is meant for 'the few' who will achieve the higher grade of happiness. A great difference exists between the two grades of actions and between their motives: sometimes good actions of the lower class of the virtuous are evil actions for 'the few'. The former group's motive is the attainment of the sensual pleasures of paradise, while that of the latter is the vision of the Lord of paradise. [126] This division of the virtuous people by al-Ghazālī is in line with that of his ṣūfī predecessors. Inspired by Qur'ānic teaching, [127] they made this distinction from as early as the time of as-Sarrāj, who categorized mankind into the worldlings, the religious and the elect. [128]

As for knowledge, it is knowledge of God and of the path to Him. The former concerns the divine essence, attributes, and works. This knowledge is 'knowledge of revelation', usually called the science of

gnosis (*'ilm al-ma'rifa*).[129] God's works include all existences save Him; some of them form the world of sense perception while others, e.g. angels and souls form the unseen world. Knowledge of God, His attributes and His works is the highest form of knowledge. Below this in excellence is knowledge of the world to come. 'Knowledge of revelation' falls outside the domain of al-Ghazālī's ethics and its discussion is prohibited.[130] Knowledge of the path to God concerns all the four kinds of action mentioned above; without this knowledge actions cannot properly be performed. Although 'knowledge of revelation' and knowledge of the 'path' are both necessary for happiness, the former is fundamental; it is sometimes called the seed of happiness in the hereafter, or even happiness itself. One type of this knowledge is faith (*īmān*), which is sufficient for happiness[131], and which is included in al-Ghazālī's ethics.[132] The valid faith is that of the people of truth and the sunna (*ahl al-ḥaqq wa s-sunna*); the faith of any other sect is heretical. Matters of faith are God's unity, sanctification, power, knowledge, will, hearing, seeing, speech and works. Faith in divine unity is incomplete without the belief that Muḥammad is the last prophet sent to mankind and to jinns, and that all the previous religions are nullified by him. Faith must also include belief in the last day and all that will happen on it, as described in the Qur'ān and Tradition.[133] These beliefs form the basis of action. They also remain in the soul after man's death and will bring him happiness.

As there are grades in actions so too are there grades in faith. The lowest grade of faith is that which common men acquire from their parents, teachers and others without knowing any proof. This faith is of the lowest grade because it is usually mingled with minor errors which occur in its transmission. If the errors are in such fundamentals as God's oneness and Muḥammad's prophethood, the faith is completely wrong. The articles of faith are set forth in all al-Ghazālī's works dealing with his complete system of ethics. A higher grade of faith is that which is combined with knowledge of its simple proofs; these are given in his *ar-Risālat al-Qudsiyya*, which is included in the *Iḥyā'* as a chapter of its "Book of Articles of Faith". This grade of faith is stronger. At the highest grade of faith, one knows its secret reality, and also complex proofs involving deeper investigation, subtle questions and difficulties. These are discussed in his *al-Iqtiṣād fī l-I'tiqād*. This grade of faith is the strongest. The lowest grade of faith ensures the lower grade of happiness and the two higher grades are required for the higher grade of happiness.[134]

The concept of knowledge and action as the primary means to happiness is linked with the concept of man's moral perfection (*kamāl*), and of his provision (*zād*) for the next life. It is for knowledge and action that the soul is brought to the world of the body,[135] and it is their highest grade which forms the soul's perfection, ensuring the higher grade of happiness.[136] This is the logical consequence of al-Ghazālī's views on the nature of the soul as immortal, and as having a special characteristic: man's differentia or the special quality by which he is distinguished from the rest of creation lies in his capacity to know the reality of things; acquisition of knowledge, therefore, is the purpose of his creation; it is what makes him a human being, and its neglect degrades him to the rank of the lower animals. Since the most excellent of all forms of knowledge is knowledge of God, this must be regarded as man's perfection and provision for his future life.[137] Because the view that acquiring knowledge is the purpose of creation appears to contradict the Qur'ānic verse, "I only created the jinns and mankind that they might serve Me",[138] al-Ghazālī, like al-Ḥujwīrī, explains the verse by saying that knowledge also is included in it, for service of God is impossible without knowing Him.[139] In this method of determining perfection by considering man's differentia, al-Ghazālī is following the philosophic tradition. But, unlike the philosophers, he asserts that knowledge alone is not perfection in its entirety; action by which character is corrected and love of God is produced in the soul is also a part of perfection. It is true, however, that in some passages[140] knowledge alone is called perfection and 'provision'; this is because in these passages perfection and provision are determined by considering the soul's special attribute, and this attribute is knowledge.

The other method of determining 'provision' and perfection is by considering the eternal nature of the soul: al-Ghazālī argues that since the soul is eternal and its permanent abode is the hereafter, that which will be useful to it there should be reckoned as its 'provision', and the highest degree of that as its perfection. This concept of usefulness in the life to come is stressed more than that of man's differentia. This is evident from the fact that, in the section entitled "Real Perfection and Imaginary Perfection", only the 'usefulness' concept is invoked in declaring knowledge to be perfection, although in other places its perfection is decided by the 'differentia' argument. Moreover, it is by applying the concept of usefulness in the hereafter that wealth, influence, etc. are said to constitute false perfection. Emphasis is placed upon this concept in all al-Ghazālī's

works dealing with perfection. Usefulness in the next life is also set forth as the ultimate criterion of goodness and value.[141]

By applying this concept al-Ghazālī shows that knowledge constitutes provision for the hereafter. He discusses this in detail and concludes that knowledge of eternal entities such as God, His attributes and His wisdom in His works and in the ordering of this world and the next, is true perfection; it remains perfect in the soul and will be useful in the future life in various ways. The same is also true of 'faith' which is included in al-Ghazālī's ethics. By means of the concept of usefulness he also shows that freedom from enslavement to carnal desires (*ḥurriyya*) is also perfection, for this is not affected by death. To call this freedom perfection is the same as calling action perfection, for all the four kinds of action mentioned above concern this freedom; indeed this concern is sometimes made explicit by relating action to freedom. There is, however, a passage in which repression of desire is said to concern only one kind of action, namely, purification from vices; this is the restricted function of repression. By the persistence of freedom, i.e. action in the soul, al-Ghazālī means the everlasting effect on the soul, i.e. the qualities produced in it. This is why the existence of knowledge and action in the soul is sometimes described as the existence of three qualities. The first is purity of the soul from vices. This is the effect of the action of purification. The second is intimacy with God, produced from continuous remembrance of Him. This is the effect of devotional acts. The third is love of God. Its theoretical cause is knowledge of Him, and its practical cause is the action of making the soul beautiful with good character-traits. These three qualities of the soul are those which cause happiness (*al-mus'idāt*) in the life to come.[142]

Thus knowledge and good action are man's 'provision' and perfection, for it is these two which exist in the soul eternally. These are the good things mentioned in the Qur'ānic verse, "... and the ever-abiding, the good works, are better with your Lord in reward and better in expectation."[143] All things except knowledge (including 'faith') and action are left behind at death, and must therefore be regarded as false perfection.[144] Faith and action, as already stated, each have two major grades, lower and higher. Any one of these grades will form provision for the next life. Perfection, however, only refers to the higher grade, which will cause the higher level of happiness. To seek perfection is not required (*wājib*) of every individual; only 'the few' can seek it. Seeking the lower grade is required of the majority of people. Their inability to ascend to the

higher grade is the predestined will of God, for should all aspire after perfection, the world-order would be paralyzed, and in this case perfection itself would vanish.[145] This idea is also found in al-Makkī's ethics; he however did not apply it to the whole of his system.

Perfection is the same as nearness (*qurb*) to God and resemblance to the angels.[146] This nearness is qualitative and not spatial, and is attainable in this life. There is, however, another meaning of nearness in al-Ghazālī's ethics: that which is attainable in the hereafter and which consists in closeness to God in paradise, gazing upon His glorious face for evermore. By the higher degree of knowledge and action, nearness to God is achieved.[147] This nearness is the goal of the ṣūfī path.[148] It is identified with attaining to God (*waṣūl*). By 'attaining' al-Ghazālī does not mean identification with God (*ittiṣāl*), or fusion with Him (*ḥulūl*), or the mingling of human nature (*nāsūt*) with divine nature (*lāhūt*); all these are erroneous views. The truth is that one who attains to God approaches Him in quality.[149] At this stage mystical visions and intuitions occur.[150]

The concept of knowledge and action as the primary means to happiness is also linked with that of love of God, since the latter is produced by the former.[151] The way in which love of God is produced is mentioned by al-Ghazālī: God possesses such attributes that one who knows Him cannot but love Him; love necessarily follows from knowledge[152] (provided love of the world is not strong in the soul). The strength of love depends upon the strength of knowledge, the weakness of love of the world, and the degree of intimacy with God produced from remembrance of Him.[153] The love felt by the lower class of the virtuous is weak, because of weakness in their knowledge of God; they know Him as a benefactor, and love Him for His benefits like an 'evil slave'; hence their love increases and decreases according to the benefits they receive. The higher class of the virtuous comprehend God's majesty, perfection and beauty, and love Him for these, as do the angels. These people are perfect. Al-Ghazālī's view in this agrees with that of al-Junayd. Differences between the two classes of the virtuous in 'faith' also cause differences in their love of God.[154]

'Action' in its four forms (as described above) results in love in the following way: the evil qualities of the soul are but various aspects of its love of the world; therefore purification clears the soul from this love, and thus makes it fit for love of God.[155] As a result of making the soul beautiful with good qualities, the soul is inclined towards

God and is removed from the world. Continuity in devotional acts is, in effect, continuity in remembrance of God and in reflection on Him, from which results strengthening of 'faith' and intimacy with and love of God, and also indifference to the world.[156] Observation of justice towards one's fellow-men produces in the soul a state[157] which is conducive to love. Since there are two grades of 'action' there are two grades of love. Differences in love will cause differences in happiness in the life to come.[158]

Love of God and the Prophet is emphasized in the Qur'ān and Tradition.[159] From al-Ḥasan's time on, the ṣūfīs stressed this teaching of the Sharī'a. Muslim philosophers spoke of love of God but did not emphasize it; influenced by Greek thought they regarded perfection in knowledge as the ideal of life. Some theologians even denied the possibility of love of God, and interpreted the Sharī'a's teaching on this subject as meaning obedience to God. Al-Ghazālī refutes them more successfully than al-Makkī did and, like his ṣūfī predecessors, declares love of God to be the ideal of life[160] for without it happiness can never be attained. He urges men not to die without loving God, for it is to Him that everyone returns after death, and the more love he has for God in this life, the greater will be his joy in the next world in meeting Him.[161] The soul is created to acquire love of God,[162] The more an act promotes this love the greater is its moral worth. To love God more than any other is enough, but perfect love is very intense and is called passionate love (*'ishq*), i.e. extreme love. This love is equivalent to attainment of the highest perfection, to nearness to God, and to the highest rank of the angels. At this highest stage of love, visions and mystical intuitions occur. Intense love, the ideal of the ṣūfīs, was possessed by the Prophet before he received prophethood so that, seeing him mostly alone in worship in the cave of Ḥirā', the beduins used to say that Muḥammad passionately loved his Lord.[163] By knowledge and action man acquires passionate love, by which he ascends to the rank of the passionate lovers among the angels, who have always been engaged in studying the beauty of God's face, glorifying Him and sanctifying Him.[164]

When such a relationship between man and God develops, he experiences the state of annihilation (*fanā'*) and hence this state is sometimes called by al-Ghazālī the goal of the mystic path.[165] The essence of his concept of annihilation is that at this stage a lover of God is sometimes so much engrossed in the contemplation of his beloved that he forgets everything except Him; he is even unconscious of himself and his own condition: "...I mean that he forgets them...I do not mean by his annihilation the annihilation of his body but the annihilation of his mind".[166] Annihilation of the mind is the cessation of its awareness of all else but God; so everything else is nothing (*nistī, fanā'*); since God alone is subsistent (*bāqī*) in his awareness, the mystic says, 'All are God'; this is divine unity (*tawḥīd*). Thus the highest stage is called annihilation or nothingness when it is related to existences other than God, and oneness when related to God.[167] Al-Ghazālī says (as al-Hujwīrī also did) that in the beginning, this state passes away like a flash of lightning, for its persistence cannot be tolerated by man; but should it persist later "it becomes an established habit and a firm state". Visions and mystical intuitions occur in this state. It is expressed by such phrases as complete annihilation (*fanā' kullī*) and annihilation in divine unity (*fanā' fī t-tawḥīd*). This does not mean 'fusion', 'mingling', 'identification', 'incarnation' and so on; all these are erroneous conceptions.[168] There is no pantheism in al-Ghazālī. God is other than His creature and must remain so. Annihilation does not mean loss of identity; rather identity is perfected by it.

NOTES

1. *D*. III, 2—3.
2. *K*. pp. 10, 11, 79, 73, 409; *N*, p. 31.
3. *K*. pp. 10, 13.
4. *D*. III, 2—3.
5. *D*. III, 6.
6. *K*, p. 5. Most of the materials used in the Persian *K* have their sources in the *D*; some ideas come from a few other works by al-Ghazālī. Since the general aim of this work is to provide the type of moral guidance which the common man may require, these materials are occasionally compressed, modified, rearranged and joined with new materials, some of which concern very minor points, while others have considerable ethical importance. Sometimes these are made not only for the common man's sake, but because of al-Ghazālī's greater maturity of mind, greater familiarity with the materials set forth in his previous works, and greater experience of men and life. Thus the *K* marks a development of his thought and must, therefore, constitute a source of any study of his ethics. Such an opinion of this work is also held by Harold Spencer who compared its introduction and the first two 'Pillars' with the *D*. In the final observations of his study he has discussed in detail the nature of the modifications, etc. and concluded that although parts of the *K* may be described as a translation of the *D* and other parts may justifiably be stated as an abridgement of it, it is certainly not merely a Persian translation nor a summary of the *D* as M. Bouyges

maintained; it is a work which indicates the development of al-Ghazālī's thought; see his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "A study of the Dependence upon al-Ghazālī's Iḥyā' of the Introduction and the First Two "Pillars" of the Persian Kīmiyā' —i— Sa'ādat", University of Edinburgh, July, 1962, pp. 1—44 (conclusion).

7. *D*, III, 3.
8. *K*, pp. 11—12.
9. *M.D.*, pp. 30—31.
10. *D*, III, 3.
11. Al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, p. 261.
12. *T*, pp. 221—28.
13. *A*, p. 28. Wahed Hosain in "The Self and the Soul in Islamic Philosophy", *VBQ*, VII (1929), pp. 287—92, quotes a few passages from *M.B.* and *K* and concludes (p. 292) by saying that, according to al-Ghazālī, the soul "is created because it has a beginning": what al-Ghazālī "means by saying that it has a beginning seems to imply that individual souls proceed from the Universal; consequently they have a commencement". He however admits that al-Ghazālī uses some expressions from which it appears that the soul is created like other natural objects, but he tries to explain these away. Hosain appears to have misinterpreted the passages he quoted. Al-Ghazālī does not believe that individual souls proceed from the Universal Soul. On the contrary he is an upholder of the Qur'ānic theory of creation, and he combats the philosophers on the doctrine of emanation or procession. Cf. W.R.W. Gardner, "Al-Ghazali as a Sufi" *MW*, VII (1917), 133, n.
14. *T*, p. 225.
15. *M.D.*, p. 31.
16. *T*, pp. 221—28.
17. *T*, pp. 225, 235.
18. Claudia Reid Upper, "Al-Ghazālī's Thought Concerning the Nature of Man and Union with God", *MW*, XLII (1952), 25—26.
19. *D*, IV, 46.
20. *D*, III, 329; cf. Upper, "Nature", p. 24.
21. *K*, p. 78.
22. *D*, III, 51. This is al-Ghazālī's general view concerning the basic nature of the soul and it is upon this that he bases many of his ethical ideas. However, there are two passages (*D*, IV, 62, 64) where a child's soul is described as devoid of any inclination, but able to be inclined to both good and evil. This neutral nature of the soul seems to have been spoken of in order to emphasize the need for the child's training in good character.
23. *D*, III, 12—13, 52—53; *A*, p. 302.
24. *N*, pp. 12, 32; *K*, p. 63.
25. *K*, p. 436.
26. *J*, p. 16; *A*, pp. 280—82.
27. *D*, III. 2. A similar passage is to be found in *K*, p. 78, and *A*, pp. 280—81.
28. *D*, III, 2, 4, 7—8.
29. *D*, III, 5, IV, 95; *K*, p. 14; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 14—15.
30. *D*, III, 7, 8.
31. *T*, pp. 199—200.
32. *T*, p. 200.

33. *D*, III, 4, 9; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 14—15.
34. *T*, p. 221.
35. From this discussion it is clear that al-Ghazālī believes in the dualism of soul and body. Indeed this dualism occupies an important place in the background of his ethical theory. It is mentioned in innumerable places in his works. Miskawayh, al-Fārābī and Avicenna accepted the dualism advocated by Aristotle and the Peripatetics rather than the dualism taught by Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato (cf. Walzer, "Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq" in *Greek into Arabic*, Oxford, England, 1962, pp. 224—26); al-Ghazālī's view is in line with the Muslim Philosophers' view (although it slightly deviates from it in emphasizing the body as an instrument of preparation for the *hereafter*). He, however, links his view with the Qur'ān and Tradition; he repeatedly quotes *ṣaḥīḥ* Traditions which taught the dualistic conception of man — a conception which formed a vital part of the message of the Prophet. Al-Ghazālī also conceives of the dualism of soul and body in the next life: the soul will be the real essence of resurrected man; the body will only be its subordinate and will be united with it in order to enjoy or suffer according to the works which the body did for the soul in its earthly life. Cf. De Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1933, pp. 163—64; Watt, *Islamic Revelation in the Modern World*, Edinburgh, 1969, p. 28; *Intellectual*, pp. 61—65. Watt maintains that al-Ghazālī held a monistic conception of man, and that the Prophet also had expressed his message in monistic terms although the monistic view of man was not a part of his message. These views of Watt do not seem sound; they are not based on the teaching of al-Ghazālī or of the Prophet on this problem.
36. *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.2 1104a—b.
37. *A*, pp. 67, 2, 27, 42; *D*, IV, 314, 29, III, 51—52, 145, I, 195, 108, II, 1; *K*, p. 76. Yafeh also realized the importance of this theory; he rightly called it "a central doctrine of great interest", a "doctrine, which underlies Ghazālī's whole philosophy"; Yafeh, however, did not explain the theory; see his art. "Place of the Religious Commandments in the Philosophy of al-Ghazali", *MW*, LI (1961), 184.
38. *Qūt*, I, 277.
39. *D*, III, 9—11, IV, 14, II, 249; *A*, p. 36.
40. *D*, IV, 14.
41. *D*, III, 9—10.
42. pp. 188—89.
43. *K*, pp. 20—21; cf. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, ed. by K. Zurayk, Beirut, 1968, pp. 12—14.
44. *Qūt*, I, 390.
45. *D*, I, 212; Cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 17, 16.
46. This term seems to have been used in the *A*, p. 177, in order to imply that the parts of the soul are not physically divisible, but distinguishable by definition and in thought.
47. *D*, III, 47. This view is confirmed in the *A*, p. 77, and the *K*, pp. 429, 431. Abdul Haqq Ansari was right when he said that al-Ghazālī believed in four faculties of the soul; see his published Ph.D. thesis, *The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawayh*, Aligarh, 1964, p. 108. K. El Baghir (in his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, "Al-Ghazālī's Philosophy of Education", University of Edinburgh, 1953, pp. 136—

37, 137) correctly says: al-Ghazālī"...introduces [justice] as a fourth faculty along with the other three". Al-Ghazālī's recognition of "the 'power of justice' as a fourth faculty...seems, however, to be an innovation;... "Umaruddin (*Al-Ghazzālī*, pp. 164, 305, n. 28) is also correct in maintaining that al-Ghazālī introduced justice as a separate faculty of the soul. He, however, is incorrect in regarding this introduction as unnecessary. His argument is that, according to al-Ghazālī, the function of reason is to direct and also to control desire and anger, and the task of justice consists in controlling them; thus justice is implied in reason. This argument is incorrect because control of desire and anger is, in fact, not included by al-Ghazālī in the function of reason so that a faculty is necessary to ensure this control. The tripartite nature of the soul given in the *M.'A.* was rejected by al-Ghazālī when he became a ṣūfī.

48. *K*. pp. 10, 624—25; cf. Al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 233, 234 where he calls the carnal soul the treasure of evil (*khizānat ash-sharr*), and also the house of the enemy, the devil.
49. *D*, III, 47—48.
50. *K*, pp. 15, 64, 771; *D*, IV, 355.
51. *K*, pp. 16, 64; *D*, II, 249.
52. *A*, pp. 188—89.
53. *K*, pp. 64, 647; *D*, III, 47.
54. *D*, III, 47.
55. pp. 629—30.
56. In the *A*, pp. 211—12, where these two motives are discussed very briefly the motive of religion appears at first sight to be identical with reason, but careful reading of the passages makes it clear that it is something different. The same is true of *M.A.*, p. 72. In the *D*, IV, 55—56 and the *K*, pp. 667—68 where the two motives are discussed in great detail it is clear that the motive of religion is not the same as reason: reason is described as the source of guidance, and the motive of religion as power, and guidance is regarded as superior to power. Clearly, then, they are two different faculties. Further, it is said that guidance, the function of reason, is given by the angel placed at man's right side (*ṣāḥib al-yamīn*) and the power of motive of religion is given by the angel at his left side (*ṣāḥib ash-shimāl*). This also clearly shows that reason and the motive of religion are two different faculties. That they are not identical is further evident from al-Ghazālī's statement, "These two angels are entrusted with the two soldiers..."
57. *Ethics* 1.13, 1102a—1103a.
58. *D*, IV, 57.
59. *D*, I, 152.
60. Scholars are not unanimous on the question of whether al-Ghazālī really believes in a faculty higher than reason. Jabre denies any such faculty; he holds that where it is said that prophets and saints know through immediate experience, the meaning is that they know by reason in its original purity, and not by any higher faculty; see his *Certitude*, pp. 147, 263, 185. Watt (*Intellectual*, pp. 164—66, 85; "Study", pp. 125—28 where Jabre is criticized), Upper ("Nature", pp. 27, 24), Smith ("Al-Ghazālī on the Practice of the Presence of God", *MW*, XXIII, 17) and De Boer, (*History*, pp. 166—67) maintain that al-Ghazālī believes in a faculty higher than reason. This dispute is part of the controversy over the essential unity or modification of the thought presented in

his authentic works. A study of the arguments of both groups, and of the relevant passages in al-Ghazālī's works, convinces the present writer that the truth lies with those who believe that al-Ghazālī conceives of a faculty higher than reason. However, since this highest faculty is not directly related to al-Ghazālī's ethics, its further discussion in the present study is irrelevant.

61. *Qūt*, I, 509 where al-Makkī speaks of intuitive (*kashfī*) knowledge and supports it by a Tradition.
62. *A*, p. 73.
63. *D*, IV, 51—52, 109, 187—88, 348, 357.
64. *D*, IV, 52, 107.
65. *K*, pp. 70, 839—41; *J*, pp. 5, 44, 51—52.
66. *K*, p. 70.
67. *D*, III, 198, IV 366—67.
68. *Ethics* 1.5, 7—8. 1095b—1096a, 7—8. 1097a—1099b.
69. *D*, III, 199.
70. *D*, IV, 89, 139, 86, III, 203.
71. *D*, IV, 139, 86.
72. *D*, IV, 17, 45; *N*, p. 45; *I.'A.*, p. 62; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 175, 210, 218, 224, 113, 156 where the same view is expressed.
73. *D*, IV, 89; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 35, 37.
74. *D*, IV, 422; *A*, pp. 20—21.
75. *T*, pp. 245, 229.
76. *T*. 236—48.
77. *T*, p. 241; *A*, pp. 293—94, 305.
78. *A*, pp. 286—89; *K*, pp. 84, 88. In this latter work (p. 83), the punishment of the grave is said to be both mental and physical, but on p. 85 physical pain in the grave is explained as being in fact mental in nature.
79. *K*, p. 53; *D*, II, 161. In the *D*, IV, 426—30, 438—39, 452—65, bodily pleasures and pain are discussed elaborately. In the *K* these are mentioned briefly because everyone can understand them; spiritual states are elaborately dealt with in this work because only a few people who know the soul can have knowledge of these matters without guidance (p. 83). For the same reason, in the *A*, which is an abridgement of the *D*, bodily pleasure and pain are omitted, and the spiritual states are described in detail.
80. *T*, pp. 229—36; *D*, I, 92.
81. *T*, p. 235.
82. *A*, pp. 293, 286; *K*, pp. 95, 97, 99—101.
83. *K*, pp. 99—101.
84. *K*, pp. 82—83, 88.
85. *A*, pp. 301—03, 190; *K*, pp. 748—49. In *A*, p. 59, the divine name 'the Avenger' (*al-Muntaqim*) is classified as belonging to that group of divine names and attributes which are metaphorical and admit of interpretation.
86. *K*, p. 746; *D*, IV, 314, 119.
87. *D*, IV, 22—28. In the *T*, pp. 229—34 al-Ghazālī reproduces the philosophers' three-fold classification of man in the hereafter, and their views of men's happiness and misery. His own classification accords with Qur'ānic teaching; only his conception of man's spiritual happiness and misery and its causes bears the influence of philosophy.
88. *Qūt*, I, 220.

90. Qur'ān 7:46—48.
89. Al-Fārābī, *as-Siyāsat al-Madaniyya*, ed. by F.M. Najjar, Beirut, 1964, pp. 83, 33; *Ārā' Ahl al-Madīnat al-Fāḍila*, ed. by A.N. Nader, Cairo, 1949, pp. 118—19.
91. *D*, II, 72, IV, 89. This is al-Ghazālī's general position. However, in the *A*, pp. 23—24, 'success' is described as lower than happiness.
92. *J*, p. 14.
93. *D*, IV, 27. This is confirmed in *A*, pp. 23—24.
94. *Qūt*, I, 219—20, 346. For the meaning of salvation cf. Gardner, "Sufi", p. 131.
95. Al-Bakhārī, *Ṣaḥiḥ*, Tawḥīd, 35; Muslim *Ṣaḥiḥ*, Īmān, 312, Janna, 5—6.
96. Qur'ān 32:17.
97. *D*, IV, 406—9, 22, 238, 287, 24, 320—21, 226—27, 238, 137, 340, 28, 96, 465, 71, III, 11; *J*, pp. 14, 44. Sometimes al-Ghazālī regards The *muqarrabūn* as below the *ṣiddīqūn*, but generally he refers to them as having equal status. The same is true of the *ṣāliḥūn*, and the *muttaqūn*. For the meaning of 'holy Tradition' see J. Robson, "Ḥadīth Ḳudsī", *EI*², III, 28.
98. Cf. Qur'ān 56:7—94; 7:36—53; *Qūt*, I, 175, 210, 218, 220, 224, 113, 156. The Qur'ānic verse and the 'holy Tradition', which al-Ghazālī quotes to support his ideas of spiritual happiness, were also quoted by the Muslim philosophers; in *T*, pp. 275—76 he criticizes the philosophers, saying that these never imply the non-existence of physical happiness.
99. *D*, IV, 89—90, III, 203; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 37—38, 35, 45. In the number of means, in their classification into four groups, in their description and in the determination of their mutual relationship, al-Ghazālī is strongly influenced by al-Iṣfahānī who discussed all these in his *Dharī'a*, pp. 35—45. Al-Iṣfahānī was, in turn, influenced by Aristotle, the Stoics and Miskawayh. Al-Ghazālī only elaborates al-Iṣfahānī's views and makes them more religious and ṣūfistic.
100. Edward William Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, ed. by Stanley Lane-Poole, London, 1893, I(6), 2412.
101. Umaruddin agress with the present writer that by good character al-Ghazālī sometimes meant all good qualities of the soul; see his *Al-Ghazzālī*, p. 163.
102. *D*, III, 203; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 35.
103. *D*, IV, 89, 91—92; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 35, 40—41; Aristotle *Ethics* 1.8—9. 1099b—1100a.
104. *D*, IV, 89—92, II, 144; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 35, 38—39; Aristotle *Ethics* 1.8. 1099b.
105. For the English translation of these terms see Lane, *Lexicon*, I (3), 1089, I (8), 3057, I (1), 136; Bergh, "Sources", p. 96.
106. *D*, IV, 89, 93—94; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 44.
107. *D*, 93—94, I, 84; *J*, pp. 32—33.
108. *D*, IV, 94; *K*, p. 690.
109. Qur'ān 5:54, 57:21, 62:4.
110. *A*, p. 159; *K*, 520, 121.
111. *K*, p. 621 (italics mine).
112. *K*, p. 620; *D*, I, 152, 196, IV, 336.
113. *Ethics* 1.10. 1100b—1101a, 1.7. 1098b—1099a.
114. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 77, 78.

115. *Dharī'a*, pp. 35—45.
116. Clearly, al-Ghazālī's conception of the goods of grace as a means of happiness has its source in philosophy; it is, however, developed by him and by al-Iṣfahānī in such a way that it becomes a religious concept. Bergh's statement in "Sources", p. 96, "The fourth category [the goods of grace], of course, lies wholly beyond the scope of Stoicism" does not mean that it is not philosophic (in its origin); he means only that this category is absent in Stoic philosophy. A theory of forms of divine grace is also to be found in the works of the Muslim theologians such as al-Ash'arī (*Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, ed. by H. Ritter, 2d ed. Wiesbaden, 1963, pp. 259—64; *al-Ibāna 'an Uṣūl ad-Diyāna*, Egypt, 1348 A.H., pp. 53, 61—69). However, comparison shows that this theory did not have much influence on al-Ghazālī.
117. However, some passages in al-Ghazālī's works suggest that there are means of obtaining divine grace. Thus in his discussion of devotional acts one finds such statements as "We [should] ask God for good grace" (D, I, 145), "We [should] ask God for good grace through His kindness and mercy" (*D*, I, 146). Clearly, asking (*suwāl*) for grace is regarded as a means of obtaining it. Elsewhere it is said that in order to acquire ability for the observance of the mean in root virtues every man is required to invoke help from God in ritual prayer (*D*, III, 54). This shows that ritual prayer (*ṣalā*) is a means of divine assistance.
118. *D*, II, 142.
119. *Dharī'a*, pp. 35, 44, 38.
120. *M.'I.*, p. 195; *M.'A*, p. 3; *D*, II, 2, 144, IV, 309; *K*, pp. 631, 632, 268, 70; *A*, pp. 2, 293; *M.D.*, p. 34; *B*, pp. 88, 113; *A.W.*, p. 58; *J*, p. 117; *I.'A.*, p. 45.
121. *A.W.*, p. 54.
122. *D*, III, 334.
123. pp. 6, 52.
124. *A*, p. 293.
125. *A*, p. 6. Sometimes, however, the term action is used in the restricted sense of devotional act (*'ibāda*) only; see *D*, II, 144.
126. *D*, II, 165; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 463. For the two categories of the virtuous, and the grades of happiness corresponding to the two broad grades of actions and belief see also *supra*, pp. 56—58.
127. Qu'ān 56:7—94.
128. Al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, p. 341.
129. *D*, III, 334.
130. *D*, I, 4.
131. *D*, IV. 343, 53; *I.'A.*, pp. 73, 79.
132. *D*, I, 112, 13.
133. *D*, I, 79—82, II, 83.
134. *A*, pp. 23—25. In the *I.I'.*, al-Ghazālī gives the main points of the science of *mutakallimūn*. He is satisfied with his exposition so that he regards it as deeper in investigation and nearer to knocking at the door of gnosis (*ma'rifa*) than the traditional *kalām* described in the works of *mutakallimūn;* see *A*, p. 24. Cf. Jabre, *Certitude*, p. 88 where he states that al-Ghazālī in *I.I'.* "finds himself the prisoner of a terminology and of a complex of ideas which do not satisfy him".
135. *D*, III, 54.

136. *D*, III, 311.
137. *D*, III, 7—8, IV, 261.
138. Qur'ān 51:56.
139. *D*, IV, 17; al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf*, p. 267.
140. *D*, III, 7—8, 2.
141. *N*, p. 3; *B*, p. 113; *A*, p. 137; *D*, III, 244—46.
142. *D*, III, 190—91, 311.
143. Qur'ān 18:46.
144. *D*, III, 190, 311, 245—46; *A*, p. 137; *B*, p. 113; *N*, p. 3.
145. *D*, III, 197; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 516.
146. *D*, III, 244—45; *A*, p. 138.
147. *D*, II, 144.
148. *M.D.*, pp. 60—61.
149. *D*, III, 350, IV, 263.
150. *D*, II, 246—47.
151. *D*, IV, 145.
152. *D*, IV, 139, 314, 272, III, 191, II, 247.
153. *D*, IV, 145, 272.
154. *A*, pp. 255, 258.
155. *D*, III, 190—91.
156. *D*, IV, 139, 314, 151, III, 190—91.
157. *D*, IV, 275.
158. *A*, pp. 91—92.
159. Qur'an 9:24, 3:31; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Dhikr, 14—18, Jihād, 132; at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Janā'iz, 67, Zuhd, 6, Manāqib, 31, 20, Jihād, 26; al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Jihād, 121; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Zuhd, 8.
160. *D*, IV, 252, 314, 139.
161. *D*, IV, 145, 271; *A*, p. 284.
162. *D*, p. 54.
163. *D*, II, 247; *M.D.*, p. 62.
164. *A*, pp. 292—93.
165. *M.D.*, pp. 60—61; *D*, IV, 368; *K*, pp. 382, 640.
166. *D*, II, 256—257.
167. *K*, pp. 382—83; *M*, p. 64.
168. *K*, p. 383; *D*, II, 256—57; *A*, pp. 54—55; cf. al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf*, pp. 226—27. In many of his works al-Ghazālī exposes the errors in these conceptions. The same was done by al-Hujwīrī in his *Kashf*, pp. 37, 243, 244, 254. For the absence of pantheism in al-Ghazālī cf. Upper, "Nature", pp. 28—30, 31, 32. That there is no pantheism in any of its forms in al-Ghazālī is also maintained by Umaruddin in his *Al-Ghazzālī*, pp. 141—42. Cf. R.C. Zaehner, *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism*, New York, 1969, pp. 162—71, 179—80.

III
CHARACTER

GOOD CHARACTER AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN

We have so far been concerned with the nature and background of al-Ghazālī's ethics, and have also endeavoured to give an account of his conception of the aim of moral life, together with the method for the realization of this aim. It now seems proper to embark upon a detailed consideration of that method which he calls "action', and the starting point is action related to man's inward self, i.e. the acquisition of the good qualities of the soul, and the removal of the evil qualities, for it is these qualities which form the sources of man's outward actions. The problem of good character (*ḥusn al-khuluq*) consisting of the four virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, together with their sub-divisions, will be given first consideration. Inseparably connected with this problem is the question of the possibility of change in character through moral training and struggle. Once this question has received an affirmative answer, the subject which demands treatment is that of the methods by which change in character can be accomplished. Following al-Ghazālī's procedure we shall begin with an explanation of the meaning of character. Character, in his view, is neither knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of good and evil, nor capacity (*qudra*) for good and evil, nor action (*fi'l*), good and evil, but an established state of the soul (*hay'a rāsikha fī n-nafs*).[1]

"Character means an established state [of the soul] from which actions proceed easily, without any need for reflection and deliberation. If this state is such that good actions — i.e. those which are praised by reason and the Sharī'a — proceed from it, it is called good character. If the actions which proceed from the state are evil, the state from which they derive, is called bad character."[2]

It is clear from this definition that the state of the soul which is meant by character must fulfil two requirements. The first is

stability. A man of generous character, for instance, is one in whose soul willingness to give away his wealth has become stable and relatively permanent. (How a quality becomes stable is a point to be discussed later.) A man who gives away only on rare occasions, for accidental causes, cannot be regarded as a man of generous character. The second requirement is the easy and spontaneous proceeding of actions from the state of the soul. The generous man is one who gives away wealth easily and without exertion.[3] These two features of character are also the features whose presence or absence constitutes a character-trait, or a virtue or vice. 'Character' is a term frequently used for a virtue or vice in al-Ghazālī's works. Thus one often finds such expressions as "the character of generosity" and "the base characters". It is also clear that, in al-Ghazālī's ethics, an outward act cannot strictly speaking be called a virtue or a vice. Thus the honesty of a man may be referred to as a virtue, but not his honest dealings. An act can however be called a virtuous or vicious act.

Al-Ghazālī then elucidates the meaning of good character by saying that if character refers to man's inward form (*aṣ-ṣūrat al-bāṭina*), good character must mean his good inward form. In man's inward aspect, i.e. in his soul, there are four faculties (discussed in the preceding chapter), and in a man of good character all these faculties remain sound, moderate and mutually harmonious.[4] A sound faculty of knowledge is that which can distinguish between true and false in statements, between right and wrong in beliefs, and between good and evil in actions. From this state, the virtue of wisdom (*ḥikma*) is generated in the soul. The sound faculty of anger obeys the dictates of reason and the Sharī'a in its arousal and appeasement. From this state, the virtue of courage (*shajā'a*) appears. Likewise, the sound faculty of desire yields to reason and the Sharī'a. In this way the virtue of temperance (*'iffa*) is achieved. The sound faculty of justice is able to control the faculties of anger and desire according to the pronouncements of reason and the Sharī'a; it is a power (*qudra*) which, like an officer, enforces these pronouncements on the faculties of desire and anger; it reduces the greed of desire by arousing anger against it, and lessens the rage of anger by arousing a strong desire against it, so that both desire and anger become submissive to reason and the Sharī'a. From the sound state of the faculty of justice the virtue of justice (*'adl*) appears. Thus justice is the name of a faculty as well as of the virtue of that faculty.[5] It was regarded by the philosophers only as a virtue.

Al-Ghazālī further specifies the sound states of the faculties and determines the bounds within which they should remain, by introducing his conception of the mean (*wasaṭ*).[6] He says that each faculty, save that of justice, has two extremes—one of excess and the other of deficiency — and a state between the two which is called the mean. The mean state of a faculty is the sound state; it is that which is praiseworthy, the two extremes being blameworthy. The mean is the virtue (*faḍīla*) and the two extremes are two vices (*radhīlatān*). Deviation from the mean to one or the other extreme generates vice. If the faculty of knowledge is at the extreme of excess, i.e. is used in "fulfilling the wrong motives", the vice of wickedness (*khubth*) is produced in the soul. If it is at the extreme of deficiency, the vice of stupidity (*balah*) is generated. If it is at the mean, wisdom is achieved. If the faculty of anger is at the extreme of excess the vice of rashness (*tahawwur*) appears. If it is at the extreme of deficiency, the vice of cowardice (*jubn*) exists in the soul. If it is at the mean state, there appears courage. If the faculty of desire is at its excess, it begets the vice of greed (*sharah*). If it is at the extreme of deficiency, the vice of the annihilation of desire is produced. If it is at the state of the mean, temperance is achieved. The faculty of justice has no two extremes; it has only an opposite, which is injustice (*jawr*). Should this faculty fail to control the faculties of desire and anger, the vice of injustice exists in the soul. If it works well, the virtue of justice is achieved. Thus the virtue of justice is not a mean between two extremes.[7] It was considered by Miskawayh as the mean between doing injustice and suffering injustice. Aristotle also treated it as a mean between two faulty extremes.

Thus if the four faculties of the soul are sound, the four virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice exist in the soul. If they are at their opposite extremes, seven vices may appear. From these virtues and vices, many sub-categories of virtue and vice can be determined. In the case of justice and injustice, however, no sub-division is mentioned by al-Ghazālī. In this he agrees with Avicenna, but not with Miskawayh, who listed several virtues under justice. Al-Ghazālī's sub-divisions of virtues and vices are as follows:

(a) Wisdom — soundness of management, excellence of mind, penetration of ideas, rightness of opinion, and awareness of the subtle actions and hidden evils of the soul.

Stupidity — folly, little experience in affairs despite sound-

ness in the power of imagination, and insanity. A foolish man pursues a right objective in a wrong way, but an insane man's objective and method are both wrong.

Wickedness — slyness, deceit, trickery, and cunning.

(b) Courage — liberality, intrepidity, manliness, self-control, endurance, forbearance, fortitude, repression of anger, dignity, amiability, and the like.

Rashness — boastfulness, haughtiness, fury, pride and conceit.

Cowardice — abjection, lack of self-respect, impatience, baseness, small-mindedness, and aversion from receiving rights.

(c) Temperance — generosity, modesty, patience, remission, contentment, piety, kindness, helpfulness, wit, and lack of covetousness.

Greed and annihilation of desire — cupidity, greed, shamelessness, impurity, extravagance, miserliness, ostentation, tendency to defame the character of others, boldness, preoccupation with useless activities, flattery, envy, rejoicing in others' misfortune, self-humiliation before the rich and despising the poor, etc.[8]

(d) Justice x x x

Injustice x x x

These subordinate virtues and vices (except folly, insanity and lack of experience) are not defined in the second book of the third part of the *Iḥyā'*. However, many of them are defined and explained in the third book, and these will be considered in the next chapter of the present study. A few of them are never defined by al-Ghazālī, presumably on the grounds that they have not so much bearing on character. Some of the subordinate vices are regarded as so serious that they are called 'destructive qualities'. Most of the subordinate virtues and vices, e.g. friendship, kindness, dignity, fury, and so on, have social connotations — and for this reason such an expression as "good character in relationships with people" sometimes occurs in al-Ghazālī's work.[9] These virtues and vices form the inner sources of man's outward actions, as described in the second part of the

Iḥyā'.[10] The notion of the mean is used in defining most of the subordinate virtues and vices. In a few cases, however, this notion is regarded as irrelevant because such vices as hypocrisy, envy and backbiting, are always vicious.

If it is the mean which is the virtue, the question naturally arises as to how to determine the right mean (*al-wasṭ al-ḥaqīqī*) in any situation. Al-Ghazālī's answer is very clear: the mean is a standard, a general principle, which will be ascertained by reason (*'aql*) and the Sharī'a. This is asserted several times in the treatment of the philosophic virtues and vices in the *Iḥyā'*, and also in other places in this work. It is confirmed in the *Arba'īn*, and the *Kīmiyā'*; in the *Naṣīḥa* and the *Maqṣad* the control of desire and anger under the commands of reason and the Sharī'a is strongly urged.[11] There is only one virtue, leniency, where the Sharī'a as a determining factor of the mean is set aside, for a special reason to be discussed later. In the very definition of good and evil character, both reason and the Sharī'a are mentioned as guiding factors.[12] In view of all this it would be wrong to suppose that in philosophic virtues and vices al-Ghazālī appeals to unaided human reason, as Aristotle did.[13] Plato, although he did not prescribe the mean, taught that the control of desire and anger by reason alone was the characteristic of a virtuous man. Miskawayh mentioned reason and the Sharī'a as factors which could decide the mean, once in his list of virtues, and once in a later section,[14] but in both places he frequently mentioned reason alone.[15] Al-Ghazālī's repeated appeal to reason as well as the Sharī'a reflects the influence of Islamic religious teaching upon him — the Qur'ān often asks men to ponder, in order that they may understand the truth contained in it.[16] The mean is mostly relative: it differs from person to person, and even in the same person in different circumstances.[17]

Al-Ghazālī considers the deep reason for the observance of the mean to be the fact that man can only attain happiness in the hereafter if at death his soul has the quality of the angels, for his substance is identical with that of the angels and the place of his origin is the angelic world. The angelic quality is freedom from attachment to the world. Only the soul free from this attachment will be saved, since the Qur'ān says that no one will be saved "except him who comes to God with a soul free."[18] The soul can only be freed by preserving the middle way. Al-Ghazālī explains this by examples: the miser busies himself with saving wealth; the extravagant man occupies himself with spending it; in either case the soul

is attached to wealth, a worldly thing. To gain freedom from this attachment he should be free from both qualities of spending and saving. But since this is humanly impossible, he should achieve what is nearest and most similar to it, and this is achieved by preserving the mean in spending. The soul of a man keeping to the mean in spending is, in a sense, free from both qualities, just as tepid water which is neither too hot nor too cold is free from being hot or cold. If he preserves the mean in all affairs his soul will have no attachment to any worldly thing. Al-Ghazālī gives another example: the centre of a hot ring is at the furthest point from both ends of the diameter of the ring; if an ant inside it dies at the centre, it dies at the coldest place. Similarly, man, who is inside the ring of desires but wants to resemble the angels who are outside this ring, cannot hope to get out of it; however, if he remains at the mean, he will be as remote as possible from desires and thus achieve the greatest possible resemblance to the angels. Al-Ghazālī says that it is for this reason that the Sharī'a prescribes the mean.[19] He also maintains that it is impossible to observe the right mean and hence no one will escape suffering in the hereafter. He explains this by maintaining that the mean is the straight path (*aṣ-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm*) which the Qur'ān orders man to follow, but that this path, i.e. the mean, is extremely difficult to follow; thus man can approach this mean but not reach it.[20] In the hereafter there will be a similar bridge-like path (*aṣ-ṣirāṭ*) suspended over hell, and all men will have to cross it in order that they may enter paradise. In proportion to a man's adherence to the mean in this life, he will be able to walk along the path in the next. If he grossly deviates from the mean here, he will slip into the gulf of hell; if he is near to the mean he will pass the bridge with the speed of lightning but will still experience some pain. This is why God said, "Every one of you shall have to pass over it [hell]; this is the irrevocable decree of thy Lord; but We shall save those guarded against evil [i.e. who were near to the mean] and leave the wrongdoers crouching there".[21]

Al-Ghazālī gives another reason for preserving the mean, namely, to acquire the ability to perform man's proper function, which is seeking useful knowledge, doing good deeds, and avoiding evil. If, for instance, a man is moderate in satisfying his desire for food, he feels neither the heaviness of his stomach nor the pain of hunger, but it is as though "he forgets his stomach". Such a state is conducive to knowledge and good deeds. This may be called the practical purpose of the mean.[22] For this as well as for the otherworldly purpose, the

mean was also prescribed by al-Makkī; he however, did not stress the mean as much as al-Ghazālī does.[23]

The importance of the mean is emphasized by al-Ghazālī in the *Iḥyā'*[24]: "The ultimate aim in all affairs and character-traits is the mean, since the best in all things is the mean, and both extremes are blameworthy." Every person obliged to perform the religious duties (*mukallaf*) has to follow the mean in "his actions, statements and thoughts (*khaṭarāt*)". Observance of the mean in desires for worldly things is "the most beloved of things to God". "The aim is the mean in all qualities and character-traits;... if the soul deviates to one of the two extremes it should be corrected". The aim in moral training is to bring the soul back to the state of the mean, for this state constitutes the health of the soul, while deviation from it constitutes its sickness. This strong emphasis on the mean is confirmed in the *Kīmiyā'*.[25] To support this emphasis al-Ghazālī demonstrates that it is the mean which is prescribed by the Sharī'a:[26] in the Qur'ān God refers to the believers as "Those who, when they spend, are neither extravagant nor parsimonious, and [keep] between them the just mean". He also says "Do not shackle your hand to your neck nor stretch it forth to the utmost limit..." "Eat and drink and be not extravagant." "...; and those who are with him [Muḥammad] are hardest of heart against the unbelievers, compassionate among themselves."[27] The Prophet said, "The best in all things is their mean".

Thus, the mean is that state in which the faculties of the soul should remain in order that good character may be achieved. We have seen that this observance of the mean results in the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Al-Ghazālī defines these as follows: wisdom is a state of the soul which enables a man to distinguish right from wrong "in all voluntary actions". Courage is a state of the soul in which the faculty of anger is always obedient to reason. Temperance is a state of the soul in which the faculty of desire is disciplined under the commands of reason and the Sharī'a.[28] Courage and temperance will be further discussed in the next chapter.

As for the virtue of justice, it is defined as a state of the soul in which anger and desire are controlled under the dictates of reason and the Sharī'a[29] — the state in which reason, desire and anger are kept in their proper place and given their due,[30] i.e. it is the state of the mean or equilibrium of these three faculties, but not the mean state of the faculty of justice. It is for this reason that al-Ghazālī

often uses justice as synonymous with the mean state of the soul. Now the equilibrium or the mean state of the soul is the outcome of the activity of the faculty of justice, since this is achieved when this faculty controls desire and anger according to reason and the Sharī'a. Since the equilibrium thus depends upon the function of this faculty, it is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the virtue of this faculty — a virtue which is independent rather than a totality of virtues. Thus in al-Ghazālī's ethics, justice is the virtue of the faculty of justice and it refers to the equilibrium or the sound state of the entire soul. This is justice within the soul.[31] Justice in respect of bodily members consists in using them in proper ways, i.e. using them in devotional acts and for the other purposes for which they are created.[32] Justice in conduct towards one's fellow-men lies mainly in giving to each man his due and in not harming any one in any way; the idea of abstention from harm is more stressed. This justice is made possible by the maintenance of justice within the soul, as will be explained in the last chapter of the present study. Al-Ghazālī also speaks of political justice, a form of which he defines as the distribution of the government's wealth among people in appropriate ways.[33] This justice, however, is irrelevant to his ethics. Thus the essence of justice in all its forms lies in placing every thing in its proper position. In the *Maqṣad* this is also described as the essence of divine justice.[34] Of all the forms of human justice, it is justice within the soul which is basic, and which is relevant to good character.

The four virtues mentioned above are the four parts (*arkān*) of good character. They are "the mothers of good character-traits" (*ummahāt maḥāsin al-akhlāq*) or "the roots (*uṣūl*) of character-traits", all other good traits being their branches (*furū'*). Wisdom is the highest of all virtues; it is extolled in the Qur'ānic verse, "Whoever is granted wisdom he indeed is given a great good".[35] Following al-Iṣfahānī, al-Ghazālī shows that in the Qur'ān it is indicated that the four root virtues form good character: in one verse it is said "Believers are only those who believe in God and His Apostle; then they doubt not and strive with their wealth and their lives in the way of God; they are the truthful ones."[36] The belief described here is a consequence of reason, and is the highest form of wisdom. 'Strive with their wealth in the way of God', as described in this verse indicates temperance, since this striving is only possible when the faculty of desire remains under control. To strive with life as described in this verse clearly refers to courage. In another verse

the Companions are praised for being "hardest of heart against the unbelievers, compassionate among themselves". This means that there is a place for firmness and another for compassion, and indicates the virtue of justice.[37]

These four virtues need to be acquired by everyone (including the mystics) for they are useful to the attainment of happiness. However, they are not meant for the special purpose of attaining the higher happiness, as are the mystical virtues. The four root virtues improve the individual soul[38] and hence they are individualistic, although many of their sub-divisions have social connotations. Self-training in the root virtues by a novice should be started after the completion of training in devotional acts and after giving up the evil actions of the body.[39]

The man who has acquired all these four virtues in their perfect degree deserves to be a king, who should be followed in all matters. Such a man was the Prophet. No other human being can acquire these virtues in their fullest form, since it is impossible to observe the right mean. The man who is completely deprived of all the four virtues resembles the devil, and should be expelled from society.[40] The majority of people fall between the two extreme cases. The nearer one comes to the Prophet in possession of the root virtues, the nearer will one be to God. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to acquire the virtues if they are not already present in the soul, and to remove the evil traits which may already have afflicted the soul. Both these processes will be discussed in the following section.

METHODS OF CHANGE IN CHARACTER

Al-Ghazālī first establishes his view that it is possible to change character through effort and appropriate moral training;[41] then he suggests the methods by which this change can be accomplished. He believes that the main function of religion is to guide men in the refinement of their character, arguing that if character were unchangeable, all commandments and admonitions, encouragements and threats would be useless. The Prophet said, "Make your character beautiful;" if this were not really possible, surely it would not have been commanded. Moreover, everyone admits that change of disposition among animals is possible; a beast of prey is changed from wildness to domesticity; a horse is changed from refractoriness to gentleness. If this is possible, the correction of man, with his predominance of reason, should certainly be possible. Some of

al-Ghazālī's predecessors denied the possibility of change in man's disposition. Al-Ghazālī refutes them and makes it explicit that change in character does not require the uprooting or complete supression of man's natural faculties of desire and anger, for this is a task which is impossible as long as man is alive; it only requires control of these faculties to the state of moderation, and experience has shown that this is possible through moral training.[42] Men, however, differ in the speed of change in their dispositions. Al-Ghazālī explains these differences by putting men on four levels. The first consists of negligent people (*al-insān al-ghufl*) who do not distinguish truth from falsehood or good from evil; they lack conviction, and have lacked it since their birth. Their carnal desires are not strengthened since they have not indulged in them. The character of any person of this type may become good in a short time. At the second level are those who know well enough the badness of what is bad but do not shun it, because they find their bad deeds enjoyable. The correction of their disposition is more difficult than that of the disposition of those at the first level, but is possible through strenuous effort. Those in the third stage believe their evil dispositions to be right and good and so pursue evil ways wholeheartedly. It is almost impossible for these men to be cured of their vices; there is no hope for their correction except in rare instances. The fourth group are those who, in addition to their corrupt beliefs and practices, see excellence in their very excess of evil. In this they vie with one another, and think that they gain fame by the amount of evil they accomplish. They are the most recalcitrant of the four levels, and it is of them that it has been said, 'It is a real torture for anyone to have to train a wolf to be well-mannered or to wash black haircloth to make it white'. The men at the first level are ignorant (*jāhil*); those at the second are ignorant and astray (*ḍāll*); those at the third are ignorant, astray and wicked (*fāsiq*); and men at the last level are ignorant, astray, wicked and vicious (*sharīr*).[43]

Having established his position that character is susceptible to change al-Ghazālī goes on to suggest how this change can be accomplished. First he mentions three methods by which good character-traits can be achieved. One of these is divine generosity: some people possess good character naturally (*bi-ṭ-ṭab' wa l-fiṭra*), as something given to them by God at the time of their birth. They are so created that all the faculties of their souls are in equilibrium and their faculties of desire and anger obey the dictates of reason

and the Sharī'a, so that they are good by nature. Examples of such people are Jesus Christ, John the Baptist, and all the other prophets. People other than the prophets may also possess good character naturally. Thus sometimes a child is born generous and sometimes miserly.[44] In all these views al-Ghazālī is in agreement with al-Iṣfahānī who put forward the Islamic religious teaching that good character may be inborn in man. This view is opposed to the Aristotelian conception that virtue cannot be natural.[45]

While it is possible that a man may possess good character by divine gift, the usual way of achieving it is, al-Ghazālī says, by mortification (*mujāhada*) and self-training (*riyāḍa*), i.e. taking pains to perform those actions which proceed from good character until they become habitual and pleasant. Thus to acquire the character-trait of generosity, a man needs to take pains to engage in generous actions such as giving away some particular possession; he should persevere in this generous action until it becomes a kind of second nature to him. An action will be considered to have become his nature and habit if he feels pleasure in performing it. Obtainment of pleasure, therefore, is the criterion for the acquisition of a virtue. Thus a man will only be said to have acquired the trait of generosity if he finds joy in giving away his wealth. Performance of good actions with pleasure and an unhesitating avoidance of evil are necessary *throughout* one's life, for without this the soul cannot be perfectly enlightened with good qualities. There must be constant perseverance in voluntary acts, otherwise no quality can be produced by them in the soul. Thus an element of will and full consciousness is involved in virtue. The reason why an act which was difficult and burdensome at first becomes easy and pleasant after prolonged practice lies in al-Ghazālī's theory of the circular relationship between soul and body, and also in his theory of the basic nature of the human soul. These theories have been discussed briefly in the preceding chapter. To support his view that pleasure is the criterion of the acquisition of a character-trait, and that perseverance in good deeds throughout life is necessary, al-Ghazālī quotes a Qur'ānic verse and prophetic traditions.[46] The Traditions were also quoted by al-Muḥāsibī in order to emphasize the need for continuance in good deeds. Most of al-Ghazālī's views on the method of achieving good character by habituation (*i'tiyād*) in good deeds are also found in the ethical works of the philosophers.[47] This method is regarded by him as the most effective and usual way of acquiring good qualities of the soul, and it is applied by him in every part of his

ethical system.

Good character may also be achieved by observing good people and associating with them. Man is by nature imitative; one's nature can unconsciously acquire both good and bad from the nature of another.[48] If a man associates with the virtuous for some time, he will unconsciously incorporate in himself something of their goodness and also consciously learn much from them. Where observation and association are impossible because of the absence of virtuous men, study of their lives will be sufficient to strengthen the desire for goodness and to facilitate its cultivation. This is why al-Ghazālī, when dealing with individual virtues and vices, often narrates the stories of those who underwent moral struggle, and also recommends the study of *Kitāb Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'* which contains details about the Companions, the Followers and those after them.[49] This method of learning (*ta'allum*) good traits by observing the good and mixing with them is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the basic principle of training children in good character, for they are more imitative than adults. The influence of association on character is readily observable. Miskawayh, Bryson[50] and Plato also strongly affirmed the need for good association in the formation of good character.

The man who achieves good character in all these three ways — by nature, by habituation and by association — possesses the most excellent character. One who is deprived of all these, i.e. one who is bad by nature, who has formed evil habits and also mixed with the vicious, possesses the worst type of character. Most people lie between these two extremes. The differences in their characters are owing to the differences in the methods they follow.[51] The method of habituation involves the element of divine grace (*tawfīq*): habit in good deeds is to be formed by their constant repetition through man's conscious efforts, but his efforts can only be successful when they are coupled with divine help — a point to be discussed later. Divine assistance, habituation and association are also included in the methods of changing character by the removal of evil traits from the soul. These last two, however, are greatly elaborated with respect to their various forms and techniques. After this brief discussion of al-Ghazālī's view of how good character can be achieved, consideration may be given to the methods of correcting evil character.

The first step in correcting evil character consists in one's awareness of the evil traits present in oneself. Al-Ghazālī suggests four methods which might help a man in this respect. The first is to keep company with a spiritual guide (*shaykh*). The guide will closely

observe one, and tell one about one's defects. The second is to ask a friend who is truthful, pious, and has insight. This friend should be urged to watch one's states and conditions closely and to tell one of one's manifest and hidden defects. Al-Ghazālī states that Caliph 'Umar and other great Muslims used to know their defects in this way. This method was also mentioned by Miskawayh, whose source was Galen's work *Kitāb Ta'rīf al-Mar' 'Uyūb Nafsihi.* Al-Ghazālī agrees with Miskawayh in observing that this way of knowing defects is non-existent nowadays. The reason for this, according to al-Ghazālī, is that most of a man's friends are flatterers who hide some of his defects, are envious men who do not say more than is necessary, or selfish men who consider as defects what are not really so. The third method is to gain knowledge of one's defects from an enemy. An enemy sees defects much more than a friend and speaks of them unhesitatingly, and hence he is more useful. This method was also suggested by Miskawayh, who derived it from Galen's work, *Kitāb Intifā' al-Akhyār bi-A'dā'ihim.* The last method is to mix with people and to ascribe to oneself the defects one sees in them. Since men are alike in following passions, whenever a man perceives any defect in another he should suspect its presence in himself to a greater or less degree, and begin to investigate it. In this way he can know his own defects very effectively. Al-Ghazālī supports this view by the teaching of Jesus Christ.[52] However, this view also has its parallel in Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb,*[53] where it is quoted from the work of al-Kindī.

When a man becomes aware of the evil traits which are present in himself, he should hasten to remove them. He should seek the help of a spiritual guide, just as he seeks the guidance of a medical man in curing his bodily diseases.[54] A true guide is the one who is gnostic (*'ārif*), intelligent, a seer of the soul's diseases, kind-hearted, admonishes others in religion, has completely purified his own soul from evil character-traits, and is eager to assist others in their efforts for purification.[55] Common men do not know the diseases of the soul, which are very obscure and subtle, their secret causes and the specific ways and subtle techniques for their removal, and hence they need guides. A man without a guide is often led astray by the devil. On finding a true guide one should cling to him as a blind man on the sea-shore clings to his guide; one's submission to the guide should be so complete that one does not oppose, inwardly or outwardly, any instruction of the guide that may appear unreasonable; nor must one inquire from the guide the reason for any

of his instructions. The secrets of all instructions will be revealed when one reaches the level of the guide. Al-Ghazālī states that it was al-Fārmadhī who taught him about the need for absolute submission to the spiritual guide.[56]

The method to be followed in removing the diseases of the soul, i.e. evil character-traits, is dealt with in various passages of al-Ghazālī's works. Combination of these passages gives rise to a complete method for the restoration of spiritual health. The fundamental basis of the method al-Ghazālī put in the following words:

> "The cure of every disease [of the soul] is by cutting off its substance (*mādda*) and removing its causes (*asbāb*)... These must be removed by means of their opposites (*aḍdād*)."[57]

A vice of the soul can be cured permanently if its substance is destroyed. This can only be accomplished by the removal of the causes of a vice;[58] that is why al-Ghazālī often says that the cure of a spiritual disease lies in the removal of its causes and, while suggesting the treatment of the individual vices, makes an exhaustive enquiry into the causes of every vice. The causes of a vice can, in turn, be removed by their opposites — which is why al-Ghazālī sometimes asserts that the cure of a disease lies in opposing its causes;[59] he even calls this opposition the general rule of spiritual treatment. The causes of a vice need to be opposed by knowledge and action, as he says:

> "Know that all the evil character-traits are cured by the unguent (*ma'jūn*) of knowledge (*'ilm*) and action (*'amal*). The cure of every [spiritual] disease is by opposing its cause, and so we should minutely investigate its cause."[60]

The element of knowledge is very comprehensive. It concerns the nature of a vice, its causes, and its harm in this life or in the next or in both.[61] Knowledge of harm should be so certain that it becomes deep-seated in the soul, and attains the status of strong faith and firm conviction.[62] Such knowledge will arouse a strong disgust for the vice. Al-Ghazālī's emphasis upon knowledge of the otherworldly harm of a vice is in accordance with the Qur'ān and Tradition. In contrast, the Muslim philosophers, e.g. Miskawayh, hardly mentioned this otherworldly harm in their treatment of vices. Opposing the cause of a vice by knowledge is called by al-Ghazālī its cognitive remedy (*'ilāj 'ilmī*). Knowledge has also the effect of arousing the desire for opposing the cause by the element of action. Thus the

element of knowledge logically precedes that of action. The action in which perseverance is necessary in order to get rid of a vice should be such that its effect will counter the cause of the vice. It should also be contrary to the actions which proceed from the vice. Thus, to remove the trait of miserliness from the soul, the act of giving away needs to be repeated for a long time. As a result of perseverance in the opposite action, the vice will be effaced from the soul, and its opposite quality, which is a virtue, will be established.[63] This happens in accordance with the interaction theory of the relationship between soul and body. The removal of a vice by means of the element of action is called by al-Ghazālī the practical remedy (*'ilāj 'amalī*) for it. Since opposite action is contrary to one's desire, it demands a high degree of patience (*ṣabr*); indeed without patience, no cure is possible.[64] This seems to be the reason why it is said in one passage that the remedy for an evil trait of character lies in the combination of three elements (*arkān*), these being knowledge, action and patience, and that it is knowledge which facilitates action.[65] But since patience concerns action, it is regarded, in all other passages, as an aspect of the element of action and not as an independent element, so that the cure of a vice lies in knowledge and action. It is the *combination* of these two elements which is necessary. In the case of a few vices, however, knowledge alone is regarded as sufficient for their removal. This is because these vices are caused by ignorance only, and what opposes ignorance is knowledge.

The principle of opposition, al-Ghazālī says, is put in its entirely in a single Qur'ānic verse, "As for him who fears to stand in the presence of his Lord and keeps the soul from passion, then surely paradise — that is his abode."[66] In prophetic traditions too, resisting the carnal desires is commanded. This teaching of the Sharī'a is emphasized by the ṣūfīs, including al-Ghazālī.[67] The Sharī'a also enjoined the removal of vices from the soul by good acts of the body. This constitutes the source of the specific form of opposition found in the ethics of al-Ghazālī, al-Makkī[68] and al-Muḥāsibī, i.e. the removal of a vice by removing its causes, and the removal of causes by means of their opposites. Al-Ghazālī's description of this form of opposition agrees with that of al-Makkī and Miskawayh.[69] A passage from al-Makkī's *Qūt* may be quoted here in order to demonstrate the extent of agreement.

> "Know that the evils of the souls are their diseases, and the

cleaning of souls from diseases is through a remedy... For every disease of the soul there is a remedy commensurate with the smallness or greatness of the disease. Apply, then, a remedy for the disease wherever it attacks you, by introducing the antidote of the disease, or by cutting off its root (*aṣl*)". [70]

However, al-Ghazālī's minute investigation into the causes of every vice and his prescription of the measures for opposing them remind one of Miskawayh [71] and al-Muḥāsibī. However, while they laid more emphasis upon counteraction by knowledge than by action, [72] al-Ghazālī considers both equally important. This view of al-Ghazālī accords with Islamic religious teachings. Al-Makkī, however, seems to have emphasized action more than the element of knowledge.

In refining the character of a disciple by means of the principle of opposition, the guide should first diagnose the disciple's disease and determine its causes, and also decide upon the form of self-training he will be able to undergo with good intention, according to age, bodily health and temperament. After a thorough examination of all these the guide will prescribe a particular form of cure. The correction of the inward self (*bāṭin*) by the rule of opposition should follow after that of the outward (*ẓāhir*). [73] If an evil trait is so strong that the disciple is unable to remove it by practising its opposite, the guide should devise a technique by which the disciple's habit in that trait may be deflected to a less evil trait, and this should then be removed by its opposite. A too miserly disciple, for example, will be ordered to give away his wealth in order to impress others. After doing this for some time miserliness will have vanished, but the evil trait of love of influence will be powerful in the soul, and this should now be removed by its opposite. This is like cleaning a blood-stain with urine, and then cleaning urine with water. [74]

Perseverance in opposition must be stopped immediately after the mean has been achieved, for the soul has now regained its health, and if opposition is continued it will acquire another evil trait in place of the first. [75] For instance, if miserliness exists in the soul, it is necessary to train oneself in the other extreme, i.e. prodigality. When, as a result of this, the soul has come back to the mean state, the state of generosity, prodigal acts must be stopped, otherwise the trait of prodigality will be generated in the soul. Al-Ghazālī mentions a technique which will enable a man to know if his soul has come back to the mean state in regard to a particular character-trait. This is to consider the action which stems from evil character:

if this action is easier and more pleasant than its opposite action the soul is in a state deviating from the mean. For example, witholding money from deserving people is an act of miserliness; if this is more pleasant than giving money to them, it is a clear indication that the soul has deviated to the extreme of deficiency; if giving money to the undeserving is easier than not giving to them, it is a sign that the soul has crossed the mean to the extreme of excess in spending. In this way an individual engaged in character refinement can easily know if he has achieved the mean. [76]

The removal of evil character-traits, by following the method of opposition and the techniques connected with it, is obviously accomplished through a man's conscious efforts. There is, however, a supernatural element, i.e. the element of divine grace (*tawfīq*) involved in it. This element is also involved in the acquisition of good character-traits through habituation and association, which is accomplished by human efforts. In the very introduction to "The Book on the Training of the Soul, the Refinement of Character, and the Treatment of the Diseases of the Soul" al-Ghazālī says:

"He [God] entrusted the task of making the character beautiful to man's diligence and effort, incited him to its refinement by inspiring dread and by cautioning, facilitated the refinement of character to a special class of men by His grace and preparation, and bestowed favour upon them by easing the difficulty of this refinement." [77]

In the fourth part of the *Iḥyā'* he confirms this view saying:

"He [the disciple] should know that that [purification of the soul from an evil quality] is only accomplished by the grace of God (may He be exalted!) and His help. Should that be entrusted to himself, [alone] he will not be able to efface the smallest vice from his soul." [78]

In his exposition of the remedies for individual vices, and also in various other places, al-Ghazālī speaks of the need for different forms of divine help such as 'divine leading', 'divine strengthening' and 'divine grace'. [79] When stating how difficult it is to observe the mean in character he says that every adult is required to beg help from God in ritual prayer. [80] This statement also makes it explicit that ritual prayer is an indirect way of drawing forth divine aid — a point that has been discussed in the preceding chapter. Al-Ghazālī's recognition of the need for divine help in moral training is in accord

with Islamic religious teachings. Its need was also recognized by his ṣūfī predecessor, al-Muḥāsibī.[81] Aristotle, however, believed that man could achieve the mean by his own efforts. In connection with virtues, Miskawayh said, "They may be sought, pursued, and attained by activity, effort and diligence"; however, when concluding his discussion of the treatment of the soul's diseases, he asserted that in treatment "... the help of God (mighty and exalted is He!) should be solicited to ensure success, for success is coupled with diligence: neither can be achieved without the other."[82] Al-Ghazālī believes that the diligence required is not too great if one is trained in good character in one's childhood. Moral training in boyhood shapes the virtuous character of the grown man;[83] hence al-Ghazālī suggests a scheme for the training of children in morality.

THE TRAINING OF CHILDREN IN GOOD CHARACTER

The training of children in good character is, according to al-Ghazālī, mainly the responsibility of their parents. He supports this view by the Qur'ānic verse, "O believers, save yourselves and your families from the Fire whose fuel is men and stones".[84] He also quotes prophetic traditions in order to prove that this training is a binding duty of parents.[85] School teachers are also regarded by him as responsible for the moral education of children to a certain extent. The methods of this training are identical with those of training adults in good character. The emphasis upon these methods, however, is different in the two cases: in the adult, habituation was the basic method and it accordingly received more emphasis in al-Ghazālī's ethics than did association, but in the case of children it is the reverse; indeed, protection from evil associates is regarded as the basis (*aṣl*) of the training of children in good character.[86] This is because most of their learning is through imitation. Knowledge of the benefit and harm of good and evil in the hereafter is irrelevant to moral training in childhood, since children, whose faculty of reason has not yet developed, are unable to understand these matters. It is reward and punishment by parents, and praise and blame by other people which should be used as means of habituating them in good and keeping them from evil. The aim of training is to implant in children the seeds of such traits as would enable them, when they become adults, to live a happy and virtuous life which will ensure happiness in the hereafter.

"If the father accustoms the child to goodness and teaches it to him, he will grow up in it and be happy in this life and in the next... If the father safeguards the child from the fire of this world, it is even more necessary for him to safeguard him from the fire of the next. The father's safeguarding of the child consists in disciplining him, refining him, teaching him good character-traits, keeping him from evil companions, not accustoming him to indulgence, and in not making ornaments or the means towards the comforts of life beloved by him, otherwise he will waste his time in seeking them when he is advanced in age, and thus he will meet eternal perdition."[87]

It is in the light of the aim and the methods expressed in this passage that al-Ghazālī works out the details of the training. He maintains that training in morals should start from the very beginning of a child's life. The child should be nursed and suckled by a pious woman. Nourishment by the milk drawn from an evil source will incline his nature (*ṭab'*) to that which is evil. When the child begins to speak he should be taught the name of God who created him. Good care should be taken of him at the age of discernment (*tamyīz*), which is marked by the appearance of modesty in him. He now restrains himself from some evil acts, judging them as such by his discernment. Modesty is a good quality and it should be encouraged when it appears in a child.[88]

The first desire that appears in a child is that for food, and this desire should be disciplined. He should be taught to pronounce the name of God before eating, to use his right hand, to start with whatever is near him, not to be the first to go to the dining room, not to gaze at different dishes or at others eating, to chew his food well and not to smear his hands and clothes with food. Hatred of gluttony should be established in his mind by comparing gluttons with the lower animals, by rebuking gluttonous children in his presence, and by praising those content with a small quantity of food. He should be trained to like giving others preference over himself in food, and to be content with whatever is available for himself. He should be blamed for any inordinate desire for tasty food, drink and splendid clothes. The most correct dress for the male child is white and coarse; dislike for coloured and silken clothes and for extravagant dress should be created in his mind. He must not be allowed to associate with or even to see those children who wear extravagant dress. All this will protect him from forming habits of excessive

enjoyment, pleasure, luxury and proud conduct. In order to guard him against such evils as jealously, calumny, theft, importunity, meddling and spite, he is to be carefully prevented from mixing with the vicious, since children usually learn evil from evil companions.[89] The child should be rewarded for any good trait or deed which he may show and commended for it in the presence of others. If he does any evil for the first time, it is better to ignore it, especially when he tries to conceal it. On repeating it, however, he should be reproached for it secretly, and warned against it by the disapproval of others. He should not be reproached always, otherwise it will become easy for him to hear blame for evildoing. The mother should prevent him from wrongdoing by telling him of punishment by his father.[90]

In the school the boy should be taught the Qur'ān, Tradition, and stories about the pious, so that love of these may be implanted in his mind. He should not be allowed to study love poetry and to mix with those who maintain that such poetry sharpens a child's brain and makes him clever. Love poetry, al-Ghazālī believes, sows the seeds of corruption in the child's mind. He should be helped to develop the habit of walking and exercise in order that he may be physically healthy. He should not be allowed to sleep during the day, nor too much at night, for this will make him lazy. Nor should be he given a soft bed or any other means of luxury, in order to harden his body and habituate him in a strenuous life. Physical exercise should be taken after retiring from school; this will give him rest from the toil of education — all study and no rest or exercise will make him dull. He should be taught to obey his teachers, parents and all his elders, whether relatives or not, and to honour them. He should be taught to develop manliness and bravery; if beaten by his teachers he should not cry or make a fuss, for this is the conduct of slaves and women.[91]

Humility, respect for friends and associates and kindliness should be taught to him. He should be forbidden to boast of his parents' possessions, or of his own food, dress, and the like. The child of a rich family should be taught the excellence of giving away, while the child of a poor family should be instructed that it is mean and disgraceful to be greedy and to take things from others. The child should be made to detest gold and silver and to fear them more than he does snakes and scorpions. He should be taught, when in the company of others, not to spit, or blow his nose, or yawn, or cross his legs, or beat his chin with his forearm, or support his head with his

hand. He must not swear, either truthfully or falsely. When his superiors come in he should make room for them and sit beside them. He should keep silent, or speak only when spoken to. He should be told not to use useless talk, vile speech, curses, or rebuke, and be prevented from hearing these from others.[92]

At the age of discernment the child will be required to perform some of the obligatory devotional acts such as ritual prayer and fasting on some days of the month of Ramaḍān. At this stage he will also be cautioned against gold, silk, theft, unlawful food, betrayal, lies, and all other sins which predominate in children. At maturity (*bulūgh*) he will be capable of knowing the deep reasons for all that in which he has hitherto been trained, and so these reasons should now be clearly explained to him, e.g. (a) the purpose of eating is to acquire strength for devotional acts and other good deeds and not for pleasure; (b) this world is important only as an avenue to the next; and so on. These deep reasons will be engraved in his mind, since he has already become accustomed to good morals.[93]

NOTES

1. *D.* III, 46—47. Al-Ghazālī's mode of argument on this point is somewhat similar to that of Aristotle in his *Ethics* 2.5.1105b—1106a.
2. *D.* III, 46. This definition of character agrees with that of Miskawayh in his *Tahdhīb*, p. 31. Miskawayh seems to have followed Galen (Walzer, "New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy", in his *Greek*, p. 147). Like al-Ghazālī, al-Iṣfahānī was also influenced by the definition of character given by the philosophers; in his *Dharī'a*, pp. 28—30 he sought to distinguish between the terms *khuluq*, *'āda*, *ṭab'*, and *sajiyya*. Al-Ghazālī's ṣūfī predecessors do not seem to have enquired into the real meaning of character. He criticizes some of them, saying that they defined character in terms of its results or consequences rather than its essence or real meaning; see *D.* III, 46.
3. *D.* III, 46.
4. *D.* III, 47.
5. *D.* III, 47, 6; *K.* pp. 629—30; *A.* p. 74; cf. al-Iṣfahānī; *Dharī'a*, pp. 27, 22; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 16; Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, pp. 152—53; Plato *Republic* 4.400—442, 10.579—580; also see *supra*, pp. 50-52.
6. Al-Ghazālī's view of the need for harmony among the faculties of the soul agrees with the teachings of Plato and the Muslim philosophers. His derivation of virtues from the faculties of the soul also brings them to mind. However, in explaining his concept of harmony and in deriving the virtue of justice from a faculty of the soul, al-Ghazālī differs from them. His specification of the soundness of a faculty by means of the concept of the mean is similar to that of Muslim philosophers and later Greek writers. For the notion of the mean itself he relies upon the Qur'ān and Tradition in which the importance of the mean is strongly emphasized. The idea of the mean was first applied to ethics by Aristotle; he was followed by the Greek moralists and later by the Muslim

philosophers, who also supported it by Islamic religious teachings. The details of al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the mean show that he is influenced to some degree by the philosophers as well as by the ṣūfī al-Makkī.

7. *D*, III, 47; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 22; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 26—28; Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, pp. 153—54; Aristotle *Ethics* 2.7. 1108b.
8. *D*, III, 47—48. In this process of subordinating several virtues or vices to a particular virtue or vice, al-Ghazālī agrees with Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, pp. 19—24) and Avicenna (*Akhlāq*, pp. 152—54; *'Ahd*, pp. 143—45). He, however, differs from them in certain details, i.e. in the order, number, and the location of subordinate virtues. This scheme of virtues is absent in al-Fārābī (*Fuṣūl al-Madanī*, ed. by D.M. Dunlop, Cambridge, England, 1961, pp. 113—14) and in his Christian student Ibn 'Adī who wrote in Arabic (*Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, ed. by Mar Severius Afram Barṣaum, in "Jahja ibn 'Adi's Treatise on Character-Training", *AJSLL*, XLV (1928—29), 24—31). It is present to a certain extent in ancient Greek texts (Walzer, "Aspect", pp. 222—23). Plato and Aristotle, however, did not present virtues in the manner of al-Ghazālī, Miskawayh and Avicenna. Some of the moral and intellectual virtues mentioned by Aristotle in his *Ethics* were incorporated by Muslim philosophers in their works, while a few of them were rejected as disagreeing with Islamic religious teachings. Al-Ghazālī examines the lists of virtues given by Muslim philosophers and introduces important changes and modifications, subtracting some virtues and adding others. All this he does because of his view that virtues may serve as means to happiness in the hereafter.
9. *D*, IV, 368.
10. *A*, p. 60. Concerning the second book of the third part of the *D* where the cardinal virtues, the mean, and the methods of moral training are dealt with, De Boer ("Ethics", p. 509) says that the philosophic treatment in this book has no further influence upon the contents of the third and fourth parts. This statement may be questioned, in view of what has been said above, and also of the fact that al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the mean is applied in both the second and the fourth parts, and that the methods of moral training are involved in all parts of the *D*.
11. *A*, pp. 23, 74, 119, 132, 177, 188; *K*, pp. 19, 64; *N*, p. 24; *M.A.* p. 47.
12. *D*. III, 46.
13. *Ethics* 2.6. 1106b. Very often Umaruddin (*Al-Ghazzālī*, pp. 75, 109, 110, 163, 166, 168, 189, 191, 200) spoke of reason as the only guiding factor in morals; he ignored al-Ghazālī's recognition of the Sharī'a as a factor necessary in deciding the mean. Mubārak, however, correctly mentioned the need of both reason and the Sharī'a; see his *Akhlāq*, pp. 11, 140, 146—47.
14. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 27, 177.
15. *Ibid*., pp. 177, 197, 200, 205.
16. The need for both reason and the sharī'a in character refinement was also recognized by the Sahlīs, the followers of Sahl at-Tustarī; see al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, p. 196. In addition to recognizing the importance of the Sharī'a, al-Muḥāsibī also recognized an important role for reason in the moral struggle against the carnal soul; quoting a Tradition he says that the task of reason is to know the harmful consequences of the demands of passions and desires, and then to prescribe rules for their control; see his *Ri'āya*, pp. 147—48.
17. *D*, III, 84, 147. The relative nature of the mean was also acknowledged by

philosophers such as al-Fārābī in his *Fuṣūl*, Miskawayh in his *Tahdhīb*, pp. 25—26, 20, 196, 204 and Aristotle in his *Ethics* 2.6.1106b.

18. Qur'ān 26:89.
19. *D*. III, 50, 83.
20. *D*. III, 55, II, 71. Al-Ghazālī says that it is only the Prophet who was able to keep to the right mean. Even he was so afraid of deviation that he said that the chapter of the Qur'ān entitled "Hūd", where he was commanded by God to be firm on the straight path, caused his hair to grow white. Aristotle (*Ethics* 2.6. 1106b, 9.1109a—b), al-Fārābī (*At-Tanbīh 'alā Sabīl as-Sa'āda*, Hyderabad, 1346/1927, p. 10) and Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, p. 25) also acknowledged tremendous difficulty in finding the right mean. But while they believed that observation of certain rules may enable a man to hit the mean and to keep it, al-Ghazālī regards the mean as impossible to achieve.
21. Qur'ān 19:71—72; *D*. III, 55, II, 71, IV, 23, 24; *A*, p. 21; *K*, p. 113. B. Carra de Vaux ("Djahannam", *EI*, p. 998) says that al-Ghazālī does not accept the material nature of the bridge-like path in the hereafter. He says that this path has, for al-Ghazālī, only a moral meaning; it is merely the straight path mentioned in the Qur'ān and it symbolizes the right mean. His reference is to the end of the *M.B.*, but this book contains no such teaching. In the *D*, the *K* and the *A* the physical nature of the bridge in the hereafter is clearly asserted; it is only *compared* with the mean, which is the straight path mentioned in the Qur'ān.

    In understanding the word *wāriduhā* (which occurs in the verse quoted above) as meaning "to pass over it [hell]", al-Ghazālī agrees with such great commentators as aṭ-Ṭabarī, Ibn al-Kathīr and al-Marāghī. Aṭ-Ṭabarī regards this meaning as the most correct one. They all choose this meaning because it is in accord with the *ṣaḥīḥ* Traditions concerning the bridge to be suspended over hell, and also because it involves no difficulty. However several other meanings of the word are also possible. See aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āi al-Qur'ān*, 2d ed., Egypt, 1954, XV, 108—14; Ibn al-Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Aẓīm*, Egypt, n.d., III, 131—34; al-Marāghī, *Tafsīr al-Marāghī*, 2d ed., Egypt, 1953, XVI, 74—75.
22. *A*, p. 94; *D*, III, 85—86, 199; cf. Aristotle *Ethics* 2.6.1106a, 2.1104a.
23. *Qūt*, II, 346, 355, 359.
24. *D*, III, 50, 82, 199. II, 2, IV, 131.
25. pp. 530, 629—30. All this shows how great an importance al-Ghazālī assigned to the doctrine of the mean in his later works; he never rejected this doctrine even partially. Watt's view in his *Intellectual*, p. 68, is not correct. He says: '... he [al-Ghazālī] must have turned to a complete rejection of the criterion of the mean as a scientific basis for ethics ... Perhaps at the time of his realization that the strict demands of logic were not fulfilled by philosophical theology he came to see that the same was true of ethics, and in ethics as in theology turned back to the Islamic revelation". For a discussion of the views of Watt and Walzer on the question of al-Ghazālī's rejection or acceptance of philosophic ethics during the mystical period of his life, see Abul Quasem, "Rejection", pp. 112—27; "Al-Ghazālī and Philosophic Ethics" (forthcoming).
26. *D*, III, 49—50. Al-Ghazālī is correct in regarding the mean as the central theme of the ethics of the Qur'ān and Tradition. To create a balance of mind and to maintain it throughout life is required of man by God and his Apostle; cf.

Fazlur Rohman. "The Qur'ānic Conception of God, the Universe and Man", *IS*, VI (1967), 12; 'Abbās Maḥmūd al-'Aqqād, *Ḥaqā'iq al-Islām wa Abāṭīl Khuṣūmih*, pp. 365ff.

27. Qur'ān 25:67, 17:29, 7:31, 48:29.
28. *D*, III, 47.
29. *D*, III, 47; *N*, p. 24; *M.A.* p. 47.
30. *A*, p. 73.
31. *M.A.*, p. 63; *N*, p. 24.
32. *M.A.*, p. 47.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 45—47.
35. Qur'ān 2:269; *D*, III, 47—48.
36. Qur'ān 49:15.
37. Qur'ān 48:29; *D*, III, 48; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 27.
38. *D*, III, 42; *A*, p. 181; *K*, pp. 18—19.
39. *D*, I, 112.
40. *D*, III, 48; *K*, p. 431. These views of al-Ghazālī slightly agree with those of al-Fārābī in his *Fuṣūl* and *Taḥṣīl;* cf. Mehmet Aydin, "The Term *Sa'āda* in the Selected Works of al-Fārābī and al-Ghazālī", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972, pp. 326—27.
41. The problem of the alteration of character was discussed by philosophers, e.g. Aristotle (*Ethics* 2.1.1103a) the Stoics, Galen (Walzer, "Light" p. 146) and Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, pp. 31—36). It was also investigated by al-Iṣfahānī (*Dharī'a*, pp. 29—30, 48) who used prophetic traditions to support his views. Al-Ghazālī follows him almost exactly. The ṣūfis who preceded al-Ghazālī do not seem to have taken an interest in this subject; they all assumed that it was possible to effect change in character through moral training. In al-Muḥāsibī's *Ri'āya*, pp. 146—48, however, there is a long passage the theme of which agrees with al-Ghazālī's views; but this passage occurs in a different context.
42. *D*, III, 48—49; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, pp. 29—30; al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, pp. 146—48; Aristotle *Ethics* 2.1.1103a.
43. *D*, III, 48—49; cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 48; al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, pp. 14—21.
44. *D*, III, 50; Cf. al-Iṣfahānī, *Dharī'a*, p. 33.
45. *Ethics* 2.1.1103a. "Moral goodness, ..., is the child of habit, ... none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by nature,..."
46. *D*, III, 50—52, 48; cf. al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, p. 62.
47. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 218—19; al-Fārābī, *Tanbīh*, pp. 4—5, 14f.; Avicenna, *'Ahd*, p. 145; Aristotle *Ethics* 2.1.1103a—b, 3.1104b, 4.1105a—1106a.
48. *D*, III, 52.
49. *D*, IV, 355.
50. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 177—78.
51. *D*, III, 52.
52. *D*, III, 67—68.
53. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 189—191.
54. Al-Ghazālī applies the methods of curing bodily sickness to the treatment of spiritual diseases, i.e. the evil character-traits. This procedure is found in Greek ethics as well as in Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb*, pp. 175, 176, 178 and al-Muḥāsibī's *Ri'āya*, pp. 30—31. Al-Ghazālī merely makes a more complete use

of this procedure than did his predecessors. This is, for the most part, omitted here for the sake of brevity.

55. *D*, III, 56. Al-Ghazālī states (*M.B.*, p. 67) that prophets are in fact the spiritual guides. Their heirs are the learned men of the hereafter (*'ulamā' al-ākhira*) whose characteristics he describes in detail in *D*, I, 53—73. In other parts of the *D*, and also in his other works, he mentions their distinguishing features, of which seven are given above. Al-Makkī's view on spiritual guides was the same. In his *Qūt*, II, 297, 358, I, 226, he described the learned men of the hereafter. Thus the guides whose help is needed in character refinement are not easily available. They do not include those religious scholars who have succumbed to the disease of worldliness and materialism.
56. *D*, IV, 321, 238, III, 65.
57. *D*, III, 149.
58. *D*, III, 150.
59. *D*, III, 226.
60. *D*, III, 129.
61. Knowledge concerning a vice is not included in *'ilm al-mukāshafa* which falls outside the scope of ethics. It is related to 'action', and is therefore included in ethics; see *D*, IV, 7.
62. *D*, III, 129, 130.
63. *D*, IV, 69.
64. *K*, p. 520; *D*, III, 173, IV, 50.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Qur'ān 79:40—41.
67. *D*, III, 53, 54, 56—59; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 501, where he regarded the opposition to passion (*hawā*) as the best warfare (*jihād*) on the grounds that passion is the real source of worldly desires; al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, pp. 20, 147, where he says that it is a man's duty to struggle (*mujāhada*) against his carnal soul and prohibit passion; al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf*, pp. 195—209, where strong resistance to the carnal soul and passion is described as the special feature of the Sahlīs, the followers of Sahl at-Tustarī.
68. *Qūt*, I, 157, 215, 366, 381.
69. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 195, 126, 202, 206: "... each one of these causes [of excessive anger] has a remedy which one may attempt [and then pursue] until it is completely uprooted. When we proceed to sever and remove these causes we weaken the power of anger, cut off its substance,..." "The remedy of these causes and consequences can be effected through their opposites,..." "... the intelligent man, ..., should not find it hard to examine the diseases which fall under these genera [the eight vices which correspond to the four cardinal virtues] as species and individuals, to cure his soul of them, and to treat them with their opposite remedies."
70. *Qūt*, II, III.
71. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 193—217.
72. Al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, pp. 98, 99, 103, 219, 248; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 196—222.
73. *D*, III, 53.
74. *D*, III, 53, 217.
75. *D*, III, 55, IV, 131; cf. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 206, where the same view is expressed.

76. *D*. III, 55.
77. *D*. III, 42
78. *D*. IV, 368.
79. *D*. I, 84, III, 268.
80. *D*. III, 55.
81. *Ri'āya*. pp. 218, 19, 20.
82. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 191, 222.
83. *D*. III, 64. This has also been recognized by Miskawayh who accordingly presented in his *Tahdhīb*, pp. 55—64, a scheme of moral education for children, admittedly adopting much of this scheme from Bryson, a Greek author, probably of the Neopythagorean School of the 1st century A.D. Comparison of al-Ghazālī's scheme in its completeness in the *D*. III, 62—64, with Miskawayh's shows al-Ghazālī's agreement — sometimes textual and sometimes in sense only — as well as differences. These differences relate to his conception of the aim of human beings, which is happiness in the hereafter. His ṣūfī predecessors, e.g. al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī did not give any special scheme of moral training for children.
84. Qur'ān 66:6; *D*. III, 62.
85. *D*. II, 193—94.
86. *D*. III, 62.
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
91. *Ibid.* Al-Ghazālī omits the training of fighting men in the battlefield; he, however, suggests measures for the attainment of a sound physique, courageous attitude and capacity to endure hardship.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*, p. 64; also see *supra*, p. 52.

IV
VICES

PRELIMINARIES

An attempt has been made in the preceding chapter to consider al-Ghazālī's thought concerning character and how it can be changed. The meaning of virtues and vices as constituents of good and evil character has been pointed out, and the methods by which they can be acquired or removed from the soul have been stated in a general way. The present chapter deals mainly with the nature of individual vices and the way in which each vice can be banished by following the general method already considered. These are called by al-Ghazālī the details of self-training (*riyāḍa*) in the removal of every vice.[1] In fact, however, these are discussed by him not for every vice but only for those vices which constitute the roots (*uṣūl*) from which the others stem; self-training in the removal of the latter need not be discussed, since he believes that with the disappearance of the root vices there would be nothing to proceed from them.[2] For each vice there is a corresponding virtue; hence virtues as well as vices will be treated in this chapter.

The root vices whose removal demands self-training are: gluttony, excess in sexual desire, desire for excessive speech, strong anger, envy, rancour, love of the world, love of wealth, miserliness, love of influence, ostentation, pride, conceit and delusion. Strictly speaking, delusion is not a root vice, but a misconception about moral matters, particularly about one's possession of good character-traits. This is plain from the *Arba'īn* where it is included not in the list of root vices but in the method of self-training and mortification.[3] In the *Iḥyā'* and the *Kīmiyā'* it is included in the list because its discussion after pride and conceit as one of their causes is felt necessary. In the *Arba'īn*, excess in sexual desire is also omitted in the list of root vices.

Some of these vices are, as will later be seen, deviations from 'the mean'; for these and also for some others the term 'vices' (*radhā'il*) is used, following the philosophers. All these root vices are also

referred to as blameworthy character-traits (*akhlāq madhmūma*) following the Qur'ān and Tradition, in which the word 'character-trait' frequently occurs. They are also mentioned as blameworthy qualities (*ṣifāt madhmūma*), abominations in the soul (*khabā'ith fī n-nafs*), diseases of the soul (*amrāḍ al-qalb*) and destructive qualities (*ṣifāt muhlikāt*); these phrases, though they occur occasionally in the Qur'ān and Tradition, are in common use among the ṣūfīs; al-Ghazālī's use of these words reflects the influence of the ṣūfīs upon him. His use of these three different terms for the same vices is not accidental: it is done in order to signify that ṣūfism, the Sharī'a and the good elements in philosophic works on ethics are in accord with each other.

The removal of these ten vices is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the purification of the soul (*taṭhīr al-bāṭin, tazkiyat al-qalb*) and also as the polishing of the soul (*taṣqīl al-qalb*).[4] Purification is obligatory for every individual and the most important work in life. To support this idea he quotes the Qur'ānic verse in which success in the future life is made dependent upon it.[5] Vices draw the soul away from God. They cause punishment in the future life, and are therefore called destructive qualities; 'destructive' here means causing great suffering in the hereafter[6] and not annihilation of being; sometimes, however, it is also used to mean causing suffering in this life.[7] In the case of some vices, certain teachings of al-Ghazālī concern the lower grade of devotional practice; others are intended for the higher, which also includes those of the lower. The former are appropriate to the pious while the latter are relevant to the mystics. Purification of the soul will only be complete when all these vices have been removed. The reason for this lies in al-Ghazālī's theory of the interconnection of vices: a vice may be caused by many other vices, and it in turn is the cause of others. So if a single root vice is left unremedied, the soul is defiled by it, and also by other vices generated from it. This idea is expressed at the end of the exposition of purification in the *Arba'īn*. Besides generating other vices in accordance with the theory of interconnection given above, each root vice has its external manifestation in the form of evil acts of the bodily members. These evil acts are those forbidden in the Sharī'a; the terms used for them by al-Ghazālī are identical with the terms used in the Sharī'a, namely *faḥshā', ma'ṣiya, jurm, ithm, munkar, sū'* and so on. The Sharī'a, he says, stated the reason for avoiding these acts: they have a bad effect on the soul, metaphorically described as 'dark spots', 'changes in its form', etc. This effect is

also mentioned by al-Makkī.[8] But al-Ghazālī is led by his theory of a circular relationship between the soul and the body to say also that when, as a result of these evil acts, the quality of the soul from which they proceeded is strengthened, similar evil acts proceed from it more easily than before; these in turn contribute to the greater strengthening of the quality, and a circular process continues indefinitely.[9] What is more necessary therefore is to get rid of the qualities, i.e. the vices, for it is this which will stop the occurrence of evil acts. This is a reason why al-Ghazālī so strongly emphasizes the task of purification. A similar attitude was expressed by Miskawayh.[10] The Sharī'a's emphasis upon it, however, is less than upon the acts. By thus linking inner purification with the avoidance of the outward acts, al-Ghazālī combines ṣūfism with the Sharī'a. This link is central in his ethics and it is made explicit in many of his works.[11]

Purification on the part of a novice should follow after self-training in good acts related to the outward self (*ẓāhir*); however it should precede the task of making the soul beautiful with the mystical virtues to be discussed in the next chapter. The root vices form obstacles on the path to God, and until these have been removed, it is impossible to traverse the stations on the path. With the removal of the vices, the soul becomes fit to receive the mystical qualities. A similar view was also held by Miskawayh who said: "They [the virtues] are not achieved by us until we have purified our soul's wicked bodily passions and their vile beastly lusts".[12] He differs from al-Ghazālī, in that the virtues about which he speaks are not the mystical virtues. Indeed al-Ghazālī's teaching concerning the stage of purification is mystical in nature. This stage is mentioned in many of his works; a passage from the *Iḥyā'* runs thus:

> "If you are desirous of the hereafter, seeking salvation and running away from eternal damnation, pursue the science of the soul's diseases and their remedies... which *will lead* you to the praiseworthy 'stations'... because no sooner is the soul purged from what is blameworthy than it is filled with that which is praiseworthy just as the soil where all kinds of plants and flowers would grow as soon as the grass is weeded out — *unless* the weeds are removed neither plants nor flowers would grow."[13]

The method prescribed by al-Ghazālī for getting rid of these vices is the one briefly described in the preceding chapter. Its elements are knowledge and action, which need to be combined for the complete

cure of a vice. The concepts of a spiritual director (*shaykh*) to assist the disciples in purification; of gradual progress in training; of resorting, where necessary, to the technique already mentioned; and of stopping the training just after the mean is achieved in the case of those vices which are deviations from it — these have all been retained and consistently applied. Since the remedy for a vice consists in performing those acts which are opposite to the acts caused by it, and since habit-formation in the opposite acts is also a means of acquiring a virtue, al-Ghazālī's description of the removal of a vice involves the description of the acquisition of a virtue.

Each vice is discussed by al-Ghazālī in its three main aspects, namely, its true nature, the reason why it is termed a vice, and the specific way in which it can be remedied; his mention of the evils of a vice and its condemnation is related to the last two aspects. Only the essential points in each of these three aspects need be discussed in the present study. Al-Ghazālī describes the root vices as forming an ascending scale beginning with gluttony and ending with pride and conceit. He also points out the link existing between them. This link will be discussed in the present study, and an effort will also be made to suggest, where possible, the main source or sources of al-Ghazālī's views on every root vice.

THE ROOT VICES AND THE CONTRASTING VIRTUES

Gluttony

Gluttony is the harmful quality which the novice should get rid of first, since all evil desires originate from it.[14] Desire for food is natural in man, and its aim is to ensure bodily health so that it may be a means to happiness. It is only the moderate satisfaction of this desire that is useful to this end. Excess and deficiency in it are both harmful, although it is the excess which is meant by al-Ghazālī in calling this desire a destructive quality. They are both bars to the two primary means of happiness, i.e. knowledge and action: satiety makes the limbs too heavy; hunger occupies the mind with the thought of food; but the man who takes a moderate quantity of food feels free from hunger and heaviness of stomach; he "forgets his stomach". Such a state is conducive to knowledge and action. For this reason the mean (*wasaṭ*) in desire for food is called the source of all good.[15] The virtue which appears from it is temperance (*'iffa*). The reason for the mean in this desire is similar to that given by

al-Makkī. It also agrees to some extent with the reason given by Miskawayh. Like the former, al-Ghazālī gives another reason for it, namely, to resemble the angels and thus to draw near to God: the angels are free from this desire; although man cannot be free from it, by observing the mean he becomes, as it were, free, and thus like them.[16]

The mean in satisfying the desire for food is impossible to observe without appropriate training for it. Training needs to be given not in the mean but at a point very near to the extreme of deficiency, since this desire is at the opposite extreme of excess. This training in deficiency in order to achieve the mean is a philosophic idea, but the details of it are mystical, having their parallel in al-Makkī. Training should be of four types. The first is in taking only lawful food, for this has a great effect in illuminating the soul, whereas unlawful food darkens it; these effects stem from the eater's awareness of the food as lawful or otherwise.[17] Unlawful food or drink is not recommended by al-Ghazālī under any circumstances because of its harm to the soul. He condemns Avicenna's view that one can drink wine as a tonic or medicine but not for pleasure.[18] Ar-Rāzī regards wine as a necessity in order to dispel anxiety and to create, where necessary, liveliness, courage, impetuousity and recklessness.[19] Al-Ghazālī mentions four grades of piety in regard to food. The first is to avoid unlawful food; a higher grade is to avoid what is doubtful, and a still higher is to avoid that lawful food which may lead to the unlawful. The highest grade is to confine oneself to that lawful food which is needed to give strength for action, since seeking more than this sometimes causes sin.[20]

The second type of training is in the quantity of food to be taken. There are four grades, in any one of which the novice may train himself. Men at the highest grade eat as much as is needed for sustenance; this is less than ten mouthfuls. Man at the second grade eats as much as fills one third of the capacity of his stomach. At the third grade nearly two-thirds of the capacity of the stomach is filled with food. A little more than this is extravagance. To specify the exact quantity of food, al-Ghazālī admits, is impossible, for it varies with the variation in man's age, physical condition and activities. The basic idea is that one should not eat unless one is truly hungry. Signs of true hunger are mentioned by him, as by al-Makkī.[21]

The third type of training is in the length of time that should elapse before taking the fixed quantity of food. There are three grades of this. The highest grade is not to eat anything during three

days or more. At a lower grade one does not eat anything during two days. The lowest grade is to eat once in twenty-four hours; more than this is extravagance. The fourth type of training is in the food and condiment which may be eaten. These should be of very inferior kinds. Desire for tasty food must be restrained, for such food creates pride, hardness of mind, love of this world and forgetfulness of the next, and sometimes its acquisition leads to sin. At the highest grade of training a novice is required to be content with bread only. If this is too rigorous for him he should at least keep from some kinds of permissible food and drink, for to take all kinds is extravagance.[22]

This rigorous training in four aspects of food is only recommended for acquiring the ability to observe the mean in eating. It is to be stopped after this ability has been acquired,[23] i.e. after the novice is able to be content with that amount of food which causes him to feel neither the heaviness of stomach nor pain of hunger. The mean in the kinds of food and condiment is also described by al-Ghazālī, as it is by al-Makkī: constant eating of meat and other desirable things is extravagance; total abstinence from them is a defect; the mean (*wasṭ*) between the two is commendable; to show what this mean is, al-Ghazālī quotes Caliph 'Umar's advice to his son — take bread and meat one day, bread and milk the following day... then bread and salt and then bread only.[24] The underlying idea here is that continuity in meat and rich food causes hardening of mind; totally forsaking them creates malnutrition; but the mean is free from both evils. Al-Ghazālī believes that to keep to the right mean in eating is only possible for the prophets and the most devout; others are unable to do this and are, therefore, required to undertake training throughout their lives.[25]

Following his discussion of gluttony, al-Ghazālī goes on to discuss excess in sex; the reason for this is that he believes that satiety in food can lead to such excess.[26]

Excess in Sex

Excess in desire for sexual intercourse is the second destructive quality of man. It leads him to such acts as are harmful to his religious and worldly life. Sexual desire is implanted in man for the purpose of the propagation of the human species, and is not reprehensible in itself; what is reprehensible is its excess or deficiency; when it is at the state of the mean (*wasaṭ*) between these two extremes, the virtue of temperance (*'iffa*) is achieved. In this state it

obeys the dictates of reason and the Sharī'a in its arousal and appeasement. Al-Ghazālī states their dictates in regard to sex saying that the Sharī'a permits the gratification of sex only with one's wife or slave women. Reason does not prescribe indiscriminate enjoyment. The mean in sex thus is enjoyment of such sexual intercourse without over-indulgence.[27] Deficiency in it means either impotence or such weakness as makes moderate enjoyment impossible. This is bad because it fails to fulfil God's purpose in creating the sex drive in man. Although bad, it is not what al-Ghazālī means by sex when he calls it a destructive quality, since its harm is not great enough to lead its possessor to perdition; it is the excessive sexual urge that he means by that term.

Excess in the sexual urge overpowers reason and thus leads to adultery and other mortal sins which, besides being social crimes, affect the soul very badly. Even if it does not cause the commission of such sins it becomes a bar to the primary means of happiness, i.e. knowledge and action. Sometimes it leads to passionate love (*'ishq*); those who succumb to it are regarded by al-Ghazālī as having gone astray. Ignorant of the purpose of sexual desire, they surpass the lower animals in uncontrollable lust. Their enslavement to this desire increases, and their reason, instead of ruling sexual desire, becomes not only ruled by it but actively engaged in its service. Besides the mortal sins, excess in the sexual urge also causes venial sins such as lustful thoughts, looking upon the opposite sex, touching and kissing. These are wrong because they sometimes lead to adultery and other mortal sins.[28]

But moderation in sex is often free from all sorts of harm. It does not fail to fulfil God's purpose in implanting the sexual urge in man, nor does it cause outward sin or inward thought of the opposite sex, nor is it a bar to the primary means of happiness. Its possessor has, as it were, no sexual desire and is thus free from attachment to an aspect of the world — a freedom necessary for salvation. Al-Ghazālī does not speak of the preservation of bodily health as the purpose of the mean in sex; it is ar-Rāzī who emphasized the control of sex for this purpose.[29] Al-Ghazālī mentions the methods of reducing excessive sexual urge to the state of the mean. These are hunger, marriage and engagement in some business which prevents the arousal of desire by diverting the mind from thought about the opposite sex. The first two means were already suggested by the Prophet.[30] Al-Ghazālī discusses the problem of the disciple's marriage,[31] and his views are more or less similar to those of

al-Makkī. As excess in sex can be caused by satiety, so also can excess in speech, which is also destructive. Therefore, having disposed of the former al-Ghazālī deals with the latter.[32]

Excessive Speech

The desire for excessive speech (*sharah al-kalām*) is the third harmful quality of man. It has many forms from which acts proceed through the tongue and so these acts are called the evils of the tongue. These acts affect the soul because of the already mentioned relationship between it and the body; thus vile speech and lying darken the soul and trouble its balance. Such a soul will not be able to enjoy fully the vision of God in the future life. Besides affecting the soul, most of these acts give pain to one's fellow-men, and harm them as well as oneself in various ways. For these reasons the tongue is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the chief cause of man's destruction in this life and the next.[33] We are warned by the Prophet against its evil, and this is emphasized by the ṣūfīs. Many of these evils are systematically dealt with in al-Muḥāsibī's works[34] but they are only mentioned in passing by al-Makkī.[35] All are discussed in detail by al-Ghazālī.

In the *Iḥyā'* the evils of the tongue are enumerated as twenty, in the *Kīmiyā'* as fifteen and in the *Bidāya* as eight. In the second work two acts are sometimes treated under one name, and a few acts are omitted altogether. In the last work only those evils are discussed which predominate in the tongue, and the same is the case in the *Arba'īn,* where twenty evils are mentioned, but only five are discussed.[36] Some of these acts are lighter and others more serious, and al-Ghazālī's treatment of them proceeds from the former to the latter. Examples of the acts of the first group are: speaking about what does not concern one, and superfluous talk; these are no sins, but only a waste of time which causes imperfection. Avoidance of such light evils is appropriate to 'the few', while all men are required to abjure the graver evils. Among the latter some are more harmful than others, and these need to be discussed here.

Cursing

Cursing (*la'n*) anything which God created — man, animal or object — is an evil act of the tongue. Cursing it means to drive it away from God's mercy, to remove it from Him. Since it is unknown

whether or not He has driven or will drive away any being from His compassion; since it is exclusively His concern, to curse amounts to interference in divine affairs. But this is not involved in cursing someone for possessing those attributes which drive one away from God's mercy. Such attributes are infidelity, heresy and wickedness, (*fisq*). There are three grades in cursing those who have these attributes: (a) to curse them generally, e.g. 'may God curse the infidels, the heretics and the wicked!' (b) to curse them in a less general way, e.g. 'may God curse the fire worshippers, the Khārijites and the adulterers!' (c) to curse them individually, e.g. 'may God curse this infidel, this heretic and this wicked man!' There is nothing wrong in the first two grades of cursing. The third grade is discussed by al-Ghazālī in some detail: if it is known from Shar'ī evidence that an individual is accursed by God there is nothing wrong in cursing him. Thus, one can curse such people as Abū Jahl, and Nimrūd. But it is wrong to curse an individual whose fate is unknown; thus a particular infidel, a heretic or wicked man must not be cursed, because it is possible that the infidel may die in faith; the heretic may reject heresy and the wicked man may repent. If cursing an individual who deserves it pains another, it should be avoided. Al-Ghazālī is very cautious in regard to cursing. He urges man to avoid it even in the right situation, for no benefit accrues from it. The tongue should be kept engaged in praise of God, or at least inactive. It should also be restrained from praying to God for anyone's harm even though he is an oppressor.[37]

False Promise

Making false promise (*al-wa'd al-kādhib*) is another evil act of the tongue. It proceeds from the vice of hypocrisy (*nifāq*) in the soul. A man may hasten to make promises, but once they are made the carnal soul provokes him not to keep them, owing to the difficulties involved in them; so he should be very cautious in the beginning. Breaking a promise is a sin when it is made with the resolve to break it, or when it is made with the determination of fulfilment but is later broken because of the provocation of the carnal soul. It is, however, not a sin when a promise is made with the resolve to keep it, but is later broken by some compulsion. In support of all these views al-Ghazālī quotes relevant Traditions.[38]

Lying

Falsehood (*kidhb*) in speech and in an oath is one of the greater evils of the tongue. It proceeds from the quality of hypocrisy in the soul. Its evil al-Ghazālī indicates in terms of its harm to the speaker's soul, and also to other people: every lie produces an evil effect on the soul which he metaphorically describes as 'unevenness', a dark spot, and a change of form; even falsehood in imagination and in the inner utterance of the soul is not free from this effect.[39] In lying, a person is kept ignorant of the truth, and this, besides being itself harmful, causes him other difficulties; occasionally, however, the harm is less than the benefits of giving him false information, and in such situations lying is right provided it is done with a sense of unwillingness and a clear consciousness of its good motive. Such a lie creates no evil effect on the soul.[40]

The unusual circumstances in which lying is right are discussed by al-Ghazālī in close relation with Tradition.[41] He says that if the aim of an utterance is good in the Sharī'a and if it can only be achieved by lying, it is right to tell a lie. This rightness has two forms — necessity and permissibleness. If the good end is something permissible in the Sharī'a, lying for it is permissible, and if the aim is necessary, lying is also necessary. Thus to tell a lie in order to save life is necessary, and if it is told in order to have advantage in a war, to remove enmity and to please a wife it is permissible, when these objectives are impossible without it. It is also permissible in cases resembling these, e.g. to protect property from an oppressor, to preserve self-respect or others' respect, to please one's wife and so on. In all these cases lying is right because the harm it does is less than the harm done by truth, according to the Sharī'a. Where it is difficult to determine the degree of harm, truth is to be spoken. Since mistakes are often made in determining the degree of harm, falsehood should be avoided as far as possible even in those situations where its harm appears less. It is commendable to avoid a permissible lie if it concerns one's own benefit, but if it concerns another's benefit it should not be avoided.[42]

Even in the cases where a lie is necessary or permissible the most virtuous avoid it by resorting to ambiguous terms (*ta'rīḍ*) as far as possible. This is to speak in such a way that the speaker is literally truthful, but the person addressed understands otherwise than is actually true. Where lying is wrong, resorting to ambiguous terms is also wrong, though its wrongness is less serious. It is right to adopt

this method for a light motive, like pleasing someone by joking with him. Lying for this motive is wrong if it causes pain to anyone or involves backbiting; if it does not involve these, it is a minor sin. To say for emphasis 'I have told you this a hundred times' is not a lie if it was told more than once. Falsely to deny appetite when one is requested to join a meal is wrong, if there is no good motive for denial; in the event of a motive it is better to deny by using ambiguous terms.[43]

Such are al-Ghazālī's views concerning truth and falsehood in speech with one's fellow-men. In his discussion of the mystical virtue of truthfulness he also speaks of truth and falsehood in one's speaking with God. He says that when a devotee utters in his ritual prayer 'I turned my face towards Him who created...', his mind must be wholly directed towards God if he is to be true in this utterance. In addressing Him, saying, 'Thee we worship' most people are false; they follow their passions, and whoever follows passions is a worshipper of them and not of God. Every speaking with Him is false if it does not agree with the devotee's mental state. Only the most devout can be safe from this kind of lie.[44]

Slander

Slander (*namīma*) is among the greater evils of the tongue. It is usually defined as relating to another any talk made about him by a third man. This definition is too narrow according to al-Ghazālī. He defines slander as disclosing any matter whose disclosure is disliked by the person to whom it is disclosed, or by the one about whom it is disclosed, or by any other person; it is all the same whether the disclosure is verbal or in writing or by indication, or whether what is disclosed is speech or action, or whether it is an imperfection or not; if it is an imperfection, disclosing it is slandering and backbiting at once. The true meaning of slander then, is the revealing of any secret whose disclosure is disliked. Any secret should be kept except when its disclosure benefits someone or prevents a sin. An act of stealing, for instance, should be disclosed, but concealment of one's own property from others should not be reported.[45]

Al-Ghazālī does not give any remedy for slander. However, his statement of its evil effects, and the task of a person to whom a secret is disclosed, suggests that here too he conceives of remedy by means of knowledge and action. Knowledge of its evil effects, especially in the future life, is discussed by al-Ghazālī in detail. The

action of the man to whom a secret is revealed should be to disbelieve the slanderer, to prohibit him from this sin, to make him realize its harm, and to hate him, and to regard him as an enemy. Such a course of action will deter him from committing this sin.[46]

Backbiting

Backbiting (*ghība*) is the greatest of all the evils of the tongue.[47] To support this contention al-Ghazālī quotes the Tradition in which it is said to be more serious than thirty adulteries. He defines it as mentioning another person's imperfections, faults which that person would not wish to be revealed. Imperfection may be in body, lineage, character, work, speech, religious affairs and worldly matters such as dress, house, and so on. Imperfections in the body are its being short, tall, or any other quality whose mention is not wished for. Imperfections in lineage are such as one's father being a sinner, or mean. Imperfections in character are vices like miserliness or cowardice. Imperfections in religious matters are stealing, prostrating defectively, and the like. Imperfections in dress are its being dirty, too short, etc. Imperfections in worldly matters are, for example, rudeness or eating too much. Each kind of imperfection is discussed by al-Ghazālī in great detail. He rejects the view that mention of another's imperfection in religious matters, or those imperfections which are truly present in him, is not backbiting. According to him, backbiting consists in an individual's saying anything of another that is likely to hurt his feelings, even if what is said of him is entirely true. To mention a defect not present in him is a calumny (*buhtān*) and not backbiting. These ideas al-Ghazālī supports by Traditions and by appeal to 'the consensus of the Muslims'.[48]

Backbiting is not limited to what is done by speech only; on the contrary, it includes making one aware of another's imperfection by any means, whether speech, writing, imitation, indication by the hand, the eyebrows and so on. To mention in a book some defect in a particular person's statement is backbiting, except when there is good reason for it. But to put his defect in a sentence such as 'someone says such and such' is not backbiting, for in backbiting a particular person's defect is mentioned, be he alive or dead. To say 'some of those whom we met yesterday are ill-tempered' is backbiting if listeners can recognize the people referred to by 'some'. To speak ill of others in the guise of invocation is the worst form of

backbiting. An example of this occurs when one man is mentioned to another, and the latter says 'we seek protection from God against lack of shame'; in the guise of invocation he wants to say that this man is shameless; this is both ostentation and backbiting at once. Belief in what a backbiter says is included in backbiting. To be silent at backbiting is to take part in it, except when one is unable to oppose it or to leave the place of it; when compelled to be silent one must mentally dislike it.[49]

Backbiting with the mind is imagining evil (*sū' aẓ-ẓann*) of someone, which is also a sin. It is to categorize him as evil, and is distinguished from 'passing thoughts' and 'inner utterance of the soul' and also from doubt; these are not sins. Its sign is a change in mental attitude towards him, or occurence of bodily acts caused by it. Convicting an individual of evil is right only when it is witnessed or known with clear proof. Relying upon an upright man (*'adūl*)'s information is also right. If, however, there is enmity between them, his report is to be taken as neither true nor false. A consequence of imagining evil is spying (*tajassus*) for confirmation; this is also a sin for this is an effort to discover what God has kept secret about His creature.[50]

Mentioning any evil of a particular person is of course not wrong if it is made for a good purpose which cannot otherwise be fulfilled. Such ends are: to seek justice or help from an authority, to remove the evil by informing those able to remove it, to seek legal opinion about it from a judge, and to caution others against it. To mention a man by a familiar surname expressive of his defect is not backbiting. Nor is it backbiting to mention only that much of a wicked man's faults which he himself makes public, for he is not pained by it, nor does such a man deserve any respect from others.[51]

Backbiting can be remedied in two ways, one of which consists of knowledge and action. Knowledge concerns its evil effects on the future life; this is discussed by al-Ghazālī in detail. Action is to investigate one's own faults and, on finding any, to feel ashamed of blaming others without blaming oneself, and to realize that no one can be free from defects. The other way consists in removing the causes of backbiting by means of knowledge. Its causes are anger, malice and seeking the pleasure of friends. Friends say evil of someone; sometimes one of them, thinking that to stop them or to go away will cause displeasure, co-operates in their backbiting. The remedy for this is to realize that it disobeys God's order. A fourth cause of backbiting is willingness to make a man unreliable to

another. A firm belief in the harm of backbiting as regards the future life can check this bad habit. Finally, a man sometimes speaks ill of another in order to justify the presence of an evil in himself. Realization of how ridiculous it is to defend oneself by an evil-doer's behaviour may prevent him from this sin.[52]

The next vice discussed by al-Ghazālī is strong anger. He does not relate it to any of the preceding vices because it concerns an element of the soul which is separate from the element of desire with which the preceding vices are concerned.

Strong Anger

Strong anger (*shiddat al-ghaḍab*) is a disease of the soul which causes many vices and evil acts. Miskawayh regarded it as the most serious of the spiritual diseases. Anger itself is not reprehensible; it is implanted in the soul to repel anything destructive and it can serve this purpose if it is moderate and not excessive or deficient. These two extremes are bad because of their evil consequences. Al-Ghazālī discusses in detail the nature of anger, its degrees and the vices and evil acts proceeding from them, and his discussion is to some extent similar to that of Miskawayh. A very harmful result of deficient anger is that it makes self-training impossible, for in this training evil desires need to be opposed, and this can only be affected by anger against them. Holy war (*jihād*) and prohibiting others from wrongdoing are also impossible when anger is deficient. The signs of such anger are: lack of disapproval of wrongdoing, and toleration of humiliation and injustice. Excessive anger is that which crosses the limit set by reason and the Sharī'a. It overpowers reason and its sign is that its possessor is led to recklessness and wrongdoing.[53]

Moderation in anger is that which is excited or appeased in the right situations, as determined by reason and the Sharī'a. This is commendable and from this is attained the virtue of courage (*shajā'a*). Al-Ghazālī describes some of the right situations and the right measure of anger by classifying things into three groups. The first consists of those which are essential for all people, e.g. food, clothes, shelter and good health. Interference with these basic needs must cause anger. The extent of necessity differs from person to person. The second group includes those things which are essential for some people only, e.g. books, tools, etc. It is also necessary to be angry when there is interference with such things. The aim of training in anger in the case of these two groups is to acquire ability

to control it so that one can do only what is good in the view of reason and the Sharī'a. It is also to weaken it so that patience may be easy. The third group includes those things which are non-essential, e.g. more than the necessary measure of food, wealth, or influence. Interference with these need not cause anger. The aim of self-training here is to achieve complete freedom from anger or, at least, to prevent its resulting actions. The former is relevant to the most devout, who know the purpose of worldly things and so do not love those which are superfluous; since they do not love them, anger for them is never aroused.[54]

Al-Ghazālī's recognition of both reason and the Sharī'a as the determinants of the right situations for anger makes it plain that he values courage in the struggle against one's passions, as well as courage in fighting against the infidel. The former, however, is stressed more (as is clear from the above discussion and also from the sub-division of courage) because it is upon this that the purification of the soul depends. This is also true of al-Makkī.[55] The evidence for the great value al-Ghazālī attributed to courage in holy war is that he condemns deficient anger, on the grounds that it renders holy war impossible, and that he extols the Prophet's bravery in battle.[56] This courage is not incompatible with al-Ghazālī's individualistic ethics, for this also has much to do with individual good: a warrior's mind is engrossed in the love of God and is completely free from any worldly thing. This is the reason why his status in the hereafter "becomes great"[57] although the status of those who win the struggle against passion is greater. This view of al-Ghazālī is a slight deviation from the Islamic teaching in which martyrs (*shuhadā'*) are assigned a higher status. Al-Ghazālī justifies his position by a Tradition in which struggle against passions is described as greater than fighting against the infidel.[58]

In regard to the remedy for the passion of anger, al-Ghazālī advises people to increase it if it is deficient[59] but he does not mention by what means this should be done. Miskawayh, however, pointed out several ways.[60] Al-Ghazālī discusses only the ways of reducing anger. In one way anger can be repressed when excited, and in another its strength can be reduced so that it obeys reason and the Sharī'a. The former method consists of knowledge and action. Knowledge concerns the reward of repressing anger, and the punishment in the future life for wrongly satisfying it, the ugliness of the angry man's appearance, and the resemblance of his character to that of a dog or other animals. Action involves seeking help from

God by uttering, 'I seek protection from God against the devil' for the devil overtakes the angry man. If anger is not appeased by this, he should sit down if standing, and lie down if sitting, for being close to the soil creates a sense of self-abasement by which vain glory, a cause of anger, is removed; moreover sitting and lying down give rest, which reduces the heat of anger. If all these are ineffective, he should wash his hands and face with cold water, for by this his bodily heat will be lessened.[61] Since anger leads to rancour and envy al-Ghazālī goes on to discuss these; he deals with rancour first because it is an immediate result of anger, whereas envy results from anger through rancour.[62]

Rancour

Rancour (*ḥiqd*) is looked upon by al-Ghazālī as a serious vice. It was also regarded as a vice by al-Muḥāsibī[63] who, however, did not discuss it. Al-Ghazālī discusses it as well as its relevant virtues. Rancour is caused by anger; when the repression of anger is indispensable on account of one's inability to satisfy it at the moment, it returns to the soul, is constricted and becomes rancour. Rancour is that state of mind in which the enmity of an angry man cleaves persistently to his soul. Eight evils are produced by rancour of which some are vices and others are wrong acts. All of them are destructive of religion. Among them are envy and joy at another's misfortune (*shamāta*) which necessarily accompany anger. At the least serious grade of rancour these eight evils are not produced, but the mind is burdened with some enmity against another, so that one ceases to favour him, to stand beside him in his need, to associate with him and to encourage him to good. This attitude lowers his level of virtue. Al-Ghazālī mentions two ideal ways of behaviour towards a man with whom one is angry. One is to give him his due fully, neither more nor less. This is justice and is appropriate to the pious. The other is to forgive him, to do good to him and to strengthen one's relationship with him. This is excellence and is appropriate to the most virtuous.[64]

Thus forgiveness (*'afw*) is a virtue appropriate to the most devout. In the *Maqṣad* it is included among the attributes of God. It is distinguished from forbearance (*ḥilm*) and repression of anger (*kaẓm al-ghayẓ*). Forbearance is also a divine attribute. In man it is a quality through which excessive anger is never excited. Repression of anger means restraint from acting according to anger when it is

already excited. Since it is through repeated repression that forbearance is acquired, it is identified with practising forbearance (*taḥallum*). This distinction between forbearance and repression is also made by al-Iṣfahānī. Forgiveness is defined as obtaining a right like that of retaliation or indemnity, and then willingly forsaking it.[65] In his list of virtues and vices al-Ghazālī does not mention forgiveness, but he seems to have included it in those sub-divisions of courage which he left unmentioned saying "and the like".[66] Although forbearance, repression of anger and forgiveness are included in the philosophers' lists of virtues,[67] al-Ghazālī, in his emphasis upon these, is more influenced by the Qur'ān and the Sunna.[68]

In the discussion of rancour, one of the consequences of its smallest degree is mentioned as ceasing to be lenient towards him who excites one's rancour. The virtue of leniency (*rifq*) is discussed by al-Ghazālī in a separate section. In the list of virtues, however, it is not mentioned. Its opposite is severity, which is reprehensible. Severity is caused by anger, and at times by greed, since these cloud a man's mind, preventing him from considering his right course and remaining steadfast (*thābit*) in it. Leniency results from a state of the soul in which the faculties of anger and desire are in equilibrium. It is, however, not good in all circumstances. Nor is severity bad in all situations; each is commendable in its proper place; this is the mean (*wasaṭ*). The proper cases of severity and leniency will be determined by perfect insight. Men of imperfect insight and those faced with difficulty in deciding the nature of a particular case should incline to leniency, for this is good in most situations. The Sharī'a as a determining factor of the mean is omitted here because leniency is so much praised in the Sharī'a that it appears to be good in all cases and hence, in distinguishing between the situations of severity and leniency, one cannot get help from it. The Sharī'a praises leniency greatly because by nature men tend to be severe and because leniency is what is good in most cases.[69] After dealing with rancour and the virtues and vices related to it, al-Ghazālī treats of the vice of envy which is caused by rancour.

Envy

Envy (*ḥasad*) is a great vice.[70] It is worse than rancour and is treated in all al-Ghazālī's works dealing with vices, but rancour is discussed only in his two major works. Envy is even regarded as one

of the three vices which "are both destructive in themselves and the roots of all other evil dispositions".[71] In considering envy as worse than rancour he agrees with al-Muḥāsibī who dealt with envy in great detail, regarding it as a serious vice, but only mentioned rancour as a cause of it.[72] He also agrees with al-Muḥāsibī in that envy is caused by rancour which is in turn caused by anger. Envy is a state of mind in which a man is pained when another person obtains any good, and he wants that good taken away from him even though he himself will not obtain any advantage from its removal. This leads to the vice of pleasure in another's misfortune. Every good which a man possesses is God's gift, and any wish by another for its removal shows (a) his displeasure with God's decree and (b) an avarice beyond that usually found, for a miser is parsimonious with his own possessions, but an envious man is parsimonious as regards the gifts which come from God's treasury. For the latter reason envy and pleasure at another's misfortune are regarded as resulting from the deviation of the faculty of desire from its mean state to the extreme of excess. Besides being bad in itself, envy is also bad because it produces innumerable sins such as slander, murder, and so on. It is, however, not wrong if one dislikes a 'good' which aids its owner in harming others, for here dislike for the good is not because it is a good, but because it is a means of corruption.[73]

The mind can only be said to be free from envy when another's weal and woe are equally felt. Since this is naturally impossible in an oppressor's case, al-Ghazālī discusses what freedom from envy should be in this situation. He says that by nature man wishes for the removal of good from an oppressor, and if this wish is so strong that it finds expression through his voluntary acts, it is envy. If its expression is totally restrained and the natural wish present in the mind is not disliked by its owner, then also it is envy, for envy is a quality of the soul and not an outward act. But if with the restraint of its expression there is always a dislike for it, i.e. if by his faculty of reason he is angry with himself for having this unavoidable natural wish, it is not envy, for by disliking it he has done all that is humanly possible. This view al-Ghazālī and al-Muḥāsibī have established after refuting the opinion that freedom from envy is achieved, if the desire for the removal of another's good will not be expressed.[74]

Envy is distinguished from emulation (*ghibṭa*) and competition (*munāfasa*) since while in envy a man wishes that others should be deprived of good, in emulation he does not so wish; he wishes the persistence of good in them, but desires to obtain a similar good

himself. Emulation may be necessary, permissible and praiseworthy depending upon the nature of the things emulated. Emulation of those forms of religious good which everyone is obliged to acquire e.g. 'faith', ritual prayer etc., is necessary. Emulation of virtuous acts like giving away in good causes is praiseworthy. Emulation for those things whose enjoyment is allowed by the Sharī'a is permissible; it is, however, avoided by the mystics since it negates the mystical virtue of asceticism.[75] which will be discussed in a later chapter.

In all these ideas al-Ghazālī is following al-Muḥāsibī very closely, but he sees in emulation a subtle danger which al-Muḥāsibī failed to perceive: if a person fails to obtain a like good to that which he emulates, he will naturally wish the removal of that good from its owner, for his grief at his failure can only be removed when he obtains a similar good, or when the good is removed; since the first alternative has failed, he will naturally resort to the second. Hardly anyone is free from this natural wish. If the desire is such that, should the matter be left to his choice, he would surely remove the good, it is envy; if the desire is so weak that he would not do so, and by his reason he dislikes this inescapable natural desire, it is not envy.[76]

The vice of envy can be got rid of in two ways, in one of which its violence can be annulled, and in another removed from the soul. The element of knowledge in the first method concerns its harm to the envious, in this world and the next and the fact that envy not only causes no harm to the envied but benefits him in both worlds. All this al-Ghazālī explains in a very similar way to his predecessor al-Muḥāsibī. To al-Muḥāsibī's cure by means of knowledge he adds the element of action, which is to do the opposite of the acts proceeding from envy, e.g. humility towards the envied, and increase in good to him. Perseverance in such acts is very effective in annulling the violence of envy. The other method is to remove the causes of envy which are pride, conceit, enmity, love of influence and greed for wealth. Cure of envy by the first method only will reduce its violence for the time being, but envy will recur again should its causes not be removed.[77] Since all its causes are but different aspects of love of the world,[78] al-Ghazālī goes on to discuss this. In the order of vices, however, he connects love of the world not with envy but with gluttony and excess in sex, maintaining that the presence of these leads to love of the world.[79]

Love of the World

Love of the world (*ḥubb ad-dunyā*) is regarded by al-Ghazālī as not only a great vice, but the vice from which all other vices proceed,[80] and hence it is discussed in all his works dealing with the vices. In the list of virtues and vices, however, it is not mentioned. In the beginning of the *kīmiyā'*, the world is discussed only as a part of the introduction to his ethics,[81] but in dealing with the root vices he introduces love of the world as a central vice; he supports this conception by a Tradition in which it is called the fountain-head of every sin. Al-Makkī also quoted this Tradition to emphasize the evil of the world, but he discussed the world very briefly in connection with the mystical virtue of asceticism, and his views influenced al-Ghazālī to some extent. Miskawayh and al-Kindī also spoke about love of the world, and their ideas have also some influence on him.

By 'love of the world' al-Ghazālī means love of the reprehensible world (*ad-dunyā al-madhmūma*), which he explains by distinguishing between the world as it exists for a man and the world in itself. The world for a man includes all that exists before his death, and his hereafter starts from immediately afterwards. What exists before his death includes that in which he has enjoyment, pleasure, fortune and desire. These are divided into three kinds, of which two are needed for well-being in the hereafter and one is not. The first kind consists of those worldly activities which accompany man after death, i.e. knowledge and action, provided they are acquired for otherworldly purpose. Although they give pleasure they do not belong to the reprehensible world. The second group includes those which give pleasure in this life but cause misery in the next. It consists of sins, and enjoyment (*tana''um*) of permissible things in excess of need (*ḥāja*); these belong to the reprehensible world; the first of these is relevant to all people, and the second is peculiar to the mystics. The third kind consists of all that gives pleasure, but is an aid to knowledge and action, e.g. legal sexual intercourse, with the intention of getting assistance in action from off-spring, and as much food, clothing and shelter as is necessary for the good health needed in knowledge and action. These do not belong to the reprehensible world unless they are sought for reasons of enjoyment and pleasure of the carnal soul.[82]

Thus everything which is not necessary for the hereafter is the reprehensible world for the seekers after God. It is referred to as

passion (*hawā*) the objects of which al-Ghazālī, like al-Makkī, enumerates by citing Qur'ānic verses.[83] To use more than the necessary amount of the things permitted by the Sharī'a is enjoyment not needed for the hereafter, and is therefore avoided by the mystics. The pious, however, may enjoy these things, but they should carefully guard against committing any sin in acquiring them.[84] Indeed al-Ghazālī states that if all people limited themselves to bare essentials and were totally engaged in the pursuit of the hereafter, abandoning worldly acts and business, the order of the world would be paralyzed, making it impossible for 'the few' to tread the path. It is therefore necessary for the sake of 'the few' that most people should turn away from the path and be engaged in worldly affairs. This is the pre-destined will of God.[85] This idea is also to be found in al-Makkī who, however, put it very briefly.[86]

In confining themselves to what is needed or essential 'the few' differ among themselves, and this difference al-Ghazālī explains by means of the doctrine of the mean (*wasaṭ*). He says that the superfluous things to be avoided by 'the few' form the limit of enjoyment. The bare essentials (*ḍarūrāt*) i.e. barely sufficient food, clothing and shelter and a few things which are means to them, must be desired by all, and form another limit. Between these two limits there is the grade of need (*ḥāja*) appropriate to 'the few' only. This grade has two extremes one of which approaches the limit of enjoyment, and although there is nothing wrong in this extreme (since the grade of need in its entirety is free from being the reprehensible world), the mystics should avoid it lest they pass to the grade of enjoyment. The other extreme approaches the limit of bare essentials and this extreme is not harmful. Between these two extremes there are many means (*wasā'iṭ*) which are praiseworthy. The more a man deviates towards that extreme which is near to the limit of bare essentials, the higher will be his rank. Prophets and saints crossed this extreme to the limit of bare essentials. The details of the means can only be known from the Companions' lives, for they were at the state of the mean: they did not forsake the world totally, but took from it only as much as they needed for religion.[87]

The reason why 'the few' should limit themselves to that which is necessary or to bare essentials, is that the world is created so that man may prepare for well-being in his eternal life, and he can do this when the body is in sound health; for this he needs to take as much food as is necessary for strength and as much clothing and shelter as are necessary against cold, heat and theft, and to engage in crafts

and trades in the measure necessary for bare sustenance. By this means he becomes free from anxious thought about the body, and can serve God with all devotion throughout his life. The enjoyment of superfluous things leads to hardening of the mind, insolence, heedlessness of religion and numerous sins. Man's relation to worldly things is established through his mind and body. From the love of worldly things such vices as ostentation, envy, and pride are generated in the soul. Through the body a man becomes engaged in various acts and affairs; involvement with one of these leads to many others and consequently the man forgets his place of return and true goal. Even if he does not forget these, he fails to prepare for the future life by remembering God and reflecting upon Him, since his mind is always occupied with other matters. At death, when he is separated from his beloved world, he experiences grief in proportion to the strength of his love.[88] Many of these ideas of al-Ghazālī can be traced in his predecessors' works: in the *Munqidh* he states that the necessity of severing the soul's attachment to the world in order to live a pious life became clear to him after his study of ṣūfism.[89] The ideas of necessity and superfluousness, and some of the evils of the latter discussed above, were also mentioned by al-Makkī;[90] he, however, did not speak of the higher grade of bare essentials. Al-Kindī indicated how entanglement with this world caused forgetfulness of the next, and of the true goal, and a passage from his work is incorporated by al-Ghazālī with slight modification.[91] Miskawayh emphasized a moderate share of wealth, influence and other worldly goods, but he, too, did not differentiate between the grade of need and that of bare essentials. His views on the purpose of moderation — which he identified with need and sufficiency — and on the reasons for avoiding the superfluous, are similar to those of al-Ghazālī; the only difference is that for the former they have reference to man's present life[92] whereas for the latter they are related more to the future life. Thus al-Ghazālī's exposition of the vice of love of the world is influenced by both the ṣūfīs and the philosophers.

Since the vice of love of the world is caused by ignorance of man's true aim and of God's purpose in creation, its remedy lies in this knowledge. Realization of the evils of this vice and of the deceptive nature of the world is also a part of the remedy, and these are discussed by al-Ghazālī in great detail.[93] Since of the many aspects of love of the world the greatest is love of wealth[94] which causes many great evils, al-Ghazālī deals with it first.

Love of Wealth

Love of wealth (*ḥubb al-māl*) is one of the greatest obstacles in the path to God,[95] and hence its removal from the soul through mortification is necessary for the novice. Abandonment of superfluous wealth, however, is required of him before he embarks on his journey since such wealth stands between him and the truth. In the list of virtues and vices, generosity, lack of covetousness and contentment are classified as virtues stemming from temperance, while greed, extravagance, neglect of the duties incurred by wealth, hatred for the poor and abasement to the rich are described as vices which are deviations from temperance to the extremes of excess and deficiency;[96] all these good and evil character-traits are related to love of wealth, for their presence depends on whether or not love of wealth is banished from the soul; this is shown by al-Ghazālī in the introduction to his exposition of love of wealth.

In accordance with his concepts of need and enjoyment, described in the preceding vice, al-Ghazālī explains the meaning of that wealth whose love is a root vice. He says that wealth has benefits as well as evils, and if it provides its possessor with the necessary minimum or a moderate amount of food, clothing and shelter, it is free from almost all harm and its love is not a vice. Indeed, the necessary minimum must be sought by everyone since lack of it causes people to be displeased with God and even sometimes to deny Him. Sufficient wealth is necessary to achieve that bodily health which is essential for knowledge and action, the two primary means of happiness.[97] Love of this wealth is, in reality, the love not of wealth but of the good purpose for which it is needed.

It is the love of superfluous wealth which is a vice for most people.[98] This idea al-Ghazālī establishes by considering the benefit and evils of such wealth. Its benefit is both this-worldly and otherworldly. In the former case it may be a means of respect, independence from others, friendship and so forth. The otherworldly benefit is threefold: 1. use in religious acts such as pilgrimage and holy war; 2. use for others' good in four forms (a) charity, (b) acts of humanity, e.g. entertainment of guests, help, gifts, religious and customary duties, (c) preservation of self-respect and (d) payment of servants; 3. use in the common good, e.g. in building bridges, mosques, hospitals and in establishing trusts for the poor. Al-Ghazālī shows that despite being for the good of others, these acts are ultimately for individual salvation. Because of these benefits

God and His Apostle praised wealth, and al-Ghazālī regards it as a means of happiness. The evil of superfluous wealth is also both this-worldly and otherworldly. The former is of three kinds: 1. enormous wealth facilitates the commission of sins; 2. if it does not lead to sins, it may cause the enjoyment of permissible pleasure which gradually extends to the doubtful, and to acquiring and spending wealth in wrong ways; 3. even if all these evils are guarded against, the mind cannot be freed from occupation with the cares of wealth, in which case remembrance of God and reflection upon Him become impossible — an evil from which hardly anyone can be free. On account of these evils wealth is sometimes condemned by the Sharī'a and is regarded by al-Ghazālī as that which removes the novice from the path.[99]

In the case of most people the evils of superfluous wealth are much more in number than its benefits. They should, therefore, eschew it as far as possible. The philosophers also urged the avoidance of the superfluous things of life, but they differ from al-Ghazālī in that they had in mind mundane evils while he is also concerned with otherworldly consequences. Al-Ghazālī harmonizes his concept of superfluous wealth with the Sharī'a holding that there is no harm in possessing it if this involves no evil; but he observes that there are only a few people who can guard against its evil.[100] Observation of five conditions enables them to derive its benefits while avoiding its evils.[101] These are: 1. to know the purpose of wealth, i.e. to meet man's basic needs (one who knows this, loves only the necessary amount and gives away the excess); 2. to guard against acquiring wealth in ways unlawful, doubtful and contrary to humanity; 3. to preserve the necessary amount for oneself and the excess for the needy, and to give this to them when they approach; 4. to be cautious in spending, i.e. to be content with little in one's own case and moderate in spending money for others; and 5. to have the correct intention in acquisition, preservation and expenditure. Those who observe these five conditions are benefitted by superfluous wealth; for them it is a gift (*ni'ma*) from God; they are the pious: the mystics, however, do not seek or preserve more than the necessary amount for they know that, even after observing these conditions, enormous wealth will cause them to lose the higher happiness.

Satisfaction with sufficient wealth is the virtue of contentment (*qanā'a*).[102] This view agrees with that of the philosophers for they define contentment in terms of moderation,[103] which is identical

with what al-Ghazālī means by sufficiency or need. Sometimes, however, he holds a very rigid view of contentment: it is satisfaction with the bare essentials of life, i.e. with as small an amount of inferior food, clothing and shelter as will provide a man for a day or a month at the most. If more than this comes to a contented man without his seeking it, he gives it away. Longing for more than the bare essentials negates contentment and defiles the soul by greed.[104] These two definitions of contentment are in harmony with the two concepts of need and bare essentials already considered. Greed forms one extreme of contentment; the extreme of deficiency is not mentioned by al-Ghazālī because the less one possesses the greater is one's contentment[105] — a concept which accords with the mystical virtues of poverty and asceticism. Avicenna, however, took the view that this extreme of contentment is negligence in acquiring necessities,[106] Philosophers condemned greed on the grounds that it causes grief and sorrow in this life,[107] but al-Ghazālī condemns it for its harm in this life as well as in the next. Its this-worldly evils are shame, dishonour and acts contrary to humanity. Its otherworldly evil is its encouragement of vices, for example ostentation and falsehood, which cause suffering in the hereafter. After dealing with greed and contentment, both of which can appear when a man lacks wealth, al-Ghazālī discusses miserliness and generosity, which can appear when he possesses it.[108]

Miserliness

Miserliness (*bukhl*) is one of the greater vices.[109] Al-Ghazālī first examines the definitions of it and the related virtues given by others, and finds them unacceptable. He then defines it in terms of the doctrine of the mean. In his view the just use of wealth is to spend it when it should be spent, and to keep it when it should be kept. Keeping it when it should be spent is miserliness; spending it when it should be kept is extravagance; between these two extremes is the mean (*wasaṭ*) which is the virtue of generosity (*sakhā', jūd*).[110] The mean in spending is commendable because by observing it man frees his soul from its attachment to an aspect of the world, i.e. wealth. In miserliness the soul is much more attached to wealth than in extravagance and hence the former is discussed by al-Ghazālī in detail. Philosophers also regarded extravagance as a less serious vice.[111] The situations where wealth should be spent or kept are to be determined by the Sharī'a, by humanity, (*muruwwa*) and by

custom (*'ādа*). The Sharī'a requires a man gladly to pay the divine tax, to maintain wife and children, etc. The requirements of humanity in respect of wealth differ according to the differences in men's conditions, and the amount of wealth they possess. Freedom from miserliness will only be achieved when both kinds of requirements are fulfilled. Neglect of the demands of the Sharī'a, however, is a sign of the worst type of miserliness. To preserve wealth for evil days after meeting both types of demand is miserliness for the most devout. In doing this when one's neighbour is needy there is taint of miserliness, even for the ordinary man. Generosity requires men to give away more than is required in simply meeting the demands of the Sharī'a and of humanity; its innumerable grades are in accordance with the innumerable differences in the amount of the extra wealth they spend. Expenditure must be made gladly; if it is reluctant, it is only outward generosity (*tasakhkhī*) and not true generosity. To give away money in order to receive thanks or praises or to escape from blame, or to obtain service is not generosity; this is exchange, and in generosity there can be no exchange. Only God has the power to bestow favour for no exchange whatsoever. The giving away of money, however, will be generosity if it is for a reward in the future life or for acquiring the virtue of generosity. The view that generosity involves giving away without expectation of any worldly thing in return, is mystical in nature, and is explicitly derived from al-Muḥāsibī;[112] it is to some extent different from Aristotle's conception.[113] The highest grade of generosity in al-Ghazālī's view is altruism (*īthār*) which is the giving away of wealth despite the giver's need of it. In this view al-Ghazālī is influenced by the Qur'ān, in which the Companions are praised for altruism.[114] Since generosity involves giving away superfluous wealth it is inappropriate to the mystics, who do not possess such wealth. What is appropriate to them is the virtue of altruism.

The remedy for the vice of miserliness is knowledge and action. Knowledge concerns the cause of miserliness and its evils, and the benefits of generosity. The cause of miserliness is love of wealth, which itself has several causes. One is the natural inclination to satisfy desires, which is facilitated by wealth. Acquisition of contentment and patience is the remedy for this. Another reason is the hope of living a long life. To remove it a man should often remember his coming death, and his friends who have died leaving behind their wealth. The third cause is fear of poverty for one's children. This can be removed by a firm belief that God who created them created their

sustenance too, and by thinking that sometimes those who inherit no wealth become richer than those who inherit much. Lastly, some people love wealth for its own sake. The knowledge that the purpose of wealth is to meet basic needs may motivate them to give away their superfluous wealth to the needy. The evils of miserliness and the benefits of generosity are discussed by al-Ghazālī in detail; knowledge of these will only make a man willing to shun miserliness, but to remove it from the soul he must spend wealth repeatedly. After doing this for some time, miserliness will vanish and generosity will be acquired. A subtle technique to form the habit of giving away is to start this for the sake of influence; before long it will be seen that miserliness is gone but love of influence has become dominant and this should now be removed. This technique should only be adopted when miserliness is stronger than love of influence.[115]

After dealing with the vice of love of wealth al-Ghazālī discusses the vices of love of influence and ostentation because these are means of acquiring wealth. He treats them in the same 'book' for both have the same aim — the creation of status in the minds of others. Love of influence is discussed first because it is a lesser vice than ostentation.

Love of Influence

Love of influence (*ḥubb al-jāh*) is a vice greater than love of wealth for it causes more evils.[116] Since this vice is for the most part not philosophic in nature, it is not mentioned in the list of virtues and vices. In the outline of the path to God, abandonment of influential position is made a stipulation to be fulfilled before beginning the journey, and the removal of love of influence from the soul is regarded as a task to be accomplished on the way.[117] In al-Makkī's ethics, renunciation of high status, influence, praise and domination, is only regarded as the highest form of asceticism,[118] but al-Ghazālī calls love of such things a vice. He deals with this vice elaborately because he himself experienced its great evils. In his view, this vice has its basis in love of reputation (*ṣīt*), which is bad. Obscurity (*khamūl*) is good for the seekers after God. However, a widespread reputation for good qualities which is not sought for, is not reprehensible.[119] Influence means the establishment of a person's status in the minds of others so that they magnify him, gladly obey him and become so submissive that he can use them for all his purposes. Such an influential status is established when people believe that he has a quality of perfection, even though this

belief may be erroneous. The qualities of perfection are knowledge, piety, good character, handsome appearance, bodily strength, or any other attribute usually regarded as perfection, though not so in reality. These are the means by which a man influences others. The results of such influence are praise, assistance in his works, respectful salutations, and so on.[120]

Love of influence is natural in human beings. Influence is power over others, and power is one of the qualities of lordship (*ṣifāt ar-rubūbiyya*), and lordship is present in man's nature, since his soul is related to the Lord. Although seeking influence is seeking power, which is a divine attribute, it is bad because it does not accompany man after death and because it leads him to many evils.[121] Some measure of influence, however, is necessary to life, and love of this is not a vice. A man can easily repel enemies and oppressors if some people are obedient to him. He should also have some place in the minds of his servants, and in those of companions and friends whose help he needs in both secular and religious affairs. To seek this measure of influence is, in reality, to seek security in life, and freedom from worldly entanglement; this is necessary for the practice of morality. The necessary measure of influence therefore is a means to happiness, provided it is not acquired by deception or ostentation. Influence can thus be almost free from all evil.[122]

It is superfluous influence which causes evils, and so love of it is a vice. This is clearly explained by al-Ghazālī: if superfluous influence is achieved without any effort, as in the case of the virtuous, there is no wrong in it.[123] Seeking this in the right way is not forbidden by the Sharī'a, for walking out in fine clothes and giving away for name and fame are not wrong acts.[124] But the seekers of influence are usually led to numerous vices, e.g. falsehood, deception, enmity and the like. They are bound to deal with others in such a way as will impress them; this is the seed of ostentation. Even if a lover of influence guards against these evils, he gets no time to prepare for the next life, as he is always occupied with his influence upon others. In view of these manifold evils, love of influence and love of honour are compared by the Prophet to two wolves destroying a herd of cattle. But the man content with obscurity is free from all the harm caused by influence, and is able to be wholly devoted to God.

The means of removing love of influence are knowledge and action. Knowledge concerns the real worth of influence and its evil in this life and the next. All these are explained in al-Ghazālī's

two major works. Action involves doing those deeds which invite blame (*malāma*) by others, or retiring to a place where one is unknown. The first is the special feature of the Malāmatiyya school of the ṣūfīs which emphasizes the commission of vile acts in order to fall from the good opinion of others. Al-Ghazālī criticizes them and recommends only permissible deeds, e.g. eating too much with big mouthfuls in the presence of others, keeping water in a cup, the colour of which resembles the colour of wine, and so on. Retirement to a city other than one's own is very effective in getting rid of love of influence, and al-Ghazālī says this from his own experience.[125] He next discusses ostentation because it is linked up with love of influence since both have the same aim of creating status in the minds of others.

Ostentation

Ostentation (*riyā'*) is a great vice; it is greater than love of influence which, in turn, is greater than love of wealth.[126] In the list of virtues and vices it was shown to stem from greed which appears when the faculty of desire is excessive. Here al-Ghazālī explains it in its various aspects following the ṣūfī, al-Muḥāsibī. He describes its nature by distinguishing it from love of influence: in ostentation an individual seeks to establish his place in others' minds through his devotional acts (*'ibādāt*), but in love of influence he seeks it by means of his non-devotional acts. Ostentation is the desire to please men in order to gain something by means of an act of obedience to God. Thus it consists of three elements, namely, the act which is expressed, that for which it is expressed, and the desire for expressing an act which is ostentation. Devotion to God is usually expressed to others through one's demeanour, style of dress, speech, action, and pious companions and visitors. The expression of piety by any of these means takes various forms, which al-Ghazālī describes, following al-Muḥāsibī very closely. The basic motive of its expression is to create a place in others' minds, and this motive is predominant in man because it gives the greatest pleasure; it appears to be a kind of power and perfection, though it is not so in reality.[127]

The reason why ostentation is so grave a vice is to be found in the seriousness of its consequences: if it is the only motive of a devotional act, it renders it not only void but also sinful. The act is void because the intention to serve God is absent in it. It is sinful for

two reasons one of which is related to man and the other to God. The first is that an ostentatious man deceives others by his act of devotion since he gives the false impression of being a religious person. The second is that intending to please men by means of service to God is jesting with Him, for it amounts to regarding them as abler than God in bestowing favour, and better than God as objects of worship. The Prophet called ostentation the lesser polytheism (*ash-shirk al-aṣghar*);[128] al-Ghazālī gives the reason for this saying, and concludes that an ostentatious man, as authoritative and analogical proofs show, incurs the wrath of God. If both ostentation and serving God are the motives of a devotional act, it is a combination which negates sincerity, and no reward will be given for it.[129]

Ostentation has many forms some of which are more harmful than others. Al-Ghazālī explains this with reference to its three constituent elements. In relation to the first element, i.e. the basic desire involved in ostentation, he says that if it is purely ostentation, it is the worst form of this vice. If the desire for ostentation is mingled with the desire for reward from God, and the latter is so weak that it alone cannot bring about the act, whereas the former can, this is very near to the worst form. If both desires are of equal strength, the act is neither useful nor harmful. If the desire involved in ostentation strengthens the desire for reward, the act will cause both punishment and reward in proportion to the strength of the respective desires.[130]

In relation to the second element, i.e. that in which ostentation exists, there are three grades of this vice. The first, ostentation in 'faith' is the worst. This is to confess the oneness of God verbally but to deny it mentally. Mental denial of paradise, hell, the future life and the need of the Sharī'a is included in this grade. The second is ostentation in the basic devotional acts, e.g. ritual prayer, fasting, etc. despite faith in God. This is also serious, but less so than the first grade. The third is ostentation in the supererogatory acts, i.e. to perform them when one is among others, but to neglect them when alone. This is also very harmful, but less so than the second grade. Ostentation in the various parts of an act is also of three grades. One is ostentation in those parts without which an act is invalid; this is below the grade just mentioned. Less serious than this is ostentation in those parts in whose neglect there is no harm, e.g. lengthening of prostration when one is among others and shortening it when alone. Least serious is ostentation in religious matters outside the supererogatory acts, e.g. being in the first row of a congregation at prayer.[131]

In relation to the third element, i.e. the motive of ostentation, there are three grades of this vice. The worst is when the motive is to have an opportunity of committing sin; next to this is expressing piety in order to refute a charge of crime. The second grade is to show piety to gain any permissible thing such as wealth. This is forbidden because in it a worldly object is sought by an act directed towards God, but it is less serious than the first grade, since the thing sought is permissible. The third is to express an act of devotion, not for gaining anything but in order that one may not be regarded as imperfect. Such are the harmful grades of ostentation.[132]

Some forms of ostentation are open and others are hidden. Open ostentation is that which is itself sufficient to lead man to action, even though the desire for reward from God may be mingled with it. Slightly less open ostentation is that which, though it alone cannot lead to action, makes easier an action which is intended for reward in the hereafter; for example, a man regularly performs the *tahajjud* prayer with all sincerity, but feels it burdensome; when any guest is present he feels it easy. More hidden than this is the ostentation which has no influence upon action, even by way of making it easy; it may yet be present in the mind, and its sign is gladness when some one becomes aware of the act; this joy originates from an ostentation hidden in the mind as fire is hidden in stone. Even more hidden is that ostentation for which a man does not wish to act but for which he expects respect from others. He is not content with God's awareness of the act, and is not free from a hidden ostentation, which is more hidden than the creeping of an ant on a black stone in a dark night. Freedom from it is only possible for the most virtuous. Thus there are many forms of hidden ostentation; the proof of its presence in the mind is the awareness of a difference between men's knowledge of an act and that of animals.[133] However, not every form of ostentation can corrupt the act. The problem of corruption is discussed by al-Ghazālī in detail.[134]

To get rid of the vice of ostentation, strong mortification is needed for everyone. In one way, this vice can be removed from the soul; in another, a man can repel the passing thoughts which come to his mind when he is engaged in a devotional act. The former consists of knowledge and action. Knowledge concerns the causes of ostentation and how it can be removed by realizing the harm it does in the

hereafter, and in this life. The basic cause is love of influence, which is analysable into three elements, namely, love of praise, fear of blame and greed for wealth. Al-Muḥāsibī also regarded these as provoking ostentation. Both agree that these will be removed when one knows the evils resulting from ostentation, which are anxiety to please men, corruption of the soul, disgrace on the day of resurrection and finally suffering in hell. Action involves hiding devotional acts from others by performing them inside the house with the door closed. After practising it for some time, ostentatious desire will not arise in the mind, and contentment with God's awareness of devotional acts will be produced. Privacy is the most effective means of getting rid of ostentation. The passing ostentatious thoughts (*khaṭarāt ar-riyā'*) produced in the mind of a person engaged in a devotional act occur in three stages. The first is his thought that perhaps someone is aware of his act. This is followed by the arousal of a desire for praise. As a third stage, his mind accepts this desire, which now becomes strong. To repel the first thought he should realize that it is all the same whether or not someone is aware of his act, and that it is enough when God knows it. The second, the desire, can be repelled by recollecting what he has already learnt regarding the harm of ostentation. As a result of this recollection, dislike of ostentation will be aroused in the mind; if this dislike is strong enough it will repel the desire, and consequently the third thought will not be produced. Knowledge is the basic element here, for this is what creates a dislike of ostentation.[135]

After discussing ostentation al-Ghazālī deals with pride and conceit. He connects these not with ostentation, but with love of wealth and love of influence; he says that these two create pride and conceit in the mind.[136] He explains them in the same 'book' because, despite some differences, they have features in common.

Pride

Pride (*kibr*) is the greatest of all the vices.[137] In the list of virtues and vices, al-Ghazālī only mentioned pride and conceit as vices which appear when the faculty of anger deviates to the extreme of excess, but now he deals with them in all their aspects. In regard to the nature of pride, he says that it requires two elements other than itself, one is a person towards whom it is directed, and the other is a quality of perfection in which pride is taken. If a man supposes himself great, and another greater or equal, this is not pride; nor is

it pride when he supposes another contemptible, and himself as more or equally contemptible. Pride comes to mind when a man believes that he has worth, that another man also has worth and that his own worth is greater than that of the other; these three beliefs stir up in his mind a feeling of joy, a trust in what he believes, a sense of his own greatness, and contempt for the other. This sense, this joy and this trust constitute pride. This state of the soul is also called 'self-esteem' (*'izza*) and also 'sense of greatness' (*ta'aẓẓum*).[138] From this inward state proceed various forms of boastful action (*takabbur*).[139]

Al-Ghazālī mentions many forms of pride. On the basis of that which pride opposes, it has three forms, namely, pride against God, pride against the prophets and pride against other people. The first is the worst; the second borders on the first; the third, i.e. one's evaluation of oneself as great and another contemptible is the least serious grade of pride, but has grave and evil consequences.[140] This pride may be in religious qualities, i.e. knowledge and action, or in secular affairs such as noble birth, physical beauty or strength, wealth and followers, friends, relatives and assistants. These are the usual means of pride. Display of pride in each of these takes many forms. To support the view that pride is the worst of all the vices, al-Ghazālī quotes a Tradition to the effect that no man in whose mind is the weight of a grain of mustard seed of pride will enter paradise.[141] He also states the reason why this is so: in the *Arba'īn* he mentions three types of abominations caused by pride. In the *Iḥyā'* he explains, by means of his theory of the interconnection of vices, that a proud man necessarily commits every vice and is deprived of every virtue. Such a one cannot enter paradise. Besides, pride belongs by right only to God for He is the all-powerful and the master of all, and so man's pride amounts to disputing the sole right of God. Pride also prevents its possessor from accepting the truth from others, even when he knows it as such.[142]

To get rid of pride is an 'individual obligation' since it is present in everyone. By one method it can be removed from the soul, and by another, only its expression can be prevented. One element in the first method is knowledge, which concerns a man's knowledge of himself and his Lord. When he knows himself he realizes his small worth and the irrelevance of pride to him. When he knows his Lord he knows His might and majesty and realizes that pride befits Him alone. Knowledge of these as the cure of pride was also emphasized by al-Muḥāsibī. Al-Ghazālī adds to it another element, i.e. action,

which is to persevere in those deeds that are the opposite of those resulting from pride. Thus to remove pride against God, prayer should be performed. To banish pride against people it is necessary habitually to perform humble acts, the nature of which al-Ghazālī shows by describing the conduct of the Prophet and the virtuous. The second method of banishing pride also consists of knowledge and action; this concerns the means of pride already mentioned. Al-Ghazālī insists that remedy by knowledge alone is incomplete; perseverance in those acts which are the opposite of pride is highly necessary.[143]

Freedom from pride does not require a man to be servile since servility (*khasāsa*) is also a vice. While pride is a deviation from the virtue of courage towards recklessness, servility is a deviation from it towards cowardice; the mean (*wasaṭ*) between the two should be acquired, for this is the virtue of humility (*tawāḍu'*), the fountain-head of all character-traits of the pious.[144] In the list of virtues it is omitted; dignity (*waqār*) is mentioned there as, it seems, the mean between pride and servility;[145] moreover dignity is also included in the list of the marks of good character (because it is extolled in a Tradition).[146] Therefore dignity and humility seem to be identical for al-Ghazālī. This also seems to be the case with the Muslim philosophers, for al-Fārābī and Avicenna mentioned humility and not dignity, and Miskawayh spoke of dignity and not of humility (although by dignity he meant something different from al-Ghazālī). Whereas al-Fārābī and Avicenna only briefly mentioned humility, al-Ghazālī discusses it in detail. He says that humility, as the mean between pride and servility, is achieved if everything is put in the place it deserves. Thus if a man sits in front of those who are equal to him, this indicates pride, whereas to sit behind them indicates humility. A scholar would be servile should he, when a shoe-maker enters the room, give him his own chair, and, when the shoe-maker leaves, accompany him to the door to see him off and clean his shoes. But he is humble should he do this for those who are equal or near to him. His humility towards the shoe-maker lies in speaking to him cheerfully, questioning him mildly, accepting his invitation, trying to meet his needs and not considering the shoe-maker contemptible and himself great. In matters of dress, humility is the mean between what makes a man notorious for his poor clothing and what makes him famous for his sartorial excellence. None should dishonour himself. Failure to preserve one's own worth, or flattery, is the sign of a deviation from the mean towards servility; this is,

however, less serious a vice than the vice of deviation to pride. The method of acquiring the mean is by increasing one's knowledge of oneself and of God, and by being humble towards those who are inferior, so that humility in its proper place will be easy.[147]

The definition of humility by al-Ghazālī as the mean between pride and servility has its main source in al-Fārābi, who defined it in the same way.[148] Avicenna regarded it as a sub-division of wisdom which restrains the soul from pride.[149] But the great emphasis which al-Ghazālī, al-Muḥāsibī and al-Makkī[150] place upon humility as a virtue derives from the emphasis given to it in the Qur'ān and Tradition;[151] Muslim philosophers regarded it as a virtue because of the influence of both Islam and Hellenistic thought, particularly Stoicism.[152] Like al-Muḥāsibī, al-Ghazālī explains how it is possible for a learned man or a pious person to be humble towards an infidel, an ignoramus, a wicked man and the like, and not to consider himself greater, despite knowing the excellence of knowledge and piety. The gist of his ideas is contained in the following passage:

> "Man's duty, then, is not to take pride in comparing himself with anyone. Rather if he looks at an ignorant person, he will say, 'this man disobeyed God in ignorance and I disobeyed Him with knowledge; so he is more to be excused than I'. If he looks at a learned man, he will say, 'this man learned what I did not learn; so how can I be like him?' If he looks at a man who is older than himself in age, he will say, 'this man obeyed God before me; so how can I be like him?' If he looks at a man younger than himself, he will say, 'I disobeyed God before him; so how can I be like him?' If he looks at a heretic or an infidel, he will say, 'how can I know that his end (*khātima*) will not be made with Islam and my end will not be that in which he now is;... so being considerate of the end he is able to banish pride from his mind."[153]

Having dealt with pride as the greatest vice al-Ghazālī goes on to the vice of conceit which is its cause, and which has a certain amount in common with it.[154]

Conceit

Al-Ghazālī describes the nature of conceit (*'ujb*) by pointing out its difference from and similarity to pride. In his opinion it differs

from pride, in that pride requires for its existence another person who is considered to be of less merit; conceit does not need any such person. It agrees with pride, in that there must be a real or supposed perfection about which a person is conceited. A man's belief in his possession of this perfection creates in his mind one of three states: fear of its disappearance or corruption, by the will of God who has bestowed it; no fear of these, but gladness in it, since it is given by God's grace; and lastly, no fear, but rejoicing in it, thinking of it as only achieved through his own effort. Only this last state is conceit. Thus conceit involves a high evaluation of an attribute, and trust in its continuity, with forgetfulness of its real giver; it is not, as pride is, related to other people.[155] The difference between pride and conceit was also discussed by al-Muḥāsibī.

A high evaluation of a gift given to another, and the bearing in mind of the gift is also included in conceit. Expectation of service or thanks for the gift is called presumption (*idlāl*). Thus this vice is an addition to conceit; every case of it is a case of conceit, but not vice versa, for in conceit a gift is considered great without the expectation of any recompense for it, but in presumption, recompense is also desired. Presumption in devotional acts consists in a man's belief that by means of these he has acquired status with God, and deserves special consideration from Him in this life; he feels that undesirable events are less likely to happen to him than to a sinner; he expects God to accept his prayer more readily than a sinner's, so that he is surprised when his own prayer is refused, as if by his acts he has done a favour to God. This meaning of presumption is identical with that of al-Muḥāsibī. Both agree that conceit, in addition to causing all the evils of pride, is an obstacle to knowledge and action, the two primary means to happiness; it makes them appear sufficient to their possessor so that he neglects efforts to increase them.[156]

Conceit is due to ignorance of the true nature of the qualities of perfection about which one is conceited. Its remedy therefore, lies in true knowledge of them. Conceit in good deeds is more usual than that in other qualities of perfection such as beauty, or noble birth, for the former are thought to be done through one's own effort; al-Ghazālī therefore deals with the nature of good deeds in detail. The gist of his discussion is that in reality they are given by God's grace without man's prior desert or right to them. Reflection on this makes a man realize the folly of being conceited and ungrateful to God. The idea that every good is God's gift is explained by

al-Ghazālī by means of the doctrine of acquisition (*kasb*). This idea was also emphasized by al-Muḥāsibī who, however, did not attach it to this doctrine. Besides removing conceit by knowing the nature of perfection and 'gift', one can also get rid of it by removing its means. There are eight such means; seven are the same as the means of pride, and the eighth is 'wrong opinion', which appears excellent to its possessor owing to his ignorance. Al-Ghazālī explains how each of these means should be remedied, and his explanation is similar to that of al-Muḥāsibī.[157]

NOTES

1. *D*, III, 68.
2. *A*, pp. 100, 175.
3. pp. 179—81.
4. *D*, II, 215, III, 205, 300; *A*, pp. 2, 100, 90.
5. Qur'ān: 87:14, 20:86.
6. *D*, II, 161, III, 251, 301; *A*, p. 535; *M.D.*, p. 69; *B*, p. 151.
7. *B*, p. 138.
8. *Qūt*, I, 377—78.
9. *D*, III, 101, 297. This has been touched on by R.A. Blashdell in "Religious Values in al-Ghazālī's Works", *MW*, XXXVI, (1946), 119.
10. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 213—14.
11. *B*, p. 143; *D*, I, 15.
12. *Tahdhīb*, p. 10.
13. *D*, I, 35 (italics mine).
14. *K*, pp. 451—52.
15. *D*, III, 83; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 347; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 183—84. For the reason why ar-Rāzī urges moderation in food see Lenn Evan Goodman "The Epicurean Ethic of ar-Rāzī", *SI*, XXXIV, 14—15.
16. *D*, III, 83; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 352.
17. *A*, pp. 63, 67. Because of these effects on the soul emphasis upon taking lawful food and avoiding the unlawful is very strong and frequent in al-Ghazālī's ethics. Details of these are considered in Bk. III, Pt. II of the *D* which is summarized in the *K* and the *A*. Al-Makkī in *Qūt*, I, 263, claimed the consensus of the Muslims on the wickedness (*fisq*) of taking unlawful food.
18. *M.D.*, p. 113; cf. Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, p. 155.
19. *Aṭ-Ṭibb ar-Rūḥānī* in *Opera Philosophica*, I, 72—74; *as-Sīrat al-Falsafiyya* in *Opera*, 110.
20. *A*, pp. 63—67.
21. *D*, III, 77—78; *K*, pp. 458—59; cf. *Qūt*, II, 343.
22. *D*, III, 78—82.
23. *D*, III, 84.
24. *D*, III, 85; cf. *Qūt*, II, 359, 355.
25. *D*, III, 84; cf. *Qūt*, II, 313.

26. *B*, p. 140; *A*. p. 101.
27. *D*. III, 85—86, 87.
28. *D*. III, 86, 91.
29. *Ṭibb*, pp. 75, 25.
30. Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Nikāḥ, 2; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Nikāḥ, 1, 3; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Nikāḥ, 1.
31. *D*. III, 87, 89—99; cf. *Qūt*, II, 489—528, especially 490, 492, 495, 502, 507, 511, 528—29.
32. *D*. III, 93—94.
33. *K*. pp. 471—72, 476; *D*. III, 46; *A*. p. 106; *B*. p. 138.
34. Smith, "Forerunner", p. 71.
35. *Qūt*, I, 334, 338, 351.
36. *A*. pp. 107—08.
37. *D*. III, 106—109.
38. *D*. III, 114—16.
39. *D*. III, 117, 118; *K*. pp. 484, 486, 471—72; *A*. pp. 108—109. Cf. al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 24; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 106—108; at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Īmān, 14.
40. *K*. p. 486; *D*. III, 119.
41. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Birr, 100, 101, Libās, 126, 127; al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Ṣulḥ, 2, Nikāḥ, 106.
42. *D*. III, 119—120; *A*. p. 109.
43. *D*. III, 121—22.
44. *D*. IV, 332. Al-Ghazālī does not mention any remedy for lying. His mention of its harm, however, suggests that the remedy lies in knowledge of its harm. Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, pp. 178—79) recommended the pursuit of mathematical sciences from childhood so that man may be accustomed to truthfulness, and shun falsehood.
45. *D*. III, 135—137.
46. *D*. III, 134—37.
47. *D*. III, 129, 130; *K*. p. 493.
48. *D*. III, 124—126.
49. *D*. III, 126—127.
50. *D*. III, 130—32.
51. *D*. III, 132—33.
52. *D*. III, 129—30; 123—25.
53. *D*. III, 145—46; cf. Miskawayh, *Tadhhīb*, pp. 193—95, 205—206.
54. *D*. III, 146—49.
55. *Qūt*, I, 501.
56. *D*. II, 338—39.
57. *D*. I, 272—73.
58. *D* [a]. III, 7. For Miskawayh's conception of the virtue of courage see Ansari, *Ethical Philosophy*, pp. 99, 101—102.
59. *A*. p. 119.
60. *Tahdhīb*, p. 206.
61. *D*. III, 149—55.
62. *A*. p. 118; *K*. pp. 512, 515.
63. *Ri'āya*, p. 310.
64. *D*. III, 157.

65. *D*. III, 156, 159; cf. *Dharī'a*, pp. 131—32.
66. *D*. III, 47.
67. Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, p. 154; al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl*, p. 113; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 22.
68. For a brief account of these, especially of endurance, in the Qur'ān see *H*. Ringgren, "The Concept of Sabr in Pre-Islamic Poetry and in the Qur'ān", *IC*, XXVI (1952), 83—90.
69. *D*. III, 160—62.
70. *D*. III, 170.
71. *B*, p. 143.
72. *Ri'āya*, p. 312. Al-Muḥāsibī discussed envy in all its aspects in this work, pp. 305—23. Al-Ghazālī also treats of it in detail and most of his ideas have their sources in al-Muḥāsibī. This is also recognized by Smith in "Forerunner", p. 71. Al-Makkī in his *Qūt*, II, 458 only mentioned envy, competition and evil imagination. Muḥammad Mahdī 'Allām suggests al-Jāḥiẓ's *Risāla* as the source of most of al-Ghazālī's views on envy. By quoting several passages from it he tries to prove the similarity in their thought; he then points out a "great difference between them in two fundamental matters", namely, (a) the manner of presentation (which is literary in al-Jāḥiẓ) so that what is a cause of envy in al-Ghazālī is its consequence in al-Jāḥiẓ, and (b) the extent of thought, i.e. al-Ghazālī adds many subtle ideas to those of al-Jāḥiẓ. These differences, he explains as al-Ghazālī's improvement upon the views of other writers of which he speaks in the introduction to his *Iḥyā'* (see 'Allām, "Al-ḥasad 'ind al-Ghazālī" in *Dhikrā*, pp. 619—33). 'Allām's suggestion may be queried for several reasons: al-Ghazālī's similarly in thought to al-Jāḥiẓ's is far less than to al-Muḥāsibī; his terminology bears no marks of study of al-Jāḥiẓ's work, whereas his terminology as well as style often coincides with those of al-Muḥāsibī; the five-fold improvement of which he speaks in the introduction to his work is on the ṣūfīs' work, and not on such works as those by al-jāḥiẓ, al 'Allām supposes; al-Ghazālī expressed his indebtedness to al-Muḥāsibī, but there is no evidence that he studied al-Jāḥiẓ.
73. *D*. III, 164—65, 47; *B*. p. 144; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 303, 312.
74. *D*. III, 173—74; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 321—22.
75. *D*. III, 164—66; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 300, 315, 306—07.
76. *D*. III, 166—67.
77. *D*. III, 170—73; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 315—20.
78. *D*. III, 169.
79. *D*. III, 68.
80. *K*. p. 521.
81. p. 4.
82. *D*. III, 190—92.
83. *D*. III, 192, 194; cf. *Qūt*, I, 498—99.
84. *D*. III, 191; *K*. p. 530.
85. *D*. II, 97, 98.
86. *Qūt*, I, 516.
87. *D*. III, 192, 199; *K*. p. 530.
88. *D*. III, 199, 192—94, 175—89; *A*. pp. 281, 283, 288—89, 28.
89. *M.D.*, pp. 5—6.
90. *Qūt*, I, 541, 598—99.

91. *Risāla*, p. (23) 80; cf. *D*, III, 188—9.
92. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 183—85, 180, 211, 213, 209, 217—18, 221. The terms 'moderation', 'need', 'sufficiency' refer to the same grade in the ethics of the Muslim philosophers. This is also true in the case of al-Ghazālī. The phrase 'bare essentials' which is to be found only in al-Ghazālī refers to a higher ideal. The philosophers' stress on necessity derives from the influence of both Greek thought and the Sharī'a. For the Greek sources of ar-Rāzī's frequent appeal to moderation see Goodman, "Ethic", pp. 7—12, 17—22, 25—26. Al-Kindī and Miskawayh were influenced by the personality of Socrates (as delineated by the cynics) and by the teachings of Plato and Aristotle; see Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 228, 221. Cf. Franz Rosenthal, "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World", *IC*, XIV (1940), 388, 409.
93. *D*, III, 195—99, 175—89.
94. *D*, III, 202, 200.
95. *K*, pp. 532—33.
96. *D*, III, 47.
97. *D*, III, 246, 200, 203.
98. *D*, III, 203; *A*, pp. 126, 130.
99. *D*, III, 200, 202—205.
100. *D*, III, 270.
101. *D*, III, 228; *K*, p. 534.
102. *D*, III, 210, 207; *K*, p. 541.
103. Miskawayh *Tahdhīb*, p. 20; Avicenna, *'Ahd*, p. 145.
104. *D*, III, 205.
105. Al-Ghazālī extols Uwis al-Qaranī who was satisfied with so little as regards food, clothing and dwelling that he was regarded as abnormal by his fellow-men. For an account of him see A.S. Hussaini, "Uways Al-Qaranī and the Uwysī Ṣūfīs", *MW*, LVII (1967) 101—13; Abū Nu'aym, *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*, Egypt, 1932, II, 79—87; 'Abd ar-Ra'ūf al-Munāwī, *Al-Kawākib ad-Durriyya*, ed. by Mahmud Ḥasan Rabī', Cairo, 1938, I, 79—81.
106. *'Ahd*, p. 145.
107. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 218, 221 where Socrates and al-Kindī are quoted.
108. *K*, p. 544.
109. *A*, p. 124.
110. *D*, III, 225.
111. Aristotle *Ethics* 4.1.1121b; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 22.
112. *D*, III, 225—226.
113. *Ethics* 4.1.1120a.
114. *D*, III, 223; Qur'ān 59:9.
115. *D*, III, 226—27, 210—22.
116. *D*, III, 259.
117. *D*, III, 65—66.
118. *Qūt*, I, 541.
119. *D*, III, 238.
120. *D*, III, 241.
121. *D*, III, 242—46, 238—39.
122. *D*, III, 246—47, 259.
123. *D*, III, 238.
124. *D*, III, 259.

125. *D*, III, 248—49, 238—41; *K*, pp. 565—66. For the principle of blame and for an account of the ethics of the Malāmatiyya see al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf*, pp. 62—69; Abū l-'Alā 'Afīfī, *Al-Malāmatiyya*, Cairo, 1949; Richard Hartmann, "As-Sulamī's Risālat al-Malamatīja", *DI*, VIII (1918), 157—203; Morris S. Seale, "The Ethics of Malāmatiya Ṣūfism and the Sermon of the Mount", *MW*, LVIII (1968), 12—23.
126. *D* [a], III, 238; cf. al-Muḥāsibī, *Ri'āya*, p. 89. In his exposition of ostentation al-Ghazālī is very much influenced by al-Muḥāsibī who discussed (*Ri'āya*, pp. 84—143) all the aspects of this vice, in eighteen sections.
127. *D*, III, 257—58; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 89, 90—92, 100—106.
128. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, V, 428, 429.
129. *D*, III, 259—60; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 91—2.
130. *D*, III, 260; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 128—29.
131. *D*, III, 261; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 123—26.
132. *D*, III, 262—63; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 126—28.
133. *D*, III, 263—64; cf. *Ri'āya*, p. 133. For the meaning of the *tahajjud* prayer see *infra*, p. 205, n. 64.
134. *D*, III, 265—68.
135. *D*, III, 268—70; *K*, p. 586; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 107—09.
136. *D*, III, 68.
137. *D*, III, 149. Al-Muḥāsibī in his *Ri'āya*, p. 232, regarded pride as a great vice and not the greatest vice. His exposition of pride and conceit in this work (pp. 208—70) is similar to that of al-Ghazālī; the latter's conception of the mean in the virtue of humility, however, seems to have been derived from al-Fārābī's *Fuṣūl*, p. 113; cf. Smith, "Forerunner", p. 70. Al-Ghazālī's views on pride, humility and conceit have differences from Aristotle's ideas in *Ethics* 4.3.1123b—1125b.
138. *D*, III, 296—97; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 238—39.
139. *D*, III, 292—93, 304, 305—306; cf. *Ri'āya*, p. 235.
140. *D*, III, 298—99; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 235—38.
141. Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 147, 148, 149; at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Birr, 61; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Zuhd, 16.
142. *D*, III, 297, 299; *A*, pp. 149—50; *M.A.*, pp. 36—37; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 247, 232—33, 238, 239. For the reasons why the philosopher ar-Rāzī condemns pride and anger in excess see Goodman, "Ethic", p. 16.
143. *D*, III, 308—316, 305—308; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 248—58.
144. *D*, III, 317.
145. *D*, III, 47.
146. *D*, III, 60.
147. *D*, III, 317—18, 307.
148. *Fuṣūl*, p. 113.
149. *'Ahd*, p. 144; *Akhlāq*, p. 153.
150. *Qūt*, I, 296, 297, II, 282.
151. Qur'ān 31:18—19; 17:37—38; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Birr, 69; at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Birr, 82, Qiyāma, 39.
152. Fehme Jadaane, *L'Influence du stoicisme sur la pensée musulmane*, Beirut, 1968, pp. 189—234.
153. *D*, III, 314; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 263, 264—65, 268—9.
154. *A*, p. 157.

155. *D*, III, 296, 319; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 232, 247.
156. *D*, III, 318, 319; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 213—14, 207—08.
157. *D*, III, 320—25; cf. *Ri'āya*, pp. 216—32.

V
MYSTICAL VIRTUES

THE NATURE OF MYSTICAL VIRTUES

The previous chapter dealt with al-Ghazālī's teachings on the evil qualities of the soul, the harm they cause their possessor, and the way in which they can be removed. When they have been banished through mortification and self-training, the soul becomes clean and purified and, therefore, fit to find a place in the near presence of God, for it is only such a soul that will be entitled to a place there.[1] As a result of the purification of the inward self through a long process of pain and struggle, the inner faculties come back to their proper states, and the defilement which has, as it were, accumulated on the face of the soul is removed. The soul is now in a position to acquire such praiseworthy qualities as will not only save it from damnation but enable it to attain nearness to God; in short, it is prepared for a new life. With the removal of the evil qualities that constituted obstacles on the path to God, the novice can now easily travel the path; he will travel it step by step until he reaches the end, when he will be called a ṣūfī.

The virtuous qualities which the seeker after God will now try to acquire are stated in the *Iḥyā'* as repentance, patience, gratitude, hope, fear, poverty, asceticism, unity and trust, love, yearning, intimacy, satisfaction, intention, sincerity, truthfulness, vigilance, self-examination and meditation. Divine unity is not a mystical virtue; it is regarded as the basis of trust. All these virtues are also dealt with in the *Kīmiyā'*, although their order in this work is different from that in the *Iḥyā'*; in the former work intimacy is not discussed under a separate heading, but along with yearning. In the *Arba'īn*, an abridgement of the *Iḥyā'*, only the most important of these virtues have been dealt with; these are repentance, fear, asceticism, patience, gratitude, sincerity, truthfulness, trust, love and satisfaction. In the ethical systems of some of the philosophers these virtues are completely absent, while in those of others only a few of them are present, without being emphasized and developed in the

manner they deserve. In the Qur'ān and Tradition, on the other hand, all of them are to be found, with a brief explanation of their meaning. It was the ṣūfis who laid so much emphasis upon these virtues, considerably developed their meaning, examined their various aspects, and arranged them in a gradually ascending order; they stressed the fact that these virtues in their perfect form are only attainable by the mystics. For this reason they may be called mystical virtues or, more properly, mystical qualities.

Acquisition of these mystical qualities, after the accomplishment of the task of purification, is identified by al-Ghazālī with the prosperity of the inward self (*'umrān al-bāṭin*), with the enlightenment of the soul (*tanwīr al-qalb*) and also with making it beautiful (*taḥliyat al-qalb*).[2] In their perfect form they are appropriate to the highest category, i.e. the mystics; in their imperfect form they are attainable by the pious; in their basic form they are present in every believer;[3] this gradation is to be found in the discussion of most of these virtues. Without acquiring them completely no one can attain nearness to God and become entitled to the highest happiness. In all the ethical works in which al-Ghazālī deals with them they are spoken of as the qualities of salvation (*ṣifāt munjiyāt*); the term 'salvation' is not here used in its strict sense; it is used in its broad sense which is synonymous with happiness, including the highest form of happiness. Many of these virtues are also called the stations of those who traverse the way to God (*maqāmāt as-salikīn*), also the stations of religion (*maqāmāt ad-dīn*) and stages of religion (*manāzil ad-dīn*): the term religion used in this context is defined as "the relationship of devotional practice (*mu'āmala*) between a man and his Lord."[4] It is plain, therefore, that the mystical qualities mentioned above are to be acquired for the special purpose of attaining proximity to God.[5] (The acquisition of the four root virtues with their sub-divisions, described in a previous chapter, was mainly urged for the general purpose of achieving a good character.)[6] The mystical virtues are also called praiseworthy character-traits (*akhlāq maḥmūda*) as are the root virtues, although the term *faḍīla* (virtue) is more often used for the latter, following the philosophers. Thus the terms 'quality of salvation', 'station' and 'stage' identify a mystical virtue, while the word 'virtue' (*faḍīla*) identifies a root virtue; the phrase 'praiseworthy character trait' is common to all the virtues.

Although all the mystical qualities mentioned above are to be acquired by a disciple seeking nearness to God, they are not of the

same grade and importance. They have been divided by al-Ghazālī into (a) those which are means and (b) those which are ends. The latter are sought for their own sake and not for any other virtues; they will remain in the soul eternally after death. They consist of gratitude, unity and trust, love, yearning, intimacy and satisfaction. All other mystical virtues are those regarded as means; their only function is to help the novice acquire the virtues regarded as ends. Because they are means they should, in al-Ghazālī's view, be stated first. This division of the mystical virtues is clearly made in a passage of the *Kīmiyā'* to be mentioned shortly, and the order of the virtues in this work is based upon this division, for the means-group is dealt with first, leaving the latter part of the work for the ends-group; gratitude, an end-virtue, is discussed with a means-virtue, patience, for a special reason to be mentioned later. The order of the virtues in the *Arba'īn* is similar to that in the *Kīmiyā'* and in this book also, al-Ghazālī speaks of the above-mentioned division: this division is first stated in the discussion of the virtue of gratitude; at the conclusion of the treatment of all the 'stations' it is again expounded in a somewhat clearer form.[7] In the *Iḥyā'*, however, this division is absent; instead, there is a suggestion for another classification: six virtues, namely, intention, sincerity, truthfulness, vigilance, self-examination and meditation are treated last, i.e. after love, without mentioning the reason for this. This suggests that these six are regarded as a group needed to support and help the other virtues, which form another group. If this was really his view in this work, it must have been rejected in favour of that in the *Kīmiyā'* and the *Arba'īn*. He constantly cultivated these virtues himself and the more he cultivated them the clearer became his knowledge of their role and significance in making the inward self beautiful; at the stage of writing these two later works, he understood[8] repentance, etc. as means, and gratitude, trust, etc. as ends, and vividly expressed this in the following passage:

"Know that what we have called the qualities of salvation are of two divisions: one comprises those which come first in the path of religion and which are not the aims in themselves, e.g. repentance, patience, asceticism, self-examination and poverty; all these are means to what lies after them. The other kind consists of the qualities which are the aims and the ends; they are sought for their own sake and not for serving as means to something else, e.g love, yearning, satisfaction, unity and trust;

gratitude is among them. Every quality that is an end will remain [in the soul] in the next life:... So it [gratitude] needs to be stated at the end of the work;..."[9]

Besides classifying the mystical virtues as means and ends, al-Ghazālī presents them in the form of a gradually ascending order. Like other ṣūfīs, he puts repentance at the bottom of it and, like al-Makkī, love at the top.[10] Love is regarded as the highest station of the path and several qualities such as yearning, intimacy and satisfaction are said to be its by-products.[11] All the means-virtues and the ends-virtues that are below love are thought to be those which prepare the novice for it. Although all the means-virtues are means to all the ends-virtues, each of the former is shown to be especially related to one of the latter. A mutual link between two means-virtues is also frequently demonstrated. An important point about the ascending order is that when the novice, after acquiring one virtue, passes to another, his concern with it is not finished; rather, he must cultivate it throughout his life. What is finished is only his mortification and self-training.[12] The methods of acquiring a mystical virtue are the same as those for a root virtue, i.e. habit-formation and association. It is clearly expressed in the case of some mystical virtues[13] that divine grace (*tawfīq*) as a separate element is also present with these. The sign of the complete acquisition of a mystical virtue is the same as that of a root virtue, i.e. to feel pleasure and ease in exercising it.[14]

Each station of the path is regarded by al-Ghazālī as consisting of three elements, namely, knowledge (*'ilm*), disposition (*ḥāl*) and action (*'amal*).[15] The first produces the second and the second the third — when knowledge is present, disposition is necessarily produced in the soul, provided there is no obstacle to it; when disposition is created, certain relevant actions cannot but proceed from it.[16] This is the order of the three elements and this is how they involve each other. This tripartite nature of a mystical virtue (which, like a root virtue, is identified with a character-trait,) is not inconsistent with the definition already given of a character-trait as a disposition of the soul only, (and not as a faculty or knowledge or action) because in a mystical virtue also, it is the disposition which is precisely called virtue, while knowledge is regarded as its cause (*sabab*) and action as its result (*thamara*). The fact that mystical virtue refers to disposition is clearly expressed by al-Ghazālī in many places.[17] Knowledge and action are here added to disposition in

order to give a complete view — so complete that one finds in it both the cause and the effect of a virtue. The idea that a mystical virtue is made up of three elements is entirely al-Ghazālī's own; his ṣūfī predecessors' definitions of it sometimes included only one element and at times two; hence he rejects them all as incomplete, but not as incorrect.[18] His conception of a mystical virtue may be made clearer by explaining its three elements one by one.

The knowledge which forms the cause of a virtue is particularly concerned with the benefit of that virtue in the hereafter and with the evil of its opposite. In addition, this knowledge sometimes concerns general matters of the next world, which may be related to that virtue only indirectly. To be capable of producing a disposition which precisely forms a virtue, it is not enough for the knowledge to be entirely certain; what is necessary is that the absolutely certain knowledge should have mastery over the soul, and become so deepseated in it that it is inseparable from it. This is made clear by using words like *istawlat al-ma'rifa, i'tiqād qāṭi', taṣdīq yaqīnī, taṣdīq bi-l qalb, īmān jāzim* and so on.[19] Such firm conviction is what Socrates meant by knowledge in his famous maxim, 'virtue is knowledge'. His influence upon al-Ghazālī does not extend beyond this, for the latter, unlike the former, maintains that even when firm conviction is present, disposition may not be aroused because of some obstacle, which is in most cases the dominance of passions.

Ḥāl (disposition) produced by knowledge is that to which all the terms used for mystical virtue refer precisely. It denotes a quality of the soul that is "fixed" and "established". Thus as an element of a mystical virtue, *ḥāl* means the same thing as is meant by the term *hay'a rāsikha* in the definition of a character-trait (*khuluq*) which was identified with a root virtue. That *ḥāl* used in this context means a fixed quality is evident from the fact that 'station' (*maqām*) is defined as a fixed and established quality of the soul,[20] and in some cases 'station' is identified with *ḥāl*.[21] Moreover, precisely speaking many of the mystical qualities are, as already mentioned, related to the element of *ḥāl*; they are also called praiseworthy character-traits, and a character-trait has already been defined as an established quality of the soul; the conclusion, therefore, is that *ḥāl* is an established quality. There is, however, another meaning of *ḥāl* in al-Ghazālī's work, and it bears this meaning when it is used in the context of 'station'. In his view, a quality of the soul is a 'station' when it is fixed and established, but when it is accidental (*'āriḍ*) and transitory it is *ḥāl* (state). This meaning is reiterated in the *Imlā'*[22]

written in defence of the *Iḥyā'*. In the latter work, this meaning is explained with the help of the phenomenon of yellowness. Dividing yellowness into that which is fixed, e.g. the yellowness of gold, that which disappears quickly like the yellowness of one's face created by fear, and that which lies between the two, e.g. the yellowness of a sick man, al-Ghazālī says that a quality of the soul is divisible into these kinds, so that which is not fixed is named *ḥāl,* for "it soon changes." and this is true in every quality of the soul.[23] The difference between 'state' and 'station', then, is one of degree and not of kind. State is not said here to be something that descends to the soul as a gift from God; it is only said to be a quality that is accidental and transitory. Clearly, then, al-Ghazālī's definition of 'station' accords with those of other ṣūfīs, but his conception of *ḥāl* is not the same as theirs.[24]

Although the disposition is a fixed quality, as is a character-trait which is identified with a root virtue, al-Ghazālī does not apply to it (except in the case of fear and hope) the concept of the mean (*wasaṭ*) which he applied to a root virtue. The reason is that the use of the mean for otherworldly purposes is obviously inappropriate to all mystical virtues. As for its use for practical purposes, it is appropriate to two of them, fear and hope: since the bases of these are passions they tend to the extreme, thereby negating their desired functions. But these functions are best fulfilled, as will later be explained, when they are at the state of the mean. Hence the mean is applied to them by al-Ghazālī, as it is also by al-Makkī.[25]

Action proceeding from disposition is of two kinds, namely, that of the bodily members and that of the soul. In the case of a few virtues, that which arises from the soul is also described as qualities.[26] The important point is that if a mystical quality or a disposition is produced in the soul, it must give rise to action, and this action will, again, leave its influence upon the soul as a result of which the quality will be strengthened; all actions are for the benefit of the soul.[27] This idea is based on al-Ghazālī's theory of a circular relationship between the soul and the body. The nature of action is determined by the nature of the disposition. The principle of opposite action as explained in the third chapter, is applied to the element of action in the case of some mystical virtues.[28]

With this brief discussion about the aim of the mystical virtues, their classification and ascending order and their elements or parts, it may be proper to go on to discuss all the mystical virtues one by one. Since a virtue is completed by three elements, it will be

sufficient if the attempt is confined to dealing with those materials that are directly related to them. All the proofs given from revelation and from the sayings of mystics and saints will be omitted for the sake of brevity. The means-virtues will be dealt with first, for this is the logical order, and this is what al-Ghazālī himself did.

THE MYSTICAL VIRTUES REGARDED AS MEANS

Repentance

Repentance (*tawba*) is the first station of the path leading to God; it is the first of the mystical virtues regarded as means. Why it is necessary at all, why it is required of everyone in every condition, and why it should be acquired first by the novice are questions briefly discussed by al-Ghazālī.[29] He also states that repentance as a mystical virtue is much more than what it is ordinarily understood to be. For the common man, repentance is of the sins committed by the body. For the novice, it is, in addition, of the roots of these sins in the soul, i.e. of the destructive qualities of envy, pride, ostentation and so on; at a higher level of moral progress, it is also repentance of diabolic suggestions, 'the inner utterance of the soul' and a sense of guilt that occasionally comes to the mind; at the highest level, i.e. the level of the most devout, it is repentance of the mind's occasional heedlessness in remembering God; forgetting Him, although for a moment, is regarded as an imperfection and so repentance of that too is required; there must be a rejection of everything other than what leads to God.[30]

As a mystical virtue, repentance, according to al-Ghazālī, consists of three elements: knowledge, disposition and action. By knowledge is meant man's awareness of the harm of sin, of the fact that it produces a veil between him and all that he loves. When he knows this with certainty, pain for his isolation from his beloved, owing to sin, is roused in his soul; this state of experiencing pain is known as regret (*nadam*). When regret predominates in the mind, there hastens to it resolution (*'azm*) for action related to the past, present and future. Action in the present involves abandoning sin; action in the future is continuing the abandonment of it until death; and action relating to the past is atoning for sins committed. Thus knowledge causes regret which, in turn, causes resolve to act. This is the order of these elements, and repentance refers to the sum total of them all in this order. The element of regret is, of course, the essence

of repentance, and this is the reason why it alone is sometimes referred to as the virtue of repentance.[31]

Since repentance is only made perfect by completing its three constituent parts, al-Ghazālī states in detail the stipulations of their completeness. The element of knowledge, he says, is completed by the knowledge of four things. The first is that 'misery' has its causes, one of which is sin; when a sin is committed, its evil affects the soul; the purity of the soul is thus lost and, consequently, it becomes unworthy of finding a place in the presence of God; this is how sin causes a veil to come between man and God, and knowledge of this is needed for repentance. The second thing is that the prophets had the greatest knowledge of the diseases of the soul, and that they were the most truthful in interpreting it. The third thing to know is their sayings, and also the Qur'ānic verses containing God's rebuke of sinners. The fourth thing to be aware of is the amount of harm caused by each particular sin, and the way of atoning for it.[32]

The element of disposition, i.e. the regret produced by the knowledge of these things, is the essence of repentance. The sign of the completeness of regret is its rising to such an extent that it creates remorse, sorrow, tears, and anxiety for a long time; when it is complete the soul becomes pure; the sweetness of sin is changed into bitterness, inclination towards it into aversion, and liking for it into hatred; bitterness is felt for all sins, because all are similar in creating a veil between man and God.[33]

The element of resolve to act, aroused by regret, has its relation to past, present and future. Resolve related to the present can only be complete when all sins have been abandoned and all obligatory devotional acts are being properly performed. Resolve linked with the future, i.e. the determination never to sin again should, at the time of repenting, be as strong as possible although it may become weak later, when desire again predominates. Its completion is inconceivable unless the penitent adopts a life of retirement and silence, eating and sleeping little and taking only lawful food. Resolve to act, related to the past, is completed by atonement for all the sins that were committed from the time of maturity to the day of repentance. Various methods of making investigation into them, along with the principles of atonement, are mentioned by al-Ghazālī, who here follows al-Muḥāsibī very closely. Total neglect or incomplete performance of obligatory acts of devotion are to be atoned for by performing them with a broken and contrite heart. Atonement for a grave or venial sin is by regret for committing it,

and by doing the deed that is opposite to it; the duration of the opposite deed should be the same as that of the sin; an hour's enjoyment of immoral music, for example, needs to be atoned for by an hour's listening to the Qur'ān. Atonement of any harm done to one's fellow-men consists of two things: one is regretting and doing the deed opposite to it, e.g. giving the poor lawful wealth for wrongly taking away someone's wealth; the other is seeking forgiveness from the person harmed, or from his heirs if he has passed away.[34]

When the elements of knowledge, regret and resolve to act are complete in the way mentioned above, repentance becomes necessarily acceptable to God. The soul which lost its purity as a result of sin, regains it now; as a consequence of the effect of regret and of good deeds contrary to the sins committed, the soul becomes clean and purified, and it is such a soul that is worthy of finding a place in God's presence and enjoying supreme happiness.[35] For perfect repentance, patience is needed in addition to the knowledge already explained; it is needed in controlling the desire for sin and removing unwillingness to fulfil obligations; since repentance is thus dependent upon patience, al-Ghazālī says that discussion of patience should follow that of repentance.[36]

Patience

Patience (*ṣabr*) is the second mystical virtue of the means-group. In addition to this, it is described as an attribute of God.[37] In the account of the root virtues, patience was treated by al-Ghazālī very briefly, after the manner of the philosophers; now it is discussed elaborately as a station of the mystic path. Like repentance it is completed by the three elements of knowledge, disposition produced in the soul as a result of knowledge, and action proceeding from this disposition. More precisely, however, patience refers to disposition, knowledge and action being respectively the cause and effect of disposition.[38] What al-Ghazālī states about these three elements of patience is linked with his theory of the faculties of the human soul, as discussed in the second chapter. Besides reason, he maintains, there is a faculty (*quwwa*) in the soul whose function is to control the faculties of desire and anger. This controlling quality (*ṣifa*) of the soul he calls the motive of religion (*bā'ith ad-dīn*) and the claim of desires and anger the motive of passion (*bā'ith al-hawā*); the two motives have always been at war with one another, inasmuch as in the case of every action, one of them impels man to do it and the

other impels him not to do it. The steadiness (*thabāt*) of the motive of religion in such an opposition to the motive of passion is the disposition to which the virtue of patience precisely refers. This steadiness is a result of the knowledge of the fact that passions are incompatible with the means to happiness in this world as well as in the next, that they are man's enemies, inasmuch as they deter him from the path to God. The better this knowledge of the evil consequence of submitting to passions, the more firm and steady the motive of religion becomes. When this motive is firm, the course of action demanded by the motive of passion is abandoned, and the one contrary to it is adopted; this proceeding of action from disposition is, strictly speaking, the virtue of patience.[39]

This patience which is restraint of the demands of carnal desires and anger is called by al-Ghazālī mental patience (*aṣ-ṣabr an-nafsī*) and is regarded by him as more perfect than bodily patience (*aṣ-ṣabr al-badanī*), which is the endurance of physical pain felt in the performance of devotional and non-devotional acts, and in disease and injury. Endurance of bodily pain is commendable only when it is necessitated by the Sharī'a. Mental patience functions in various channels; it is required against excessive desire for food and sex. In misfortune it is required against violent outbursts of passions in the form of crying, tearing of clothes and so on. It is needed to restrain greed for wealth. Firmness of mind is also required in the battle-field, in restraining anger, in keeping others' secrets concealed, in abandoning what is superfluous, i.e. in asceticism, and so on. Thus most of the good qualities of the soul are dependent upon patience. Its importance as a means-virtue is therefore very great.[40]

Patience is needed throughout life. This is so because, at every stage of life, a man is concerned either with something that is agreeable to his lower nature, or with something disagreeable, and in each case he is in need of patience. The agreeable things include wealth, fame, health, etc., and non-observance of patience in these leads man to insolence and evil deeds. Patience involves not relying on or rejoicing in these things, and not using them for worldly pleasure. The things disagreeable to his lower nature are (a) things that are in man's power, e.g. devotional acts and sin, (b) things which are not in his power and (c) things whose occurrence is not in his power but whose avoidance is. Now, patience in devotional acts is needed because the carnal soul is reluctant in their performance. It is needed before devotional acts, and also within them and after them: before starting them, in making the intentions completely

pure from ostentation; within them, in observing all obligatory and supererogatory parts, with both their external and internal aspects; after completing them, in not publicizing them for the sake of fame, and not feeling vainglorious. In refraining from sin, too, patience is needed, because the carnal soul is by nature prone to it. As for the things whose occurrence is not in man's choice but whose avoidance is, e.g. harm from others in different forms, patience is needed in not taking any revenge for such acts at all, or in taking revenge only in proportion to the harm done; enduring harm from others entails a high level of patience. The things which are not in man's power at all are misfortunes and calamities like the death of children, loss of wealth, paralysis of any organ; patience in these is the most excellent kind of patience and this can only be attained by the most devout; mental pain, or silent tears in misfortune, are not incompatible with this kind of patience, since these are natural for man; this patience is, of course, lost by violent outbursts of passion and by complaints to others. Thus at every step of life, man is in need of patience. Even when a mystic has completely controlled his passions and adopted solitude, he needs it in maintaining his control over them and in repelling from his mind diabolic suggestions, and passing thoughts that come in solitude, preventing him from remembering God.[41]

Although patience is needed at every stage of life, the need for it in all life-situations is not the same. In some it is obligatory, while in others it is supererogatory. Patience in abstinence from those deeds which the Sharī'a made unlawful is obligatory. It is supererogatory in doing those good deeds which are disliked by natural passions, and this is appropriate to 'the few'. There are two situations where patience is reprehensible. One of these is in receiving an injury that is unlawful in the Sharī'a, e.g. when a man's own hand or that of his child is being cut off by an oppressor. The other is in receiving an injury that is disliked in the Sharī'a. In a particular situation, the question of whether patience is needed or not, and, if needed, whether it is obligatory or supererogatory, will be determined by the Sharī'a.[42]

Patience as a mystical virtue can only be said to have been acquired by a novice when he can exercise it in all the situations demanding it, not with much pain, but with little exertion of his carnal soul, for this shows that his religious motive has become so strong that it cannot be overcome by his motive of passion at all. The conception of pleasure as the criterion for the acquisition of a character-trait has been discussed in the third chapter. If a man can

observe patience only in some situations but not in all, or if he can observe it in all situations with much rather than little pain, his motive of religion has not become strong enough; he is just learning patience (*taṣabbur*) and has not yet acquired it. The motive of religion gets strength from the practice of patience, and also from sure knowledge of the evil consequences that passions can have. After the exercise of patience with pain and difficulty for a long time, the religious impulse becomes strong so that patience in all circumstances becomes easy. Endurance of pain is not always possible; it is possible only when the fear of God is dominant in the soul. Therefore, the virtue that deserves consideration after patience is fear.[43]

But al-Ghazālī, like al-Makkī,[44] takes up the virtue of gratitude for discussion because it is inseparably related to patience. Concerning this relation he points out that two things — affliction and bounty — come to man in his life, demanding appropriate responses from him. When affliction befalls him, his response should, at least, be in the form of patience (it is, of course, better to express gratitude even in such a condition — a view that has been justified on several grounds).[45] But when bounty is bestowed upon him, he must respond to it by expressing gratitude to its Bestower. Al-Ghazālī says that if this relation did not exist between patience and gratitude, he would have treated the latter not along with patience, but with other ends-virtues; for in fact it is one of them.[46]

Gratitude

Gratitude (*shukr*) to God is considered by al-Ghazālī as one of the higher stations of the path leading the novice near to Him; its high place in the path he proves by means of Qur'ānic verses and prophetic traditions. Since it belongs to the ends-group of the mystical virtues, it is to be acquired by the novice later and, if acquired, it will remain in the soul in the hereafter; thus those who are 'happy' will be expressing gratitude to God there too. To give a complete description of gratitude, al-Ghazālī speaks of it in terms of the three elements that make up most of the mystical virtues, i.e. knowledge, disposition and action. Gratitude to God is for the gift (*ni'ma*) He bestows upon man, and so knowledge here is of the fact that every gift is ultimately from Him. This knowledge produces in the soul the disposition of joy in the Benefactor (*mun'im*) — a joy mingled with a sense of submission and humility towards Him.

From this disposition of joy proceeds action, which is the use of every gift for the purpose for which the Benefactor has given it. These three elements complete the virtue of gratitude, although what it precisely refers to is the element of disposition. The definitions of gratitude by al-Junayd, Ḥamdūn al-Qaṣṣār and others, include only one or two of these elements and so al-Ghazālī rejects them as incomplete.[47]

Since clear apprehension of the real nature of gratitude to God depends upon clearly understanding its three elements,[48] al-Ghazālī proceeds to explain them one by one. Knowledge, the cause of gratitude, is, he says, linked with the concept of divine unity (*tawḥīd*) and sanctification, and is attainable only after them. The gist of this knowledge is that gifts come from God, and no one has any partnership with Him in bestowing them. The intermediate causes (*asbāb, wasā'iṭ*) of a gift are only appointed by God so that they work on His behalf; they can only do what they are commanded by Him. When an individual, for example, benefits another with his wealth, he is bound to do so inasmuch as God created in Him a will to that effect; therefore, it is God who is the real Benefactor, who gives the benefit through the alms-giver. This knowledge is necessary for perfect gratitude because it is only from such knowledge that the soul can rejoice in the Benefactor alone, in which case gratitude is felt only towards Him. But if one believes the gift to have come from intermediary causes, one's gratitude will be given to them only; if one believes that they have at least some role to play in bestowing the gift, one's gratitude will be directed towards them too, in which case gratitude to God alone will be incomplete. For these reasons the knowledge that every benefit comes from God and from no other is very necessary, so necessary that at times al-Ghazālī calls this alone the virtue of gratitude.[49]

The disposition which is precisely the mystical quality of gratitude, is the joy produced by the knowledge of the gift. In order to be a perfect disposition, this joy which is mingled with a feeling of submission and humility should be towards God alone and should come to the mind from the realization that the gift received from Him will serve as a means to draw near to Him. This perfect disposition is possessed by the mystics and the most devout, and its sign is that they are joyful only when they receive those things of the world which help them in reaching the goal. A man's joy may be because he realizes that the gift he received is something enjoyable and accords with his need; this joy is not the disposition of gratitude,

since it is not towards the Benefactor in any sense. Again, joy may be towards the Benefactor not because the gift received from Him is a thing of enjoyment, but because the recipient realizes that it proves that God is pleased with him, and will give him more benefit in the future; this is a disposition of gratitude no doubt, but this disposition is of an inferior kind; it is possessed by those who worship God and offer Him thanks in the hope of rewards from Him in the future life.[50]

Action proceeding from the disposition of gratitude is by the soul, by the tongue and by the members. Action of the soul is a desire for the good of all men. Action by the tongue is the expression of joy towards the Benefactor through such sentences as 'all praise be to God (*al-ḥamd li-Allāh*)'. Action of the members consists in using God's gifts for the purposes for which He gave them. To use them for any other purpose, or not to use them at all, is ingratitude. Thus the purpose of creating the hand is for man to repel what is harmful and to grasp the useful; if it is used in committing sin, or is not used where it should be used, this is ingratitude to God in regard to this gift. Men of insight can know God's purpose in creating each gift, by reflection and inspiration (*ilhām*), while common men who have a lower grade of intellect can know it from the Sharī'a. In general, it may be said that each gift is given so that man may work by it for the hereafter; therefore it is only by using it for that end that one can become grateful to God.[51]

Because gratitude is necessary for the gift man receives, al-Ghazālī states what 'gift' really means and what its forms are. In support of his view that gifts are innumerable he quotes the Qur'ānic verse, "And if you count God's gifts, you will not be able to number them; most surely man is very unjust and very ungrateful."[52] Some of them are hidden, others are manifest; some are common to all human beings, e.g. air, water, the rays of the sun, etc. while others are particular to a few people, such as wealth and honour, or to a single individual. Al-Ghazālī says that whatever is useful in this world and the next, is a gift in the absolute sense of the term; there are only two such things, namely, knowledge and good action. What is painful in this world but pleasure-giving in the next, is also a gift. In most of the things of this world there exist both benefit and harm from the viewpoint of the hereafter; if the benefit of a thing is greater than its harm, it should be reckoned as a gift; the amount of benefit and harm varies from person to person, and so a thing may be a gift for one person, but affliction for another. Only those things

of the world that serve as means to otherworldly happiness are gifts. These are innumerable, but from them al-Ghazālī selects sixteen which he discusses in detail.[53]

At the end of his discussion on gratitude, al-Ghazālī does not speak of the virtue that should follow it. The reason is that he has already pointed out that what should follow after the virtue of patience is the fear of God, but that instead of discussing it he dealt with gratitude, for a special reason already considered. Now that the discussion on gratitude is finished he goes on to treat fear,[54] without feeling any need to repeat his reason. Since he sees a link between fear and hope he considers both together. Of these, however, fear deserves first consideration, because this is its true position, and because hope is better than fear when they are judged from the point of view of their sources[55]; (a rule in mysticism is that what is higher should be discussed later). However, he discusses hope first — an arrangement that accords with that of al-Makkī — because it has a similarity with the preceding virtue, gratitude. The similarity is that both are related to the same attributes of God, i.e. the mercy and kindness which attract man to His love.[56] In the *Arba'īn,* however, a brief treatment of hope is to be found towards the end of the discussion of fear.

Hope

The virtues of hope (*rajā'*) and fear (*khawf*) are compared by al-Ghazālī to "two wings by means of which those who are brought near [to God] fly to every praiseworthy station [on the path]".[57] Each of the other means-virtues, in addition to being means to all the ends-virtues, is a means to one or two means-virtues other than itself; but fear and hope, besides the special relation of the former to patience, are means to *all* the virtues other than themselves. To facilitate the discussion of their nature as mystical virtues, al-Ghazālī first states the general meaning of hope and fear. In regard to hope he says that it refers to the joy (*irtiyāḥ*) of the mind which results from its anticipation of anything that it esteems desirable.[58] There must be means to such a thing, and if the mind expects it on the ground that most of the means have been obtained, it is reasonable to call this anticipation hope. But if the anticipation of the thing is made despite defective and disorderly fulfilment of the means, it should be called delusion (*gharūr*) and stupidity (*ḥumuq*) and not hope. If the means to the thing are unknown, the

expectation of it should be called wishful thinking (*tamannī*) because this is an expectation without foundation. Legitimate hope, then, is expectation of a desirable thing after the fulfilment of all the means to it that are within man's power.[59]

Similar to this is the nature of hope as mystical virtue. Should a novice strengthen his 'faith' by means of devotional acts, purify the soul from blameworthy qualities and then expect that God, out of mercy, will strengthen him in this conduct until death, and grant him a good end (*ḥusn al-khātima*) which will lead to forgiveness, this expectation can be called real hope; this will cause him to persevere in good deeds to the last of his life, completing thereby the means to mercy. But if he neglects the act of strengthening the 'faith' or leaves the soul unpurified, and is engrossed in worldly pleasures and expects that God will forgive him, this expectation is mere delusion and stupidity. Real hope of mercy, which is cherished after obtaining the means to it, and which causes a man to remain moral thoughout the rest of his life, is a disposition of the soul which is aroused by knowledge and which, in turn, necessitates action. Thus, the virtue of hope too consists of the three elements necessary for each station on the path to God. By knowledge is meant here man's awareness of having obtained most of the means to mercy, and by action, the best possible effort in performing devotional acts, which constitutes the remaining part of the means to mercy. This effort is a necessary part of real hope because the opposite of hope, i.e. despair, is blameworthy for the reason that there is no activity in it. Among the signs of real hope are: feeling pleasure in working to attain nearness to God, joy in secret converse with Him, and eagerness for praising Him with humility. Should these signs be absent in a novice he cannot be said to have acquired the virtue of hope; he is deluded and has given way to wishful thinking.[60]

Hope of mercy should be at the stage not of excess or deficiency but of the mean (*wasaṭ*). Hope is the first of the two mystical virtues, the other being fear, to which al-Ghazālī, following al-Makkī,[61] applies the doctrine of the mean — a doctrine that was found to be so important in his conception of root virtues and vices. But while in that place he used the doctrine sometimes for practical purposes, and sometimes for otherworldly purposes, he here uses it purely for the former. He says that it is only when hope is at the mean state that its purpose — which is to energize the novice for knowledge and action — can be best fulfilled. If hope is excessive, it becomes sloth and laziness. If it is deficient it borders on despair, depriving its

possessor of knowledge and action. Thus both excess and deficiency are bad and should be remedied by appropriate means. Excessive hope can be reduced by reading the Qur'ānic verses and prophetic traditions on fear. Some of those whose hope of mercy deviates too much towards the extreme of deficiency are in despair, and they abandon devotional acts and repentance from sin; others keep themselves so busy in them that they harm themselves and their families. Hope in both groups of people should be increased to the state of equilibrium and this can be achieved in two ways. One is reflection on the innumerable types of gifts that God has bestowed upon man; this will enable them to realize how kind He is in this world, and this realization will create in their minds the hope that in the next world too He will show such kindness to man. This reflection is, of course, difficult for common men who, therefore, need to follow the second way, which consists in reading the Qur'ānic verses, prophetic traditions, and sayings of mystics and saints about the hope of God's forgiveness in the hereafter.[62]

Fear

While hope in general refers to the joy of the soul when it expects something desirable, fear is the soul's experience of pain when it anticipates something harmful.[63] This painful feeling is aroused in a man's mind by his knowledge that the harmful thing will overtake him, and the intensity of this feeling is in proportion to the strength of this knowledge. So long as this feeling exists certain actions are necessarily caused by this. This is the nature of fear in general, and similar to this is the nature of fear in mysticism. As a mystical virtue fear refers to the fear of God. It is the soul's experience of pain when a novice knows (a) God's attributes of majesty, power and absolute independence, so that if He destroys the whole universe none can destroy Him, or (b) his sins, defects in his good deeds, the blameworthy qualities of his soul, and the punishment for all these, or (c) all of these, i.e. his sin and God's majestic attributes. On the strength of his knowledge of these depends the strength of his feeling of pain. This feeling influences both the body and the soul. In the former, it produces pallidness, fainting, shrieking, weeping and sometimes it even causes death; instead of committing sins the members become engaged in devotional acts and in making up for the excesses of the past. The effect of fear on the soul is that desire for worldly enjoyment and sin disappears; modesty, humility and

submission to God come to the soul; pride, rancour and, in short, tendency to evil leave it; self- examination, vigilance and anxiety about the 'end' occupy the mind. When desires are controlled, the virtue of temperance (*'iffa*) is achieved. The lowest grade of fear is what keeps man from all that is unlawful; this is called abstinence (*wara'*). A higher grade of fear restrains man from what is doubtful; this is called piety (*taqwā*). Man at the highest grade abstains from what is not unlawful lest he fall into what is unlawful; this is called truthfulness (*ṣidq*). Such a man does not build a house which is not necessary for him, nor amass wealth which is not necessary for his sustenance; he becomes indifferent to the world, knowing that he will have to leave it behind, and does not spend any moment on things other than God. Then, the knowledge of sin or of the majestic attributes of God, or of both, produces in the soul a painful feeling which is the disposition of the mystical virtue of fear, from which proceed the above-mentioned actions of the body and the soul.[64]

Objects of fear are things abhorrent in themselves such as hell-fire, or things not abhorrent in themselves but causing things that are abhorrent. Difference of worth among those who are at the 'station' of fear is owing to the difference of worth among the abhorred things. The fearful things of the second group are many. Some of them are: death before repentance, imperfection in it, a diminishing of enthusiasm for devotional acts, replacement of gentleness of mind by hardness (*qasāwa*), deviation from uprightness, dominance of desire for sin, bewilderment at God's enormous gifts, diversion from Him to things other than Him, exposure of disgrace and shame on the resurrection day, God's awareness when one's mind is heedless of Him, and evil end, i.e. losing 'faith' at death. All these are the objects of the mystics' fear. Fear of the evil end becomes most dominant in them, and this is the most perfect fear. The fearful things of the first group are: the pangs of death, interrogation by Munkar and Nakīr and punishment in the grave, terror of resurrection, the awfulness of standing before God and His interrogation, the sharpness of the Bridge and the difficulty in crossing over it, hell and its shackles and terrors, deprivation of paradise or diminution of grade in it, separation from God and so on. Of all these, the fear of separation is most dominant in the mystics. The pious fear sin and crime, whereas the mystics fear God Himself, because of His majesty and those attributes that necessarily demand awe. The latter fear is higher in grade and more perfect because it remains always, whereas the fear of sin disappears after sin is

abandoned. One who knows God and His attributes knows that some of these attributes would cause Him to be feared even though one were free from sin; for if the sinner knows God truly, he will fear Him and not the sin.[65]

Fear of these things is only commendable when it is at the mean-state,[66] because it is only such fear that leads one to knowledge and good deeds — which is the purpose of fear as a mystical quality. The man in whom fear is at the state of deficiency tends towards an effeminate softness which pervades his mind whenever he hears a Qur'ānic verse on fear. On such occasions he begins to weep; but after a while his mind becomes heedless. This fear is of little use, for it cannot lead to knowledge and action. Excessive fear, on the other hand, creates despair; this too is bad because it causes disease, depression, bewilderment and intellectual atrophy, and sometimes even death; all these are bars to knowledge and action. Thus both deficiency and excess of fear obstruct the realization of the purpose of fear as a station on the path and, therefore, need to be remedied. The remedy for excessive fear is the same as that for deficiency of hope, and has already been stated. The remedy for deficiency of fear is man's knowledge of himself and of God — himself as helpless and sinful and God as great, etc.; this knowledge necessarily creates fear in the mind. One unable to have this knowledge should associate with those who have acquired the virtue of fear so that the fear in them will spread to him. If such persons are not available, reading the books concerning the fear of the prophets, angels, and righteous fathers, will suffice.[67]

Al-Ghazālī deals with the question of which of the two virtues of fear and hope is better, and which should be made more dominant in the soul. He says that if they are judged from their sources, hope is found to be the better, and so serving God in the hope of reward should be regarded as better than serving Him for fear of punishment. Since hope and fear are two means-virtues, the appropriate question, al-Ghazālī says, is not which of them is better but which is more useful. The answer to this question is, in his view, not the same for all. For a man who feels security from God's wrath, fear is more useful, but if a man is in despair of His mercy, hope should be made more dominant in his soul. If a tendency to evil is strong in a person, fear is more needed for him, but if this tendency is completely controlled, an equal amount of fear and hope should exist in the soul. In view of the fact that in most people a tendency to sin is dominant, it can be said absolutely that fear is more useful provided

it does not border on despair. Thus the need for fear is greater than that for hope,[68] and it is for this reason that in the *Arba'īn* only fear is mentioned in the title of the section dealing with them.

Al-Ghazālī does not say why he passes on to the virtue of asceticism, and not to any other means-virtue, when he has concluded his discussion on fear, but he explains this when he shows how all the mystical virtues other than love of God lead the novice to love. Here he points out that asceticism and patience are impossible without fear and hope.[69] (This relation of fear and hope to these two virtues is conceived of as special, as opposed to their general relation to all the mystical stations other than themselves.) Since asceticism is dependent upon fear, al-Ghazālī finds it logical to discuss it after fear. But because patience in poverty is the source (*mabda'*) of asceticism[70] he discusses poverty first (together with asceticism) in his two major ethical works.

Poverty

Poverty (*faqr*) is defined by al-Ghazālī as lack of that wealth (*māl*) which is necessary.[71] It is preferred by the mystics because great wealth often leads man to evil or at least keeps the soul attached to something other than God. Poverty is superior to riches even though they are utilized in good deeds.[72] A poor man may be in one of five states of mind — displeasure, pleasure, contentment, and so on. In the highest state he is pained at the prospect of great wealth, and he flees away from it for fear of its possible dangers. Beyond this state, there is even another which is the most excellent. In it existence of wealth and its non-existence are felt alike: receipt of wealth does not produce joy, nor lack of it cause pain. By this state of indifference the soul achieves complete freedom from a worldly thing. This state is appropriate to those who are drawn near to God and have achieved perfection. Although such men may possess great wealth, yet their state is accounted as poverty because they consider themselves as dependent on God in all general affairs, and are independent of wealth in particular. The state of fearing great wealth and fleeing away from it is better for most people, for wealth distracts them from God.[73]

The mystical virtue of poverty is not explicitly stated by al-Ghazālī to consist of knowledge, disposition and action; however, from his exposition of poverty it is clear that it also consists of these three elements. The element of knowledge concerns the fact that poverty is

decreed by God and that great wealth often brings evils. This knowledge produces in the soul a disposition which, at its lowest level, is of pleasure in poverty because it is a decree of God although there is displeasure because of poverty. At a higher level of disposition, one desires poverty with the conviction that the bare essentials will ultimately be produced by God, and is displeased with more than sufficiency. 'Action' is not to complain about poverty, but to hide it; not to be humble to the rich because they have wealth; not to neglect devotional acts because of poverty; to accept, when wealth is given, only the necessary amount and not amass it. The most devout provide only for a day and a night; the fearers of God may accumulate only for forty days; the pious may amass for a year at the most; to amass for more than a year is appropriate to common men.[74]

The mystic who lacks sufficiency will be provided for by gifts from others. In accepting gifts he needs to observe certain stipulations, one of which is to accept only the amount he needs. Another is to believe that gifts ultimately come from God, the giver being only an intermediary. In the absence of gifts, the mystic may beg from others. Begging is permissible only in compelling circumstances. The mystic who is mostly occupied with the acquisition of knowledge and the performance of good deeds, has no time to earn his livelihood and is, therefore, allowed to beg.[75] After discussing poverty al-Ghazālī deals with asceticism.

Asceticism

Asceticism (*zuhd*) belongs to the means-group of the mystical virtues. It is regarded by al-Ghazālī as a noble (*sharīf*) station on the path to God. Like other stations, it too is described as composed of knowledge, disposition and action. The nature of this virtue he states by first stating the meaning of asceticism in general. Its meaning is the turning away of desire (*raghba*) from a thing towards some better thing. Thus there are two elements in asceticism, namely, that from which desire is turned away (*marghūb 'anhu*) and that to which it is turned (*marghūb fīhi*). While it is necessary that the former should be desirable, the latter should be of more value. In the light of this it can be said that abandonment of this world in favour of the next is asceticism, and the abandonment of the next world in favour of this world is also asceticism. But asceticism as a mystical virtue refers especially to the rejection of this world in

favour of the next. The phrase 'this world' here means those permissible things of the world (*mubāḥāt*) which form the objects of the carnal soul's pleasure (*ḥuẓūẓ an-nafs*). Abandonment of legally forbidden things is not the mystical virtue of asceticism, for this is obligatory for everyone; abandonment of doubtful things, too, is not asceticism, for this is accomplished by the pious. In asceticism permissible things must be rejected, despite the ability to enjoy them. This stipulation distinguishes it from poverty, for in the former, rejection of worldly things is after their possession, but in the latter they are not possessed at all. Again, in asceticism, abandonment of a thing involves regarding it as contemptible in comparison to the delights of the hereafter that will be obtained in exchange; hence giving away for the sake of liberality, magnificence, name and fame is not asceticism, for this is done even by those who do not seek happiness in it.[76]

The knowledge required for asceticism is that this world is insignificant in comparison to the next, for the delights of the former are transitory and very much inferior to those of the latter. On the strength of this knowledge depends the strength of the disposition of asceticism. Despite possession of this knowledge, many do not reject the world; their 'faith' is weak and their desire for this-worldly enjoyment is dominant.[77] The action proceeding from the disposition of asceticism is the virtual abandonment of this world and concentration on the next; it is virtual abstention from worldly pleasures, including the means to these pleasures. An ascetic stops his bodily members from committing sins, and employs them in all supererogatory and obligatory good deeds. Indifference to this world and attention to the next are the two stipulations of the action of asceticism. Abandonement of some worldly things and not of all is asceticism no doubt, but it is not absolute asceticism.[78]

Al-Ghazālī speaks of three grades of asceticism on the basis of its purpose. The lowest grade is abandonment of the world in order to escape from punishment in the next world. This is the asceticism of those in whom fear predominates (*khā'ifūn*). Higher than this is abandonment of the world with a view of obtaining the reward to be given in the next world. This is higher because it is connected with love of God, and this is appropriate to those in whom hope is predominant (*rājūn*). The highest grade in forsaking the world exists when it is done neither for fear nor for hope, but only for love of God. The mystics, the lovers of God, are at this grade for it is they who regard as negligible all things other than Him.[79] Al-Ghazālī

describes another four grades of asceticism on the basis of the things abandoned. At the highest grade one abandons everything save God, i.e. this world and also the delights of the next; this is absolute asceticism. At a lower grade one abandons all those things which give pleasure to the carnal soul and which are not needed in travelling on the path to God. This is the complete abandonment of the world, because 'the world' refers to all that exists for the pleasure of the carnal soul. The third grade is abandonment of not every means of this pleasure but only of wealth and influence together with all the means to them. It is upon these two that most of this pleasure is dependent. Forsaking these is interpreted as forsaking that measure of them which is not needed for the hereafter. The fourth grade is rejection of knowledge and power and gold and silver, for the last two are the chief forms of wealth, and the first two the chief forms of influence. This knowledge is that which is acquired for gaining influence on others. Just as repentance from one sin is not fruitless, so is asceticism in even one pleasure of the carnal soul. Complete asceticism, however, is turning away from all those carnal soul's pleasures which are not needed for the purpose of the next world; such things hinder the novice from travelling on the path. To support this view al-Ghazāli quotes Abū Sulaymān ad-Dārānī's definition that asceticism is giving up everything that comes between a man and God.[80]

Al-Ghazālī makes it explicit that asceticism is not dependent upon the mystical virtue of trust; the truth is rather the reverse.[81] This confirms what he said earlier: that asceticism is a means-virtue, while trust is an end-virtue. As a means-virtue the former is no doubt an aid to all the ends-virtues including trust, but it is an aid especially to trust; hence the virtue that deserves treatment after it is trust; however, in the *Kīmiyā'* al-Ghazālī does not discuss trust after it,[82] since he has not yet completed the exposition of all the means-virtues, and he has already set the rule that the discussion of the means-virtues should precede that of the ends-virtues. Therefore, leaving aside the claim of trust he begins to deal with three means-virtues — intention, sincerity and truthfulness — together. One may ask here why he deals with these three and not with any of the other means-virtues which, like these three, await discussion. Al-Ghazālī does not say anything that may provide an answer to this question. The most likely answer is that since an ascetic is held in high esteem, men may feel tempted to abandon this world for the sake of such esteem, and not for otherworldly delights. To guard

against this temptation they need to know the nature and excellence of sincere and true intention.

Intention

Al-Ghazālī sees intention, sincerity and truthfulness — three means-virtues — as inseparably related to each other, and so he treats them together. The relation that he finds among them in that intention (*niyya*) is a basic requirement of devotional acts, for without it action is useless in the sense that no effect on the soul is produced by it; intention without sincerity (*ikhlāṣ*) does produce effect, but this effect is harmful to the soul; sincerity without truthfulness (*ṣidq*) and reality is obviously in vain.[83] Because it is only action with truly sincere intention that is useful to the novice, in his task of making the inward self beautiful, in mysticism great emphasis is laid upon sincerity and truthfulness, and al-Ghazālī even goes so far as to call them means to salvation (*asbāb an-najāt*).[84]

In Tradition, intention is described as that on which the worth of action is dependent, and good intention is said to be good by itself, that is, even though it may not be actualized into action owing to a certain obstacle. Considering intention as a mystical virtue, al-Ghazālī gives an account of it in the same way as he gives an account of other mystical virtues, and interprets the Tradition on it in the light of his mysticism. Its nature he states in terms of the three elements of knowledge disposition and action. Of these, disposition is what he means precisely by intention, while knowledge and action he reckons as its cause and effect respectively. When a man knows with all certainty that a certain thing is useful to him, whether in this world or in the next, and he feels that it is necessary for him to do it, there hastens to his soul the will to accomplish it, which moves the power in the body to set the organs in action. This will or resolve is the disposition referred to as intention; resolve, will and intention thus mean the same thing to al-Ghazālī. Arousal of the power to move the organs is the action proceeding from the disposition. This action has sometimes a single motive (*bā'ith*) behind it and sometimes two. In the latter case there may be three possibilities — each of the motives may be so powerful that by itself it can cause the action to happen, or so weak that it cannot cause the action unless it is joined with the other; one of them may be such that it alone is capable of bringing about the act, but when the other is mingled with it, it is aided by it. The second motive in these three cases may

respectively be called a companion (*rafīq*), a partner (*sharīk*) and an assistant (*mu'īn*) of the first.[85] This doctrine of single versus double motive is of special importance in ṣūfī ethics because to it is related the mystical virtue of sincerity.

Al-Ghazālī maintains that if the performance of devotional acts is to serve its purpose in moral life, it must be with intention. Good intention creates in the soul an inclination (*mayl*) to God and the hereafter, and a deviation from love of the world, and these are only strengthened and confirmed if action according to it is performed; it is the strengthening of the inclination already produced by intention that is the purpose of the performance of action. Action without intention and unmindful action are both absolutely useless, for they leave no effect on the soul and hence their existence is like non-existence. But good intention is good even though it is not acted upon, for it has made the soul inclined to good and turned it away from the world; of course, this inclination would have been confirmed if the act has been performed. By intention al-Ghazālī does not mean a passing thought or mere wish to do something good, but a firm determination (*'azm an-niyya wa l-himma*) which is later impeded by some "external causes".[86] Something very similar to this is to be found in Kant's famous theory of good will. There is, however, no evidence that he studied al-Ghazālī or the Traditions which form the ultimate source of al-Ghazālī's conception.

The assertion that action depends upon intention is applicable to good and neutral acts, and not to evil ones. Bad deeds are bad even though they are done with good intention. Good actions are turned into evil ones if they are performed with evil motives. Neutral deeds like using scent and taking food are changed into good or bad according to whether the motives behind them are good or bad. Every neutral act, however small, may be a means of drawing near to God provided it is performed with that intention. Devotional acts are incorrect if worshipping Him is not intended by them. The pious worship Him for fear of hell or hope of paradise, but those who are brought near to Him serve Him only to please Him.[87] Making an intention before worship is not merely uttering words like 'I intend to do this act for God; rather it is to produce a strong inclination of the soul towards Him.[88]

Sincerity

When a devotional act is performed with a single motive and this

motive is to attain nothing but nearness (*taqarrub*) to God, the state of the soul is called sincerity. The highest degree of it is achieved if the only motive behind the act is to please God; this is the sincerity of the most devout. If the only motive is to enjoy the delights of paradise or to escape the punishment of hell, sincerity will be of a lower grade. Performing a devotional act purely for a worldly motive or performing it primarily in order to achieve nearness to God and mingling with it a worldly or selfish motive means that there is no sincerity in it. Thus a person who gives alms to a beggar for the sole purpose of pleasing God is a sincere (*mukhliṣ*) man; should he give to him only to cease being annoyed by him, or both to get rid of him and to please God, he is not to be regarded as sincere. A worldly motive may, as already stated, be mingled with that of nearness to God as its companion, partner or assistant, and in sincerity the motive of attaining nearness to Him must be completely free from the motive of pleasing the carnal soul in any of these three forms. Mingling is sometimes manifest and sometimes hidden; often it is so subtle that the devotee feels that he is performing the act purely to please God, but in reality he is performing it for some other reason.[89]

To purify the motive of nearness to God from any other motive, small or great, is very difficult but not absolutely impossible. It becomes possible for the man who has succeeded in totally removing love of the world from his soul, and in replacing it by so strong a love of the hereafter that he remains engrossed in the thought of the next world. Not only his acts of devotion but all his actions and inactions are motivated by seeking nearness to God. He eats, drinks, sleeps and does all other neutral deeds not for enjoyment but for acquiring strength to worship Him, and hence he limits himself to that measure of them which is necessary for that purpose. Every act of his, even going to the lavatory, becomes a sincere act. If, on the other hand, love of the world — particularly love of high status or power — predominates in the soul, even the intentions behind such major devotional acts as ritual prayer and fasting very rarely become free from worldly motives. Acquisition of sincerity, then, is facilitated by control over the desire for pleasing the carnal soul, the removal of worldly love from the soul, and the strengthening of love of the hereafter.[90]

Truthfulness

Truthfulness, as a mystical virtue, has a wider connotation than

usual. In addition to its presence in speech, it is, according to al-Ghazālī, also present in intention, in resolution (*'azm*), in the fulfilment of resolution, in action and in all the stations on the path. One who acquires truthfulness in all these, in its perfect form, is called most truthful (*ṣiddīq*) and one who acquires it in only some of these is truthful only in relation to what he acquires.[91] The meaning of truthfulness in speech has been stated in a preceding chapter in connection with falsehood. Truthfulness in resolution means firmness and strength in the resolve which men sometimes makes for doing good deeds when opportunity arises. An individual, for example, resolves to give away half of his wealth if he should become very wealthy. Truthfulness here means completeness and strength; a truthful or most truthful person is one whose resolution for all good deeds is strong and complete. Truthfulness in fulfilling resolution means that when the opportunity for action comes, one who resolved to act, actually does so. Truthfulness in action requires that a man's outward self should be in conformity with his inward self; if the outward self is better, even though unconsciously, his truthfulness in action is lost. The term 'unconsciously' is significant here; it distinguishes the loss of truthfulness from ostentation in which the outward self is consciously shown to be better. Thus if a man's external behaviour is such that it indicates the presence in him of a quality which is not really present, he falls short of being among the most truthful, but he does not thereby become an ostentatious man so long as his external behaviour is unconscious. Truthfulness in the stations on the path refers to their perfection. Each station has its beginning and end or perfection, and between the two there exists a wide range of excellence. An ordinary believer possesses all the qualities that are known as 'stations' but is not truthful in them, i.e. the qualities are weak in him. That man is most truthful in them who has acquired all of them in their perfect degree. Such a man is, of course, rare.[92] To acquire them in their perfect degree is not an easy task; it requires, among other things, constant watch over the activities of the carnal soul (*nafs*) and a firm control over it all the time. Al-Ghazālī, therefore, goes on to discuss the virtues of self-examination and vigilance which concern this.

Vigilance and Self-examination

These two means-virtues are treated by al-Ghazālī together, on the grounds that they are closely related to each other. They are two

aspects of the same task of subduing the carnal soul, the combination of the faculties of desire and anger. In the discussion on patience as a mystical virtue, these two faculties were spoken of as man's enemies inasmuch as they deter him from the path to God, and are at war with the other faculties of the soul; hence the emphasis on the need for the firmness of 'the motive of religion' in opposition to them — a firmness that is called mental patience — throughout life. But here, in the virtues of vigilance and self-examination, the problem of subduing the carnal soul is discussed in all its aspects. Al-Ghazālī believes that although the carnal soul is rebellious in nature and is hostile to all that is good, especially to devotional acts, it can be reconciled with the good, if it is kept under the control of reason. First reason needs to impose upon it certain tasks and conditions, and order it to act in such a way that the soul may reach its goal. Then it should watch at every moment over the activities of the carnal soul, and this should be followed by ascertaining whether anything has been done by it that may hinder the progress of the soul. If any such thing is done, the carnal soul should be punished for it, compelled to struggle against evil, and subjected to severe reproach so that it may not do it again. Thus the virtues of vigilance and self-examination consist of six successive steps, namely, imposing conditions (*mushāraṭa*), vigilance, examination, punishment (*mu'āqaba*), struggle (*mujāhada*) and reproach (*mu'ātaba*). Of these steps what is most important is the step of examination.[93] The need for self-examination and reproach was recognized by al-Kindī and Miskawayh who, however, did not discuss these matters elaborately.[94] They were influenced by Islamic teaching and also by Greek thought.[95]

As regards imposing conditions, the time for it is in the morning. Explaining to the carnal soul the tremendous importance of a lifetime spent in achieving otherworldly happiness, an individual should urge upon it the utilization of every moment of the day to that purpose. He must warn it against using its instruments, the seven members, in a sinful manner, and order it to use them for the purpose for which they were created. The devotional acts to be performed during the day and the night should be fixed, and there should be a great number of supererogatory acts. The carnal soul should seek advice each morning concerning the time, members and acts of devotion, until it becomes habituated in fulfilling all its duties with pleasure. It needs also to be warned against dealing unjustly with the problems of social life. The task of imposing

conditions is also called by al-Ghazālī self-examination before action, in the sense that it is a warning to the self.[96]

Murāqaba literally means watching someone. As a mystical virtue it is a disposition of the soul which results from knowledge, and in turn results in action of the bodily members and of the soul. When an individual knows with certainty that God is aware of all his secret thoughts and outward deeds, there is produced in his soul a disposition of reverence to Him, of being occupied with Him and of directing towards Him all his thoughts and cares. In consequence of this disposition, his thoughts and actions remain correct. There are two grades of vigilance: (a) the vigilance of the most devout is such that his soul is so much engrossed in God's greatness and majesty, and so completely possessed by His awe, that he is unaware of anything other than Him; such a man does not hear if one talks to him and does not see the person in front of him. This vigilance is short-lived and is only over the actions of the soul; he need not watch over the actions of his body, for his members are accustomed to devotional acts and they do not commit even the permissible deeds. (b) The vigilance of the pious man who knows with certainty that God is aware of all his thoughts and actions and feels afraid of Him, but who is not completely engrossed in His greatness and majesty as the most devout are; he is aware of himself and of the world; he needs to watch each of his voluntary acts at two stages, (1) before beginning to perform it, with a view to ascertaining whether the first thought (*khāṭir, himma*) of it has come from God or from the self or from the devil, and (2) after beginning to perform it. The latter, if it is in a devotional act, concerns the observance of those internal and external attitudes by which the worth of the act is enhanced; if it is a permissible act, it concerns performance of the act with full courtesy, considering God as the bestower of his ability to perform it, and feeling himself to be in His presence.[97]

As regards examination, in the evening the novice should minutely examine the self in order to know if it has fulfilled the conditions imposed upon it in the morning; he should also know whether any of its actions and inactions during the day was against the soul's progress towards its goal. Should any obligatory act be found to have been totally neglected, or performed imperfectly, it must, respectively, be fulfilled or compensated for with some supererogatory act. If a speech, look, thought or action, like sitting, eating, and sleeping, or even a silence or inaction is found to have been undesirable, it should be redeemed by doing appropriate deeds.[98] As regards

punishment, if the carnal soul is found to have committed any sin it should be punished so that it may not repeat it, and the punishment most useful to this end is to deprive for a time the sinful member of the gratification of its desire. The appropriate punishment for eating 'doubtful' food, for example, is suffering hunger for a day or two.[99] This is the application of the principle of opposite action to the virtue of self-examination.

As regards struggle, besides being punished for committing sin, the carnal soul, if found slack in any virtuous act, should be compelled to persevere in many virtuous deeds; in this way it may make up for what it has neglected. It will no doubt be unwilling to do so, but its unwillingness can be removed by associating with a devout person. In the absence of such a person what is needed is to know about the great perseverance of a devout person in good deeds; knowledge of this will incite the carnal soul to be engaged in very many acts of virtue.[100] Finally, as regards reproach, one trying to incite the carnal soul to do good and to avoid evil should reprimand it. By means of reproach it can be checked from exceeding the proper bounds and from inclining to evil, and if it is reproached every day no evil can be done by it. The method of reproach is to point out to the carnal soul its stupidity and ignorance. After elaborately discussing this method of reproach,[101] al-Ghazālī begins to deal with meditation, the last means-virtue.

Meditation

A man can gain the knowledge of the path to God by learning from others; he can also obtain this knowledge by himself through insight of the way, and the mental process enabling him to do so is meditation (*tafakkur*). In regard to the nature of meditation, al-Ghazālī points out that in it two pieces of knowledge are mentally joined together in a particular way so as to achieve a new knowledge. For example, a most basic truth about the 'path' is that the hereafter is preferable to this world; this can be obtained by mentally combining the proposition, 'what is more lasting should be preferred' with the proposition, 'the hereafter is more lasting'. This process may be continued indefinitely. By joining the conclusion arrived at with some other piece of information, a new conclusion can be attained. In this way knowledge about ethical matters may go on increasing. This process is appropriate to those capable of deducing conclusions from premises and acquainted with the

manner of meditation. Meditation is better than remembrance (*dhikr*) because while the benefit of the latter is fixation in the soul of the things remembered, the advantage of the former is the achievement of knowledge in addition to the fixation in the soul of the objects of its meditation.[102]

When new knowledge is attained, the disposition of the soul is changed and with this change in disposition, the actions of the bodily members also change. Thus in the virtue of meditation, are also present all the three elements required of a mystical virtue. These al-Ghazālī explains by means of the above-mentioned example: when, as a result of meditation, a man knows the excellence of the hereafter, desire for it and abandonment of this world follows; as a consequence of the creation of this desire or will, the actions of his bodily members change — they abandon this-worldly actions and proceed to those related to the next. Meditation thus constitutes the source of and the key to all forms of good (*khayrāt*). It is better than remembrance, for it is remembrance and something more; remembrance is, in turn, better than devotional acts performed by the bodily members (in fact, these acts are noble because remembrance is present in them); therefore, meditation is more excellent than devotional acts. It is for this reason that the Prophet said, "An hour's meditation is better than a thousand years' worship."[103]

Meditation as a mystical virtue should be made on four matters related to the 'path'. These are, (a) actions, (b) the qualities of the soul, (c) God's essence, attributes and beautiful names, and (d) His works. Actions include both good and bad ones; they comprise the actions of the seven members and of the whole body; an example of the latter kind of action is disobedience to parents. Qualities of the soul also include those which are blameworthy and those that are praiseworthy. These qualities are many in number, but al-Ghazālī thinks that it is enough to meditate on ten good qualities and on an equal number of evil ones, for these are the roots from which others stem. Meditation on a quality should be concentrated on three aspects of it, namely, (a) its nature as good or bad, (b) the way of acquiring it if it is good, or of getting rid of it if it is bad, and (c) whether it exists in the meditator now, or existed in him in the past, or will exist in him in the future. Meditation on God's essence, attributes and beautiful names is reserved for the most devout and for the intelligent. Common men are puzzled when they come to meditate upon these, and this is why the Sharī'a forbade them to do

so. What is suitable to men of lesser intellect is to meditate on God's wonderful works. By doing this they will arrive at the conclusion that these have an Agent who possesses the attributes of majesty and greatness, holiness and highness, perfect wisdom, will, power and so on. All existences (*mawjūdāt*) other than God are His works; many of them are unknown and so meditation on them is impossible; of the known existences many are imperceptible by the senses, e.g. angels, jinn, the throne, etc. and therefore meditation on them is obscure; it is easy to apprehend things perceptible by the eye such as the sky, the earth, and all that is in them, and so one should meditate on these works of God.[104] With meditation the treatment of the means-group of mystical virtues comes to an end. Al-Ghazālī then goes on to deal with the ends-group.

THE MYSTICAL VIRTUES REGARDED AS ENDS

Trust

The first of the mystical virtues of the ends-group is gratitude to God. Al-Ghazālī gives an account of this after his discussion on 'patience' for a special reason already mentioned, and this study has followed his order. Trust (*tawakkul*) in God is the second of the mystical virtues regarded as an end; it is a high station of the path to God. Like other stations, this too is described as composed of knowledge, disposition and action; disposition, however, is what is meant precisely by trust, while knowledge is only its basis and action its result. This knowledge is stated as belief in three things, namely, (a) God's unity (*tawḥīd*), (b) His power and (c) His generosity and wisdom. Belief in divine unity is the most important, and this is why it alone has sometimes been called the basis of the virtue of trust, and is identified with the element of knowledge. In order to serve as the basis of trust these beliefs must be very dominant in the soul.[105] In fact divine unity constitutes a great part of the element of knowledge which is the cause of trust. Al-Ghazālī discusses its nature in a section separate from the one on the disposition of trust, because it is extremely subtle and difficult to understand, and therefore needs explanation; to suppose, as one may do, from this separate treatment, that divine unity is classified by al-Ghazālī as a separate mystical quality is wrong. Since it is not a mystical quality it is dropped in his assertion in the *Iḥyā'*, "trust is a station that comes after asceticism".[106] In not regarding divine unity as a mystical

quality, al-Ghazālī follows al-Makkī[107] rather than al-Qushayrī, who regarded it as a 'station'.[108]

In order to show how trust is mainly based upon divine unity, al-Ghazālī enumerates its grades as four. The first is merely saying that God is one, without belief in His oneness. The second is belief in His oneness; this is the divine unity of common believers and of the theologians (*mutakallimūn*); the former form this faith by hearing from others, while the latter by means of some sort of proof. The third is the divine unity of the gnostics, those brought near to God; through a light (*nūr*) created by Him in their souls, i.e. through mystical intuition (*kashf*) they see that all things come from the One; although they see many things in existence, they see that the real Agent of them all is the One. The fourth is the divine unity of the most devout; they see nothing in existence except the One; this is called by the mystics annihilation in unity (*fanā' fī t-tawḥīd*). Al-Ghazālī gives a short but complete description of this grade although this, in his view, has nothing to do with the disposition of trust. Nor can the disposition be produced by the first grade of divine unity because that is hypocrisy, nor by the second for that is mere faith or faith confirmed by proof. Common men and theologians are thus deprived of the mystical virtue of trust. It is only the third grade which is a major part of the basis of trust, for at this grade it is 'uncovered' that there is no agent except God and that every form of existence is created only by Him. He has no partner in the work of creation; all the causes (*asbāb*) of things are only appointed by Him to work on His behalf. When a man knows all these things through mystical intuition, his knowledge of them becomes clearer than that of a thing acquired by seeing it with the eyes. Such knowledge of God's unity and power creates the disposition of trust, but this creation is incomplete without belief in His mercy and wisdom. This belief strengthens reliance upon Him and upon His care of everyone — dispositions which are required for trust. The gist of this belief is that God's mercy is all-pervasive and His wisdom is supremely perfect. His kindness to all beings — from the bees and ants to human beings — is greater than that of a mother to her child. The world is the best possible world, so that nothing can be added to or taken away from it in order to make it more perfect. He regulates the world in the best manner and makes everything such as it should be. Imperfections in it He created not only to make the value of perfections known but also because every form of these is in reality a perfection and good for a certain

individual, though not to others. Divine mercy and wisdom thus necessitate both perfection and imperfection in the world.[109]

The belief that God is the only agent of action, that He has perfect wisdom and power over men's deeds, and that He is merciful towards every individual, necessarily produces in the soul the disposition of trust, i.e. reliance in all acts upon God alone. This reliance should be so perfect that in the mind there will be present, not vacillation or absorption in anxiety about actions, but quietness and tranquility; if the external means of earning a livelihood are not obtained, the mind is not disturbed by the thought of sustenance, but has faith that God will ultimately supply the bare necessities. In the disposition of trust, the mind should be calm and peaceful. In respect of strength there are three grades of the disposition of trust. At the lowest grade is a man whose reliance upon God is like one's reliance upon one's lawyer. Higher than this is the grade at which man's relation with God resembles that of a child with his mother. His dependence upon God in all matters is natural (*tab'ī*) so that he is not aware of it; but those at the lower grade mentioned above trust in Him through effort and difficulty, and are aware of their trust. At the highest grade man's relation with God is like the body's relation with the person who washes it. He sees divine power operating in all his movements and passively responds to the washer's hands as they move the body; he believes that he is only a channel of motion, power, will, knowledge and all other qualities, and that each is produced in him by God; thus he waits for what is to be produced in him. While one at the second grade abandons invocation to anyone other than God, one at the third grade shuns invocations to Him also, thinking that God gives him more if he does not pray to Him. The second and the third grades are very rarely achieved; it is the first grade of trust that is generally found.[110]

In regard to 'action' al-Ghazālī maintains that so long as the third and highest grade of trust exists in the soul (and it exists for only a few minutes) man remains like a dead body, and makes no effort towards action. The second grade of trust does not last more than a day ot two during which time no effort for action or resort to the means of it is made except earnest prayer to God. In the first grade, of course, there are efforts towards and choice of action; but this effort is limited in the sense that it is directed only towards those acts which God explicitly orders men to perform, and towards those which, though not ordered, are approved by Him. Effort towards such actions is not incompatible with the mystical virtue of trust, for

it is made in carrying out His order, explicit or implicit; rather absence of this effort is opposed to trust since one who relies upon another is required to act according to his advice. The view that trust requires absolute negation of activity is, according to al-Ghazālī, wrong. At its first grade trust requires man to earn a livelihood and to perform the activities of life by employing the body and the soul. All his voluntary actions are directed towards acquiring any useful thing he lacks, safeguarding anything he already has, preventing any harmful thing that threatens to overtake him, and removing any harmful thing which has already attacked him. This involves, respectively, earning a livelihood, preserving wealth, seeking safety from a thief, ferocious animals, etc. and taking medicine in order to cure bodily diseases. In each of these four kinds of activity certain stipulations need to be fulfilled by the mystic. Their essence is that he will rely, not upon his acts, but upon God's mercy; he should believe that just as man's guidance, motions and means to actions are all from God, so too their completion; he believes that no external means has any power of its own; whatever he sees, he sees to be from God. When such is his condition, he is 'one who trusts', in a mystical sense.[111] From trust, al-Ghazālī passes on to discuss the virtue of love of God, without stating any reason for this — obviously because it is the only virtue awaiting discussion.

Love

Love (*maḥabba*) of God is the highest of all the mystical virtues; it is the last station on the path to Him. It is true that after acquiring it some praiseworthy qualities, for example yearning, are produced in the soul, but they are produced as its by-products or consequences and not as independent qualities. All the mystical virtues stated so far lead the novice to it and prepare him for it; all the vices are gotten rid of with a view to cleansing the soul for its sake. Every believer has the basic love of God; a mystic is not content with this degree of love; he aims at developing it to such an extent that it takes possession of his entire soul; such an intense love is perfect love (*ḥubb kāmil*) and this is what constitutes the highest perfection of a human being. One who is unable to attain to this highest degree of love, should at least love God more than any other thing. The more intense one's love of Him in this world, the higher will be one's degree of happiness in the next.[112]

While giving an exposition of the virtue of love, al-Ghazālī does

not say explicitly that it, too, is composed of the three elements of knowledge, disposition and action; but from his description of what the love of God really means, how it is produced and what are its signs, it is plain that he regards this virtue, too, as consisting of these three parts. Before dealing with these, he proves the possibility of love of God by citing the Qur'ānic verses, prophetic traditions, and the consensus of the Muslim community (*ijmā'*) on the obligatoriness of love of God. Besides proving the existence of this mystical virtue by means of the Sharī'a, he makes rational inquiry into the reason for love in general, and thereby proves that it is not only that love of God is possible, but that nothing save Him can be the true object of love. All this he does as an answer to those who deny love of God, thinking that love is only possible between the members of the same genus, and who interpret the love of God spoken of in the Sharī'a as perseverance in obedience to Him. By denying this they have also denied yearning, intimacy, etc. which are the products of love. These people are not the Muslim philosophers, for they acknowledge love of God by the gnostic (*'ārif*) who possesses true knowledge of Him.[113] They are referred to as some theologians (*mutakallimūn*) and also as some scholars (*'ulamā'*). One of them is said to be Aḥmad Ibn Ghālib, known as Ghulām Khalīl. Al-Ghazālī believes that they denied love of God because they failed to understand its real meaning.[114]

To make clear the meaning of love of God, al-Ghazālī states the meaning of love in general. If, he says, a thing is agreeable to a man's nature it gives him pleasure, but if it is disagreeable it gives him pain. Everything that gives man pleasure is beloved by him, and its being loved means that his nature is inclined to it. Similarly, a thing that gives him pain is hated by him and its being hated means that his nature is averse to it. What gives neither pleasure nor pain is neither loved nor hated. Love, then, refers to the inclination of nature (*mayl aṭ-ṭab'*) to something that is pleasure-giving. If this inclindation is too strong it is called passionate love (*'ishq*). Hate is the aversion of nature from something painful, and if the aversion is very strong and prolonged it is called rancour (*ḥiqd*). Inclination to or aversion from a thing comes after the thing is known. Sensuous objects are known by the five senses, but abstract substances are apprehended by means of man's sixth sense variously known as reason, the light, or the soul. This sense is stronger in apprehension than the five senses, and the beauty of the abstract meaning apprehended by it is greater than the physical beauty seen by them.

Application of all these to God gives the result that it is the soul that apprehends Him; the pleasure it enjoys by perceiving His beauty is very intense; inclination of man's nature to Him, i.e. man's love of Him, becomes very strong. Love of God may, then, be defined as the inclination of man's nature produced when his soul gets pleasure by apprehending His beautiful attributes.[115] This inclination is the disposition of the virtue of love.

In order to show that love of God is not only possible but that it constitutes the only true form of love, al-Ghazālī states the reasons for love in general. The first reason, he says, is man's love of himself, i.e. love of his own existence and the perfection of his own attributes; it is only because he loves himself that he loves property, children, friends and relatives; he loves them because they are means of his perfection and the continuation of his existence; al-Ghazālī explains how love of others is based upon self-love. The second reason for love is beneficence. By nature man loves anyone who does good to him. Since loving a man for benefit is loving not him but his beneficial act love of him ceases with the cessation of his act, and increases or decreases according to the increase or decrease in the act. The third reason, love for benefactor without receipt of any benefit from him, is implanted in man. A man who hears about the beneficence of a king in a distant part of the world loves him even though, because of the distance of his country, he cannot have any share in his good works. This shows that man loves another, because he does good, absolutely without any reference to himself. The fourth reason is the love of what is beautiful for the sake of its beauty, and not for anything obtainable by it. Beauty of a thing consists in the perfection befitting it, and so beauty is not the same for all beings. Internal beauty, the beauty of the inward form or good qualities, is perceptible by reason. Perception of internal beauty, like that of external beauty, gives pleasure to the perceiver, and consequently his nature is inclined to it, i.e. he loves it. The last reason is the relationship and affinity that may exist between two persons. Sometimes this affinity is based upon something visible, such as the affinity between the young, and sometimes it is hidden, as in the unity of two persons without there being any consideration of benefit or beauty or any other thing. This affinity is spiritual.[116]

When all these reasons are united in one person, the love for him must be doubled, and if these are of an extreme degree, he will be loved exceedingly. Since the five reasons in their totality and their extreme degree can only refer to God, it is only He to whom love in

its real sense is due. Al-Ghazālī shows how all the five reasons are united in God in their extreme degree. He says that the first reason — love of the self necessitates love of God, because the existence, perfection and continuation of the self are all from Him alone. It is He who creates the self, preserves it after creation and perfects it by creating the organs and the qualities of perfection, the means to them and the guidance to the means. One who knows this loves Him necessarily. As for man's love of one who does good to him, it demands that he should love God only, since the being who in reality does good to him is God; one who appears to be the source of benefit is only the intermediary through whom the benefit comes. By analysing a man's act of benefitting another with his wealth, al-Ghazālī shows how God is the real Benefactor and man can be called 'benefactor' only metaphorically. Love for a benefactor only because he is a benefactor, and not because of any favour from him, also requires love for God and love of nothing except in relation to Him, for it is He who is the Benefactor of all creatures. One who knows that God is the Benefactor of all cannot love anyone save Him. Love for what has inward beauty for beauty's sake also necessitates love of God alone, because inward beauty, i.e. beauty of the good attributes of the human soul, is present in Him in perfect degree, whereas in man it is present only imperfectly. Since man's good qualities are, in the final analysis, from God, it is folly on one's part to love a man for their beauty without loving God. Lastly, love based upon hidden affinity also requires love of God for there exists hidden affinity between Him and man. Some of this affinity can lawfully be described in a book, while some of it is unlawful and can only be experienced by those who have traversed the 'path'. What can be expressed is the affinity in those qualities which are divine and which can be acquired by man, although imperfectly. Thus all the reasons for love in their supreme degree can only refer to God, and hence it is only He to whom love in its real sense is due.[117]

Strong love of God is produced in the soul by knowledge of Him. This knowledge belongs to 'knowledge of revelation' which is outside the scope of ethics. As for the action of "the soul, the tongue and the members" which proceeds from love when it is dominant in the soul, al-Ghazālī states it in a section entitled "The Signs of Love". He says that one who loves God prefers, inwardly and outwardly, what God likes to what he himself desires; for a true lover's will is his beloved's; he refrains from following his passions and committing sin, persists in difficult good deeds, and is not at all idle in serving

God; committing sin is incompatible with perfect love but not with basic love. His mind is not free from remembering God at any time, and his tongue does not become tired of mentioning the name of God since he is a true lover, and a true lover cannot forget his beloved; he regrets greatly an hour passed without such remembrances, and begins to remember Him again; but he does not regret if any of his worldly things are lost because he believes that his Beloved decrees for him what is good for him. Performing devotional acts, remembering God and mentioning His name are all felt by him easy and pleasurable. Solitude and converse with God are the things most liked by him; so engrossed does he become in his converse with his Beloved that all things other than God pass into oblivion; night is most desired by him for at night there is no obstacle in the way of prayer to God, or to reciting His book and enjoying the pleasures of converse with Him. Because he loves God he loves all that is related to God, such as the Qur'ān, the Prophet and all pious men; he is hostile to God's enemies who do what He dislikes, and is not impeded from being angry with anyone for His sake. He keeps his love in secret, carefully avoids any claim to it, and guards against expressing ecstasy in love; all that he tries to do is to make his Beloved aware that he loves Him. While loving God he fears Him, too, for His majesty and greatness; fear is not incompatible with love since the former arises from the apprehension of His greatness while the latter comes from the knowledge of His beauty; he is afraid of avoidance, veil, removal (*ib'ād*), premature halt in spiritual progress, loss of what cannot be regained after being lost, diversion from God (*salw*), and substitution of love of Him by love of other than Him; when fear of God goes with love of Him, the degree of fear will be less than that of love. Lastly, the lover of God wishes to meet his Beloved, and since he cannot meet Him without leaving this world through death, he wishes death; if he dislikes the coming of an early death, and not the death itself, because he is yet unprepared to meet God, it is not a sign that he does not love God. He is intimate with God and is satisfied with His decree.[118]

Absence of these actions of the soul, the tongue and the members will prove that love of God is not dominant; al-Ghazālī mentions two ways of strengthening it, one of which is severance of the soul's attachment to the world and removal of the love of things other than God. This is effected by the acquisition of all the mystical virtues below love: when love of things other than God is not in the soul, love of Him finds a place in it. The other way is increasing

knowledge of Him, and this may be accomplished in two ways. One is what the ṣūfis, the strong (*aqwiyā'*), adopt, namely, undergoing motification and purifying the soul by remembering God all the time, with so much concentration on Him that they forget themselves and the world. In such a state God's greatness becomes as clear to them as if they were seeing it with their physical eyes. This process is one of knowing God first and then knowing His works through Him. The other process, which is easy, and therefore suitable to the weak (*ḍu'afā'*), is reflecting first on God's wonderful works, then on their Agent, as the possessor of perfect power, wisdom, majesty and goodness, and finally on these attributes in such a way that their real nature may be revealed. This means first knowing God's works, and then knowing Him through them. This process is widely adopted by those treading the 'path'. Those who know God not in these two ways, but only through hearing about Him from others, have only a general knowledge of Him, and this is why their love of Him is weak.[119]

Yearning, Intimacy and Satisfaction

After love, al-Ghazālī deals with the virtues that he regards as the products or fruits of it.[120] These are yearning (*shawq*), intimacy (*uns*) and satisfaction (*riḍā'*). Intimacy is discussed in the *Kīmiyā'*, not in a separate section as in the *Iḥyā'*, but within the discussion on yearning, and this implies that it is looked upon as less important than yearning; in al-Makkī's system also yearning received more complete discussion than intimacy.[121] Satisfaction is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the most important of all the virtues that are the consequences of love, and this is why it is elaborately treated in all his works dealing with the mystical virtues; in the *Arba'īn* it is enumerated as the ninth mystical quality.[122] By regarding satisfaction as a product of love al-Ghazālī agrees with some of his ṣūfi predecessors and differs from others. The latter consist of as-Sarrāj, al-Kalābādhī and al-Makkī for they all placed satisfaction before love. The former include al-Kharrāz, for he placed satisfaction after love, but before yearning and intimacy. Al-Makkī seems to have distinguished between two kinds of satisfaction; one is what is facilitated by trust in God and this he placed immediately after trust, calling it the eighth 'station',[123] and the other is what is produced by love; this he placed after love without, however, calling it a 'station' or treating it elaborately.[124] Those who placed it

immediately after trust believed that trust is sufficient to produce it, but al-Ghazālī indicates that unless a man loves God strongly, it is almost impossible for him to be well-pleased with all that comes from God. Since yearning, intimacy and satisfaction are qualities that come to the soul automatically when love of God is dominant in it, and not independent qualities, al-Ghazālī does not speak of them as composed of the three elements of knowledge, disposition and action. It is only in the case of intimacy that he describes its signs, which may be regarded as its element of action. In the case of satisfaction it is stated that supplication and fleeing from places of sin, or refusal to enter into places where an epidemic has broken out, are not against satisfaction; it is wrong to think that the discussion of these is discussion of the element of action proceeding from the disposition of satisfaction. The truth is that these are discussed as an answer to those who deny satisfaction — an answer which also clarifies the meaning of satisfaction.

Yearning is a necessary consequence of love of God. Al-Ghazālī shows the nature of yearning as a mystical quality by stating the nature of yearning for a worldly object. Yearning for an object is impossible if the object is completely perceived or completely unperceived; it can be yearned for only when it is apprehended in some way and unapprehended in another. A man's yearning for it means that his mind wants it to be present before his eyes so that by seeing it, his apprehension (*idrāk*) of it may become perfect; perfect apprehension is only achieved after seeing with the eyes. Similar is the nature of yearning for God. Although a lover's perception of divine beauty is extremely clear (*ghāyat al-wuḍūḥ*) it is not perfectly clear; his mind wants his Beloved to be present before his eyes so that he may see His beauty with perfect clarity. This restless desire for perfect clearness of what is only imperfectly clear, is yearning for God. This yearning will only be satisfied in the next world, when the lover will have the vision of God. There is another kind of yearning which will not be satisfied even in the hereafter. Al-Ghazālī states it by saying that a lover perceives only some divine matters (*umūr ilāhiyya*) and he believes that many of them are still totally unknown to him. So his mind is restless to know, although vaguely, what he could not as yet perceive at all. This state of disturbance and restlessness in the soul is yearning for God. The reason why it will not be satisfied even in the next world is that this can be satisfied only when the lover knows all about God, His attributes, His wisdom and His works, but knowing all these is impossible for man, since

they are unlimited; however much divine majesty and beauty will be known in the next world, some aspects of them will still remain unknown, and so his yearning for knowledge will eternally remain in him; whenever his longing is satisfied even partly, he will experience new pleasure.[125]

As regards intimacy, sometimes what predominates in a lover of God is joy on account of his feeling of nearness to his Beloved; there is also joy in contemplation of His presence; when his perception is confined to the beauty of God and is not directed to that aspect of it which has not yet been perceived by him, his mind rejoices in perceiving it. This rejoicing of his soul resulting from the study of divine beauty is what al-Ghazālī means by intimacy with God. This pleasure, this joy, becomes very intense because, being severed from that unperceived part of divine beauty and from the danger of being removed from the Beloved, the mind becomes enthralled in the perceived part of divine beauty. The sign indicating dominance of the state of intimacy in a man is that he loves solitude, for without being separate from things other than God, one cannot be intimate with Him; such a man finds great pleasure in remembering God in loneliness; when he mixes with people he is with them physically but with God mentally.[126] Besides this, absence of affectation (*inbisāṭ*) is found in his speech, work and secret prayer to His Beloved. This frankness is unsound in appearance, for it shows audacity to and absence of awe of God, but it is tolerated from those whose state of intimacy with Him is established; if it proceeds from others they thereby become almost infidel.[127]

The most important of all the qualities which are necessary consequences of the mystical virtue of love of God is satisfaction with His decree (*qaḍā'*). Anyone who has strong love for God necessarily remains satisfied with all that his Beloved does. Satisfaction with those works of God which are agreeable to him is something easy and understandable, but to be satisfied with those of His works which are against his passions and natural desires, especially with the affliction that occasionally befalls man, is also easy for those who have passionate love (*'ishq*) of Him. There are two ways in which this is shown to be easy. One of them is that a lover's mind is so much engrossed in the love of his Beloved that he does not feel the pain of affliction befalling him. Such a phenomenon is not absent in worldly matters: there are many warriors who, while engaged in fighting, fail to feel the pain of their wounds; they only become aware of these when they see the blood gushing. When a man is deeply engaged in

some action, the pain of thornpricks is not felt by him. The other way is that the lover does indeed feel the pain of affliction, but is not only satisfied with it but also desirous of it, since he knows with certainty that the reward to be given for this satisfaction is far more than the pain of suffering it. His carnal soul dislikes the affliction, but reason, knowing it to be sent by God and curative, desires it. He is like a trader who joyfully takes the trouble of going to distant cities in the hope of profit, or like a patient who feels the pain caused by the surgeon's lance and is pleased with his operation.[128]

It is not a stipulation of satisfaction that a man should remain pleased with what he has, and not work or pray to God for what he lacks. Supplication (*du'ā'*) to God for forgiveness, for immunity from sin and for assistance in various good deeds is not incompatible with satisfaction. God created means of action (*asbāb*) and asked man to resort to them, and supplication is but a means in the sense that by it are produced in the soul such commendable qualities (*ṣifāt maḥmūda*) as tenderness, a contrite heart, and humility; these qualities make the soul beautiful and serve as means of God's kindness to the supplicant. Supplication is very much like drinking water for quenching thirst; since drinking water is a means of quenching thirst, to do this is not against satisfaction with God's decree of thirst. Adoption of means is not against trust (*tawakkul*) and satisfaction. To complain against intolerable heat or cold weather, to blame a particular kind of food, and to assert that poverty is affliction, and family is anxiety — all this shows imperfection in satisfaction.[129]

Nor is satisfaction opposed to dislike of sin, hatred of means of it, prohibition of its commission, and instruction to do good; sins, infidelity and various other forms of evil are decreed by God, but one who is satisfied with God must not approve of these. Knowing that these are decreed by Him, some people wrongly maintain that satisfaction with them is needed; al-Ghazālī calls these persons men deprived of deep knowledge. He shows in two ways how hating these forms of evil despite their ordinance by God is not incompatible with satisfaction with God. He also elaborately explains that it is not imperfect satisfaction to flee from cities where vice is rampant, to condemn such places and the means to vices so that hatred for them may be created in the minds of others.[130]

NOTES

1. *J*, p. 12.
2. *D*, IV, 213, 29; *J*, pp. 6, 25.
3. *D*, IV, 334—35, 284; *A*, p. 237; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 155—56.
4. *D*, IV, 365.
5. *D*, IV, 367.
6. This difference between the aims of these two kinds of virtues is significant. The root virtues, and also some of the mystical virtues, contain passions as their basis. These passions become virtues or vices when they are felt in certain ways. In the case of the root virtues, passions are considered by al-Ghazālī from the perspective of man's social relationships, but in the case of some of the mystical virtues, the same passions are considered from the viewpoint of man's special relationship to God. Thus the status of passions has now changed. Fear, which was regarded formerly as a vice now becomes fear of God and a virtue. Love formerly meant love of man, but it now means love of God. And so on.
7. *A*, pp. 218, 272—73. Umaruddin (*Al-Ghazzālī*, p. 209 also classified the mystical virtues as means and ends. He, however, based this classification on the *K* only and was not aware of the two passages in the *A*.
8. The importance of the *K* in the development of al-Ghazālī's thought is discussed in *supra*, p. 43, n. 6.
9. *K*, p. 675
10. *D*, IV, 289, 2; al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 364, II, 156.
11. *D*, IV, 290, 285.
12. *D*, IV, 60; *K*, p. 669.
13. *D*, IV, 368, 366, 327, 369.
14. *D*, IV, 60; *K*, 669.
15. *D*, IV, 59; *K*, p. 674.
16. *D*, IV, 211, 55; *K*, p. 676.
17. *D*, IV, 4, 55, 71, 187, 211, 223, 251, 312.
18. *D*, IV, 223.
19. *D*, IV, 3, 340, 321, 222, 250, 211.
20. *D*, IV, 123, 225.
21. *D*, IV, 35, 312, 211, 223, 251.
22. p. 16.
23. *D*, IV, 123, 215.
24. For their views see al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, pp. 180—81; al-Qushayrī, *Risāla*, I, 193; Abū Naṣr as-Sarrāj, *Kitāb al-Luma'*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd and Ṭāh 'Abd al-Bāqī Surūr, Cairo, 1960, pp. 65—66; L. Gardet, "Ḥāl", EI², 83; Arberry, *Sufism*, 75.
25. *Qūt*, I, 467, 483—85. For the two-fold function of the mean see *supra*, pp. 83—84.
26. *D*, IV, 290.
27. *K*, p. 746; *D*, IV, 314, 328.
28. *D*, IV, 326, 346, 357, 9, 32.
29. *D*, IV, 8—9, 11—12; *K*, p. 647.
30. *D*, IV, 10—11; *K*, p. 650; cf. Arberry, *Sufism*, p. 75.
31. *D*, IV, 3—4, 31, 34; *K*, p. 649.
32. *D*, IV, 44—45.

33. *D*, IV, 30—31.
34. *D*, IV, 30—34, 44—50.
35. *D*, IV, 11—12, 13—14.
36. *D*, IV, 43, 50; *K*, p. 665. However, in the *A* fear of God is discussed after repentance because it is this fear which impels one to repent (*A*, p. 195). In this work, patience is dealt with after poverty and asceticism, on the grounds that their perfection depends upon it (p. 260).
37. *M.A.*, p. 72.
38. *D*, IV, 155, 31, 58.
39. *D*, IV, 55—57, 59—60.
40. *D*, IV, 58—59.
41. *D*, IV, 60—65, 62; *K*, pp. 669—73.
42. *D*, IV, 60.
43. *D*, IV, 59—60; *K*, pp. 674—75; *J*, p. 39. For an account of the virtue of patience in the Qur'ān see Ringgren, "Sabr", pp. 83—90.
44. Qūt, I, 413.
45. *D*, IV, 110—16; *K*, pp. 693—94.
46. *K*, pp. 675, 694, 669.
47. *D*, IV, 71; *K*, pp. 675, 676—77; *A*, p. 218.
48. *K*, pp. 676—77.
49. *D*, IV, 71—72; *K*, p. 677.
50. *D*, IV, 72; *K*, pp. 678—79.
51. *D*, IV, 73, 78, 76; *K*, pp. 679—80, 673.
52. Qur'ān 14:34.
53. *K*, pp. 685—86, 688—89; *D*, IV, 86—94.
54. In the *A*, however, fear is placed after the virtue of repentance for the reason mentioned in *supra*, p. 155, n. 36.
55. *D*, IV, 125; *K*, p. 695. According to al-Makkī, however, fear is higher than hope; see *Qūt*, I, 456, 478.
56. *D*, IV, 145; *K*, 718, 695.
57. *D*, IV, 123. A similar sentence is to be found in the *K*, p. 695. In comparing fear and hope to two wings, al-Ghazālī follows al-Makkī in his *Qūt*, I, 437.
58. Cf. Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, p. 24; al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 437.
59. *D*, IV, 123—24.
60. *D*, IV, 124—25; *K*, pp. 697—98.
61. *Qūt*, I, 467, 483—85.
62. *D*, IV, 127, 135; *K*, pp. 698—703.
63. Cf. Avicenna, *Akhlāq*, p. 26; al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 437.
64. *D*, IV, 135—36; *K*, pp. 704—08.
65. *D*, IV, 150, 151; *K*, pp. 707, 709—11.
66. Cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, I, 467, 483—84, 485 where the equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) of fear and hope is praised as the necessary quality of a true believer, and deviations from it are condemned.
67. *D*, IV, 146—47; *K*, pp. 708—09, 713—14.
68. *D*, IV, 144—45; *K*, pp. 695, 704, 718; *J*, p. 39; *A*, p. 208.
69. *D*, IV, 271.
70. *A*, p. 210. However, in the *A* poverty is briefly discussed after asceticism (but still within the same section as asceticism). The reason is the closer link of poverty with the next virtue dealt with in this work, i.e. patience — closer be-

cause poverty can only be the source of asceticism when it is coupled with patience.

71. *D*, IV, 164—65.
72. *D*, IV, 173—77. The value of poverty in the mystic path is also recognized by other ṣūfīs: al-Hujwīrī devoted a complete chapter of his *Kashf*, pp. 19—29, to its discussion; al-Qushayarī in his *Risāla*, II, 536—49, regarded it as a 'station'; al-Makkī in his *Qūt*, I, 528, discussed it as a part of asceticism; he, however, did not regard it as a 'station'.
73. *D*, IV, 165—67.
74. *D*, IV, 177—78.
75. *D*, IV, 178—184.
76. *D*, IV, 197—98; *K*, pp. 836, 871, 832—33.
77. *D*, IV, 187—88; *K*, 730—31, 732.
78. *D*, IV, 188—89; *K*, 836, 831.
79. *K*, p. 731; *D*, IV, 195—96.
80. *K*, p. 736.
81. *K*, p. 813; *D*, IV, 241, 231.
82. In the *D*, however, al-Ghazālī discusses trust after asceticism. An explanation of this is given in *supra*, pp. 149—50. In the *A*, patience is dealt with after asceticism for the reason mentioned in *supra*, p. 155, n. 36.
83. *D*, IV, 309; *K*, p. 763.
84. *D*, IV, 309.
85. *D*, IV, 312—13; *K*, pp. 744—45.
86. *D*, IV, 312. 313—15, 320; *K*, pp. 745—47.
87. *D*, IV, 315—17, 319, 320.
88. *D*, IV, 319—21.
89. *D*, IV, 324—25, 326—28; *K*, pp. 757—59.
90. *D*, IV, 325.
91. *D*, IV, 331; *K*, p. 761.
92. *D*, IV, 331—35; *K*, pp. 762—63.
93. *D*, IV, 336, 346, 355; *K*, p. 764.
94. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 186—187, 190
95. Self-examination before sleep was urged by Pythagoras and Plato. Rosenthal in his "Philosophy", p. 407 quotes Plato's instruction stating that his source is Abū Sulaymān Sijistānī's *Ṣiwān al-Ḥikma* where it was quoted from the *Waṣīyyat Aflāṭūn li-Talmīdhihi Arisṭū*.
96. *D*, IV, 237—38; *K*, pp. 764—66.
97. *D*, IV, 340—44; *K*, pp. 766—71.
98. *D*, IV, 346; *K*, pp. 771—72. Al-Ghazālī's discussion on self-examination is influenced more by al-Muḥāsibī than by al-Makkī; see Josef van Ess, *Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥārit al-Muḥāsibī*, Bonn, 1961, pp. 139—43.
99. *D*, IV, 346—48; *K*, pp. 772—73.
100. *D*, IV, 348—55; *K*, pp. 774—76.
101. *D*, IV, 355—61. Badawī in his "Maṣādiruh", pp. 225—29, shows the resemblance in style, form and sometimes content, of al-Ghazālī's exposition of reproach of the carnal soul to *Kitāb Mu'ādhalat an-Nafs* which belongs to the Hermetic literature, as well as its difference from it in other respects. He then concludes that al-Ghazālī was only influenced by the general spirit and manner of presentation of this work. He, however, does not say how al-Ghazālī could

have become acquainted with it. Dhū n-Nūn is said to have been familiar with Hermetic wisdom (see Arberry, *Sufism*, p. 52). Through him al-Ghazālī may have been acquainted with this Hermetic book.

102. *D*, IV, 363; *K*, 780—81.
103. *D*, IV, 364; *K*, p. 781.
104. *D*, IV, 365—71, 381; *K*, pp. 781—85, 797.
105. *D*, IV, 211, 223; *K*, pp. 798, 799, 807, 810.
106. p. 241.
107. *Qūt*, II, 3—75.
108. *Risāla*, II, 581—88.
109. *D*, IV, 212—13, 222—23; *K*, pp. 799—801, 802, 807; *A*, p. 242.
110. *D*, IV, 223—25; *K*, pp. 808, 809—10.
111. *D*, IV, 225—26, 228; *K*, pp. 809—11; *A*, p. 69.
112. *D*, IV, 252—54, 278—80, 283; *K*, pp. 829—30.
113. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 147.
114. *D*, IV, 252—54, 278—80, 282, II, 248; *K*, pp. 829—30; al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 126—27.
115. *D*, IV, 254; *K*, p. 831.
116. *D*, IV, 255—58; *K*, pp. 832—34. Comparison of al-Ghazālī's account of the causes of love in general, with the accounts of Aristotle (*Ethics*, 9.4.1166a, 1169b) and Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, pp. 135—39, 143—55, 170—72) clearly shows how greatly they influenced him; cf. Bergh, "Love", pp. 305—21. Comparison of al-Ghazālī's entire account of love of God with those of al-Makkī (*Qūt*, II, 99—141) and al-Qushayrī (*Risāla*, I, 610ff) shows how skilfully he makes use of philosophers' ideas in explaining a mystical virtue, and to what extent his use of them contributes to its systematization and clarification.
117. *D*, IV, 258—64; *K*, pp. 834—38.
118. *D*, IV, 282—90; *K*, 853—55.
119. *D*, IV, 271—73; *K*, pp. 850—51; *J*, p. 24.
120. *D*, IV, 252, 290.
121. *Qūt*, II, 120—24, where yearning is linked up with listening to mystical song (*samā'*) which provokes yearning. Al-Ghazālī devotes the eighth book of the second part of his *D* to the treatment of various aspects of *samā'* together with its role in provoking yearning, love and esctasy (*wajd*).
122. p. 270.
123. *Qūt*, II, 76—91.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 150.
125. *D*, IV, 177—91; *K*, pp. 855—56.
126. *D*, IV, 291; *K*, p. 856.
127. *D*, IV, 292—94.
128. *D*, IV, 297—300; *K*, pp. 859—60.
129. *D*, IV, 300—03; *K*, pp. 860—61.
130. *D*, IV, 301—304; *K*, p. 861.

VI
DEVOTIONAL ACTS

THE FUNCTIONS OF DEVOTIONAL ACTS IN MORAL LIFE

As already explained, knowledge and action (*'amal*) are regarded by al-Ghazālī as the two primary means of realizing the moral ideal, and action is divided into that which is concerned with man's inward self (*bāṭin*) and that which concerns the outward (*ẓāhir*). With an exposition of the former in the two preceding chapters, an attempt may now be made to deal with the latter. This order of discussion, followed here only for the sake of convenience, is of course the reverse of the one followed by al-Ghazālī himself. In his ethical works, the description of action related to the outward self precedes that of action related to the inward self. This is not accidental; it is done with a view to keeping the exposition of the system in harmony with the order to be followed in the practice of it. According to al-Ghazālī, the spiritual training of a seeker after God should begin in outward action; it is only after successfully completing this part of self-training that he can proceed to train himself in inward action. This idea, which accords with that of other ṣūfis, [1] found expression in some passages, [2] one of which may be quoted as follows:

> "... you must realize that the guidance... has a beginning and an ending, an outward aspect and an inward. No one can reach the end until he has completed the beginning; no one can discover the inward aspect until he has mastered the outward. Here, then, I give you counsel about the beginning of guidance, so that thereby you may test yourself and examine your heart. If you find your heart drawn towards it and your soul docile and receptive, go ahead, make for the end,..." [3]

Outward action is divided by al-Ghazālī into that which is directed towards God and that which is directed towards one's fellow-men. The first category of action is the same as that of the devotional acts (*'ibādāt*) prescribed by the Sharī'a. These are seven in number — ritual prayer, fasting, divine tax, pilgrimage to Mecca,

Qur'ān-reading, praise of God, and invocation of Him. The first four are obligatory and the remainder supererogatory. Each of the obligatory acts becomes an act of supererogation when it is performed more frequently than the Sharī'a obliges. For example, fasting in the month of Ramaḍān is obligatory, but to fast on other great days of the year is supererogatory. Each obligatory set consists of many parts some of which are such that without them the act is invalid; some are needed only for its perfection (*kamāl*); some are the means of its excellence (*ḥusn*), and others are for perfecting this excellence. [4] All these parts are broadly divided into two groups, namely, those which are basic, necessary for the validity of the act, called obligatory parts, and those which are complements, perfecting the efficacy of the basic parts, called supererogatory parts. [5] Performance of the obligatory acts is relevant to the lower class of virtuous men. People who fail to perform such acts are immoral. Those who are able to perform the supererogatory acts form the higher class of the virtuous. This is expressed in many of al-Ghazālī's works, [6] but it has found vivid expression in the following passage of the *Bidāya:*

> "In respect of his religion a man stands in one of three classes: (a) he may be 'safe' (or 'saved'), namely, when he confines himself to performing the duties of strict obligation and avoiding sins; or (b) he may be 'above standard' (literally 'making a profit'), namely, when of his will he makes an offering and performs supererogatory acts; or (c) he may be 'below standard' (literally 'incurring a loss'), namely, when he falls short of what is incumbent upon him. If you cannot be 'above standard', at least endeavour to be 'safe', and beware, oh beware, of being 'below standard'". [7]

Every devotional act is regarded by al-Ghazālī as having two aspects — internal and external — and its perfect performance depends on the fulfilment of both aspects. The latter is, as it were, the body or shape (*ṣūra*) of the act, while the former is its life (*ḥayā*) or spirit (*rūḥ*). Should the internal aspect not be performed, the act is merely motions of the body and is incapable of producing the desired effect on the soul. [8] The harm of neglecting one particular part of the external aspect differs from that of neglecting another, and this difference is owing to the difference in the grades of the various parts. In the case of some acts, e.g. ritual prayer and pilgrimage, every part of the external aspect is shown to have an inward aspect independent of the inward aspect of the act as a

a whole; if a part is performed with neglect of its corresponding inward aspect, the devotional act is comparable to a man who has eyes but no vision.[9] The external aspect of an act, as described in al-Ghazālī's ethical works, is more than the act as described in the works of Islamic jurisprudence, including his own. The inward aspect is the action of the soul; it involves performance with single-minded devotion, purity of thought and absolute sincerity; al-Ghazālī complains that these accompaniments of performances are not stressed by the jurisprudents.[10] These are variously referred to by him as *al-ma'ānī al-bāṭina, ṣifāt al-qalb, aḥwāl al-qalb, a'māl al-qalb, waẓā'if al-qalb* and so on. To be able to accomplish these it is necessary to know the deeper meaning of an act, and this is accordingly described in many cases. The mystical idea that an act whose inward aspect is neglected is unsound (*bāṭil*), i.e. useless with respect to the hereafter, is proved by evidence from the Sharī'a. The judgement of the Muslim jurisprudents that an act is sound when its external aspect is observed is explained by al-Ghazālī as one made to save the worldly from the punishment of the ruler. Since the worldly are unable to do more than this, to stipulate the observance of the inward aspect is to stipulate the impossible for them.[11] By thus insisting on the observance of both the inward and the outward aspects of an act, al-Ghazālī combines ṣūfism with the formal observance of the Sharī'a. This is the continuation and probably the completion of the task begun by some of his ṣūfī predecessors.

This emphasis upon the inward aspect of an act is linked with al-Ghazālī's conception of the functions of devotional acts in moral life. He maintains that they are prescribed for remembrance of God. How this is achieved is explained in a passage of the *Kīmiyā'*.[12] In the *Iḥyā'*, too, he speaks of this aim;[13] when dealing with the mystical virtues he confirms this view, saying that devotional acts are excellent only because remembrance of God is present in them.[14] In the *Arba'īn* this aim is described as remembrance of God and the turning of the soul from this world to the hereafter.[15] Since remembrance is present in every act of devotion, perseverance in it means perseverance in remembrance, as a result of which love of God and intimacy with Him are produced in the soul.[16] Thus, the ultimate aim of devotional acts emerges as love of God and nearness to Him.

Besides remembrance of God, al-Ghazālī sometimes speaks of another function of devotional acts, namely, purification of the soul from vices and making it beautiful with virtues. This he points out

while discussing most of the acts: ritual prayer as a whole, he says, is prescribed by the Sharī'a to enable man to polish (*taṣqīl*) the mirror of his soul, to renew his remembrance of God and to strengthen his 'faith'; both prostration and genuflection aim at creating the quality of humility in the soul.[17] The function of alms-giving is to cleanse (*taṭhīr*) the soul from miserliness and to generate in it the quality of gratitude to God for granting wealth.[18] The function of fasting is to purify the soul from the dominance of passions which impel a man to evil; it is also to acquire a divine attribute and an angelic quality.[19] Knowledge of the inward aspect of pilgrimage helps man to cleanse his soul; besides, by doing those acts of pilgrimage whose reasons are unknown, man opposes passions and achieves perfect obedience to God.[20] Recitation of the Qur'ān removes the rust from the soul.[21] The qualities produced from praise of God and invocation to Him are said to serve as illumination (*jalā*) of the soul.[22] Various kinds of acts are prescribed because of their various effects in enlightening the soul.[23] From all these statements of al-Ghazālī it is plain that acts of devotion have a two-fold function of purification of the soul and making it beautiful. This function is spoken of in the *Arba'īn* also.[24] In some passages of his works, however, al-Ghazālī speaks of only one aspect of this two-fold function. Thus he sometimes calls the devotional acts medicines for the diseases of the soul;[25] this only refers to their purificatory effect. Sometimes he describes their performance as watering the tree of 'faith' after removing the thorns of evil qualities from the soul;[26] this only refers to the aspect of making the soul beautiful. Mention of one aspect is made in order to emphasize it in its relevant context. This two-fold goal is of course secondary to that of love of God and of attaining nearness to Him. It only leads to this final aim in the following ways: (a) when the soul is cleansed from vices and fortified with virtues, it is drawn near to Him, its love for Him becomes strong and love for the world weak. (b) Complete polishing of the mirror of the soul causes a light in the soul which serves as a key to intuitive knowledge of the secrets of divine affairs, and the subtleties of ethical matters.[27] —"... the aim of action is to purify and cleanse the soul that the truth may be revealed in it and that it may be beautified by the true knowledge which is intuitive knowledge". Such a knowledge of God produces a strong love of Him.[28] However in some places acts of devotion are said to be the effect of love rather than its means. This in reality refers to a stage when strong love has already been created in the soul by devotional acts and by other means.

Thus the final aim of acts of devotion is love of God and nearness to Him, through remembrance of Him, and through the purification of the soul and making it beautiful. It is wrong to suppose that the purpose of these acts is to enable man to receive the four forms of divine grace (*tawfīq*) which allow him to work for happiness. Nowhere does al-Ghazālī speak of such a purpose. On the contrary, he explicitly says that divine grace is a means of carrying out God's commandments,[29] and that men may receive grace irrespective of their deserts. In some passages, however, there is a suggestion that begging or invocation to God for this grace is a means of receiving it. This problem has been discussed in the second chapter. Al-Ghazālī criticizes as wrong the philosophers' opinion on the aim of devotional acts. They maintained, he says, that these acts aim at keeping order among common men and at restraining them from fighting and quarrelling with one another, or from giving rein to their desires; therefore the wise who can guard themselves against these desires are not under an obligation to follow the Sharī'a.[30] Unlike the philosophers, al-Ghazālī says that it is necessary to perform the various kinds of devotional acts at every stage of life, for by this are achieved constant remembrance of God, confirmation of intimacy and strengthening of love.[31] Even after one has been endowed with gnosis (*ma'rifa*) and has reached the goal of life, one's obligation to perform these acts is not abolished; it remains until death for it is through them that the intimacy and love which have been acquired will be preserved. The circular relationship between the body and the soul necessitates that the nearer a man is to God the more eager he is to keep His commandments.[32] This view of al-Ghazālī accords with that of many of his ṣūfī predecessors.[33] Like al-Ḥujwīrī, he bitterly criticizes the contention of permissive people (*ahl-al-ibāḥa*) that the Sharī'a is meant for 'the weak" (*ḍu'afā'*) and that no sin harms him who is strong on the path, i.e. who has made good progress on it. Like al-Qushayrī, he regards permissive people as those who have strayed from the path of ṣūfism, and he enumerates their arguments under seven headings and refutes them.[34] He also condemns those who follow the doctrine of authoritative instruction (*ta'līm*) for their neglect of God's commandments;[35] their influence is one reason for neglect of the Sharī'a by the people of his time, another reason being the influence of philosophy. However, he does not say anything about the Ḥallājīs and the Fārisīs, who were attacked by al-Ḥujwīrī. The latter also attacked the Carmateans and the Shī'ites for their doctrine that

when reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is revealed the Sharī'a will no longer be necessary.

To have the desired effect on the soul devotional acts need to be performed with sincere intention; instead of purifying the soul, an ostentatious act makes it more polluted with love of the world and submission to passions.[36] The acts should be performed readily and with pleasure, and in order to acquire the ability one has to undergo the self-training discussed in the third chapter. From this brief discussion concerning the functions of the acts of devotion, a transition may be made to a more detailed treatment, dividing the acts into two groups. Treatment of the group of obligatory acts will precede that of the group of supererogatory ones, and the order of the acts in each group will be the same as that set forth by al-Ghazālī himself.

OBLIGATORY DEVOTIONAL ACTS

Ritual Prayer

Ritual prayer (*ṣalā*) is the greatest of all the obligatory devotional acts.[37] Its precondition is purification (*ṭahāra*) which is of three grades, namely, cleanliness of the body and of clothing, purification of the soul from vices, and its purification from things other than God. Bodily cleanliness also enlightens the soul, for when the soul is aware of this cleanliness, purification is produced in it through the interaction of body and mind.[38] Al-Ghazālī first states the external aspect of prayer which consists of various acts of three different grades. Then he discusses the inward aspect in general, maintaining that it is completed by the presence of six qualities in the worshipper's mind. These are single-mindedness, understanding the meaning of the verses and the praises recited in a prayer, magnifying God, fear, hope and shame. The first is the mind being completely free from things other than the acts being done and the words being uttered in prayer — so completely that it is aware of only these and its thought does not wander to any other thing; it is engrossed in the thought of God. Without this single-minded devotion, prayer is invalid in the sense that it produces no effect on the soul; it is the life-spring of prayer. Unlike the jurisprudents, who maintained that the presence of devotion at the start of prayer is enough for the validity of prayer, al-Ghazālī stated that it must be present throughout the prayer if prayer is to have the desired effect on the soul to

become provision for the hereafter. Magnifying God involves a feeling of self-abasement, and self-submission to Him who is great and majestic. Fear is of His punishment on account of defects in prayer. Hope is of His reward despite defects in it. Shame is felt owing to inability to perform the prayer as required.[39]

Besides thus describing the inward aspect of prayer in general, al-Ghazālī also discusses the internal aspect of every specific part of the external aspect of prayer because it has an effect on the soul, and it is for this effect that prayer is enjoined.[40] He does not speak of any social significance of the Friday assembly prayer (*ṣalāt al-jum'a*) or of prayer in the congregation (*jamā'a*). The latter's effect he regards as equal to that of twenty-seven individual prayers.[41] As regards the former, he says that the earlier one comes to the mosque the nearer one is to God, and he urges men to devote the whole of Friday to the hereafter, keeping away from all worldly occupation, and engaging in prayers and good deeds.[42] By contrast, the philosopher Miskawayh maintained that these two forms of prayer are prescribed in order to help men develop their innate love and fellowship so that they may not quarrel among themselves in society.[43] For al-Ghazālī, prayer is for the benefit of the individual soul: the effect of it on the soul is to remove the evil effect of small sins; virtuous qualities like humility, fear and hope are produced in the soul; prostration draws it near to God;[44] as a result of concentrating the mind on remembrance of God throughout the prayer, the mind gradually becomes inclined to Him and begins to love Him. Thus if performed with due regard to both its aspects, prayer becomes a means of attaining love of God and nearness to Him.[45]

Divine Tax

The second obligatory devotional act is divine tax (*zakā*). Al-Ghazālī discussed in detail the types of things on which the tax is to be levied, different rates on different things, people to whom tax is payable, and the behaviour to be adopted when paying the tax. He says that a man at the lowest grade of spiritual progress pays only that amount of wealth whose payment is fixed by the Sharī'a. Those at a higher level give away more than that; they store up wealth not for enjoyment but for meeting their need, helping the poor, and doing good deeds when opportunity arises. At the highest grade are the most devout, who give away all their wealth.[46] Paying divine tax is a devotional act related to wealth (*'ibādat māliyya*), and in order to be

able to fulfil its inward stipulations, one has to know its deeper meaning: it is prescribed so that by means of it man may help the needy, purify his soul from the evil quality of miserliness, make it beautiful with the quality of gratitude to God, express obedience to Him, and confirm love of Him.[47] All these will produce in the soul a state in which it will long to meet God.[48]

One who pays divine tax has to carry out several tasks so that his act may not be fruitless. These involve paying the tax earlier than the obligatory time. If one fixes a time for payment, it should be the first or the twelfth month of the lunar year. To pay secretly is better, for this is safe from ostentation; however, if paying openly is likely to encourage others to pay, and there is complete safety from ostentation, it is better to pay in the presence of others. The alms-giver must abstain from *mana* and *adhā*. The latter is frowning at the sight of a beggar, annoyance with him and talking harshly to him, hating him and looking at him with the eye of contempt. The former is a quality of the soul which makes the alms-giver feel that by helping a poor man he confers a great benefit on him, and, therefore, has him in his control; because of this feeling he talks about his alms, expects from a beggar thanks, service, respect, salutation and so on. The alms-giver should consider his alms as something very small even though it is his entire wealth or a great part of it. Alms should be given from the highest type of lawful wealth, and with pleasure; how to achieve this stage of excellence has been explained in the third chapter. Priority should be given to poor relatives, for by giving to them one gets the rewards of alms-giving and of fulfilling the right of relatives, whereas by giving to those poor men who are not relatives one gets the reward of alms-giving only.[49]

Fasting

Fasting (*ṣawm*) is the third obligatory act of devotion. The fixed time for it is the lunar month of Ramaḍān. Fasting on other great days of the year is an act of supererogation. There are three grades of fasting according to al-Ghazālī. The lower grade is to refrain from food, drink and gratification of sex, from dawn till sunset. This is the common man's fasting (*ṣawm al-'awāmm*). A higher grade consists in keeping the members of the body from that of which God disapproves. This is the fasting of the elect (*khawāṣṣ*), i.e. the pious (*ṣāliḥūn*). They keep their eyes from looking at things disapproved,

the tongue from quarrelling, lying, slandering and uttering what is unnecessary, and the ears from listening to anything which should not be uttered. The same kind of restraint is exercised over their other members. They break their fasts (*ifṭār*) with lawful food and do not take an excessive amount; eating more than they normally eat is incompatible with the aim of fasting, which is to weaken carnal desires. At the highest grade of fasting the mind also fasts, i.e. it refrains from all worldly thoughts and cares and remains engrossed in God and the hereafter. This is the fasting of the prophets, the most devout, and those near to God, and this fasting is broken if the mind is attentive to any worldly matter which is not an aid to the hereafter. Mere abstention from food, drink and sexual gratification is, as it were, the body of fasting; the spirit of fasting lies in weakening carnal desires. When this is achieved, man gains a divine attribute, namely, freedom from hunger and thirst. This is also an angelic quality, and by its acquisition man is also brought near to God. With the weakening of carnal desires the tendency to evil becomes weak and the capacity for good deeds increases, and this is why fasting is called the foundation of devotional practices and the key to good works. When the soul is purified by hunger it becomes capable of remembering God and reflecting upon Him; rememberance of God in this state creates a great effect on the soul.[50]

Pilgrimage

Pilgrimage to Mecca (*ḥajj*) is a devotional act, obligatory once in the lifetime of a normal adult Muslim capable of it. Being 'capable' means that he should have bodily health, money enough to sustain himself on the journey, and also sufficient to sustain his family during his absence, and that the way to Mecca should be safe. The time for it is from the beginning of the tenth lunar month of every year up to the ninth day of the twelfth month. There are five obligatory acts on which the validity of pilgrimage depends. These are the state of ritual consecration in and around Mecca (*iḥrām*), circumambulation of the Ka'ba (*ṭawāf*), the ceremony of running seven times between Ṣafā and Marwa (*sa'ī*), halting (*waqūf*) at 'Arafa and shaving (*ḥalq*). Al-Ghazālī mentions six other requirements without which pilgrimage is incomplete though not invalid, and also many supererogatory acts to be performed from the beginning of pilgrimage to its end, together with the manner (*adab*) of their performance.[51] All these acts constitute the external aspects

of pilgrimage.

In order to perform the inward aspect one needs to know the deeper meaning of pilgrimage. According to al-Ghazālī, pilgrimage in Islam occupies the place of monasticism (*ruhbāniyya*) in previous religions, in the sense that a pilgrim leaves home, family and all other things so that he may serve God and remember Him exclusively. Acts such as offering sacrifice, throwing stones, and running, whose reasons are not clear to the intellect and with which man's nature is not intimate, are enjoined only because perfect obedience (*kamāl al-'ubūdiyya*) is achieved by doing such acts; one who does them is motivated exclusively by a desire to carry out God's order. By this is achieved perfect obedience to Him, and complete disobedience to passions.[52] The journey to Mecca resembles the journey to the hereafter through death; all the acts of the former have their parallels in the latter; these parallels should be remembered during the acts of pilgrimage. Thus when a pilgrim is trying to acquire that provision for his journey to Mecca which will not quickly perish, he should realize that the lasting provision for the journey to the hereafter is devotional acts free from ostentation. Al-Ghazālī discusses the inward aspect of every external act of pilgrimage, together with its deeper meaning, for he believes that pilgrimage must be performed in every respect if it is to be a preparation for the next life.[53] He does not speak of pilgrimage as a means of enhancing the mutual love and fellowship of the Muslim, which was the view of the philosopher Miskawayh.[54] Regarding the circumambulation of the Ka'ba al-Ghazālī says that it is not merely of the body but also of the mind; the mind should feel that it is circumambulating the divine presence inasmuch as the Ka'ba is the representation, in the world of perception, of the divine presence imperceptible by the senses. This is the act of the soul in cirmumbulation, and if all the acts of the soul are performed together with all the acts of the body, pilgrimage becomes complete, and the pilgrim is included among those loved by God.[55]

SUPEREROGATORY DEVOTIONAL ACTS

Qur'ān-reading

Although the purpose of the revelation of the Qur'ān is not recitation, but the guidance of mankind on the right path, its recitation is a supererogatory act of devotion whose influence on the

soul is great.[56] Since the Qur'ān is God's speech, anyone who reads it necessarily remembers Him, and as a result of this remembrance love of God is generated in his soul.[57] This remembrance is achieved even though one does not understand the meaning of the Qur'ān. As a result of perseverance in recitation, observing all its rules, one acquires knowledge of God, His attributes and His works; one also acquires such virtuous qualities as fear, hope, reverence, humility, submission and so on.[58] Thus 'faith' is strengthened, the soul becomes pure, and the rust on it disappears.[59] There are ten external rules of Qur'ān-reading, and these need to be observed so that an effect on the soul may be produced through the interaction between soul and body.[60] The internal actions, however, are discussed by al-Ghazālī more elaborately. Some of these are: realizing the greatness of the Qur'ān as the word of God, reading it with single-mindedness, reflecting on the meaning of every verse being recited, creating in the soul different conditions according to the different meanings of verses recited. Thus while reading the verses on threats and punishments the mind should be overtaken by fear; while reading the verses concerning mercy the mind should be filled with joy; when verses on God's attributes are read, it should be submissive and humble. Three grades of recitation are mentioned by al-Ghazālī, and men are urged to rise gradually to the highest of them. At the lowest level a reciter supposes that he is standing before God and reciting the Qur'ān to Him; in his own mind he is a beggar entreating and supplicating. At a higher grade he supposes that God is conversing with him; he is mentally abased and magnifies God. On ascending to the highest grade he supposes that he is hearing the Qur'ān from God Himself, and he sees God and His attributes in its verses; so absorbed is he in this, that he is not even aware of his recitation. This is the recitation of those brought near to God, while the first two grades are appropriate to the less virtuous.[61]

Praise

Praise (*dhikr*) of God, the second supererogatory devotional acts, is regarded by al-Ghazālī as the best and most useful of all other acts of worship provided it is performed with single-minded devotion; if it is continual but with absent-mindedness, or if it is performed with attention but rarely, it is of little benefit to the soul.[62] Four forms of praise are mentioned by al-Ghazālī. They are, asserting God's oneness (*tahlīl*), glorifying Him (*tasbīḥ*), praising Him (*taḥmīd*),

and seeking His forgiveness (*istighfār*). Of these the first is the best. Al-Ghazālī speaks of four grades of praise; to paise Him absent-mindedly with the tongue alone is the lowest grade of praise; this cannot produce any effect on the soul. At a higher grade attention is given with effort and difficulty; if this effort is not made attention is lost. At a still higher grade the mind remains so much absorbed in praise that it cannot easily be deflected. The highest grade of praise is that in which what is praised (*madhkūr*), i.e. God, takes possession of the soul so completely that the mind is not even aware of the act of praise. A man at this grade becomes so much engrossed in God that he forgets all other things, including himself — a state called annihilation (*fanā'*) and also nothingness (*nistī*) in ṣūfī literature. This praise is a manifestation necessitated by the circular relationship between body and soul; it is not the praise which produces love of Him, and hence there is no harm if one fails to reach this stage. What is needed for producing this love is the second and the third grades of praise; after continuous practice for a long time with effort and difficulty, the mind becomes easily engrossed in praise, so that it can hardly be separated from it. Consequently the love of what is praised, i.e. God, becomes deep-seated in the soul.[63]

Although in the *Iḥyā'* and the *Kīmiyā'* praise of God is regarded as the best of all acts of worship, in the *Arba'īn* its merit is compared with that of Qur'ān-reading. Here it is stated that Qur'ān-reading is better for all except those who are seeking God. For the latter also it is better until they have refined their character and acquired the necessary knowledge. After this, if praise is sufficiently dominant in them to lead to perseverance, praise is better for them. They will then have only one thought, and thus they may attain to the stage of 'annihilation'. This state is temporary, and when they return to their normal condition they will be benefited by Qur'ān-reading. Qur'ān-reading, then, is better in all conditions except that in which the contemplation of God occupies the soul.[64]

Invocation

Invocation (*du'ā'*) to God, the last supererogatory act of devotion, is called in Tradition the marrow of the acts of worship because, al-Ghazālī says, what is required in a worshipper's mind is self-abasement and helplessness, and God's greatness and might; these are necessarily present in any true invocation.[65] One may invoke in one's own way, but it is better to use those invocations which are

transmitted by Tradition (*ma'thūra*). A number of them have been mentioned by al-Ghazālī so that men may read them in the morning and evening and after every ritual prayer. He mentions several other invocations which should be used in misfortunes, and at the start of various works. He describes ten methods of invocation with special emphasis on those related to its inward aspect. If a man invokes God in these ways, virtuous qualities such as submission and humility to God are produced in his soul. As a result of remembering God in invocations, the soul gradually learns to love Him.[66]

NOTES

1. Al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, p. 54.
2. *D*, I, 112; *B*, p. 87
3. *B*, p. 87.
4. *D*, I, 142, 173, 212.
5. *M.D.*, pp. 69—70; *D*, I, 173.
6. *D*, I, 141; *K*, p. 136; *B*, p. 110; *A*, p. 43.
7. *B*, p. 110
8. *D*, I, 206.
9. *K*, pp. 141, 137.
10. *D*, I, 142, 130.
11. *D*, I, 212, 202, 144; *K*, p. 685.
12. *K*, p. 210, also 204, 179, 861.
13. *D*, I, 142.
14. *D*, IV, 364.
15. p. 98.
16. *K*, pp. 90, 207, 70, 54—55, 712; *A*, p. 98.
17. *D*, I, 143; *K*, pp. 735—37.
18. *D*, I, 193, 194.
19. *D*, I, 214, 143; *B*, p. 130.
20. *D*, I, 239, 240.
21. *D*, I, 245, 257.
22. *D*, IV, 305, I, 298.
23. *A*, p. 98.
24. p. 227.
25. *K*, p. 74; *A.W.*, pp. 69, 33, 79.
26. *K*, pp. 664, 697.
27. *D*, I, 152.
28. *A*, pp. 98, 93; cf. Yafeh, "Commandments", p. 173—84 especially 176, 180.
29. *D*, I, 271, 254; *K*, p. 26.
30. *M.D.*, pp. 72—73. Cf. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 140—41; Avicenna, *Shifā': Metaphysics*, II, 444, 445; al-Fārābī, *Milla*, p. 47.
31. *A*, pp. 98, 93.
32. *K*, p. 197.

33. For their views see al-Ḥujwīrī, *Kashf*, pp. 107, 122, 139, 53, 134, 140, 191, 217—18, 257.
34. *K*, pp. 56—60, 30—31, 361—62; *M.D.*, pp. 72,77.
35. *M.D.*, p. 71.
36. *D*, IV, 315, I, 149.
37. *D*, I, 187.
38. *A*, pp. 28, 67.
39. *D*, I, 144—46.
40. *D*, I, 148—53; *A*, pp. 28—29.
41. *D*, I, 132.
42. *D*, I, 163, 169.
43. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 140—41; cf. Avicenna, *Shifā':Metaphysics*, II, 444, 445.
44. *D*, I, 134, 152, 133.
45. *D*, I, 142.
46. *D*, I, 192.
47. *D*, I, 191—94, 198; *A*, pp. 32, 34.
48. *D*, I, 198.
49. *D*, I, 193—96, 198.
50. *D*, I, 210—12, 214; *K*, pp. 174—77; *B*, pp. 129—30.
51. *D*, I, 220—32.
52. *D*, I, 239—40, 191.
53. *D*, I, 239—44; *K*, pp. 194—96.
54. *Tahdhīb*, p. 141; cf. Avicenna, *Shifā':Metaphysics*, II, 444.
55. *D*, I, 244.
56. *D*, I, 249.
57. *K*, p. 210.
58. *D*, I, 256, 246, 254, 245.
59. *D*, I, 257, 245.
60. *D*, I, 247—57; *A*, 42.
61. *D*, I, 252—59.
62. *D*, I, 214; *A*, p. 52.
63. *D*, I, 271—72; *K*, pp. 205—10.
64. *A*, p. 58. In the *I.'A*, p. 26, however, the *tahajjud* prayer is considered to be the highest of all devotional acts. At the end of the first part of the *D* this prayer is elaborately discussed. It is a supererogatory prayer and is a means of attaining nearness to God. The best time for its performance is the middle part of the night (*jawf al-layl wa wasaṭuh*), which is best suited for concentration of mind and for communion with God.
65. *D*, I, 283—87.
66. *D*, I, 298; *K*, p. 210.

VII
DUTIES

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

It has already been stated that the action of the outward self which, like that of the inward, forms a means of realizing the moral ideal, has two divisions: that which is directed towards God and that which is directed towards one's fellow-men. The former consists of the devotional acts prescribed by the Sharī'a, and a brief description of them is given in the preceding chapter. The latter is the fulfilment of all the rights (*ḥuqūq*) that others have with respect to an individual. Rights imply society. A man, in al-Ghazālī's view, is usually required to lead a family life and a life in a community; (it is only in special cases that celibacy and seclusion from society (*'uzla*) for a limited period become necessary).[1] Love, unity and co-operation should exist among people, who are all travellers in this world, seeking provision[2] for the next. In a life of co-operation with other human beings, a man has a justifiable claim on moral grounds to have or to obtain something, or to act in a certain way; such a claim is what al-Ghazālī means by the phrase *ḥaqq al-'abd* which may be rendered as a man's right or due. Rights are many in number. If an individual has a right, a claim, in a community, some other individual or individuals must have the obligation to fulfil that claim; this obligation (*farīḍa*) is called duty. A duty, then, may be defined as the obligation of an individual to satisfy a justifiable claim made upon him by some other individual member or members of that community. A child, for instance, has a right to education; so it is the duty of his parents to provide him with that education. Right and duty are thus related to each other. Since rights are many, duties are also many.

The duties which an individual must fulfil if he is to realize the moral ideal are the duties towards his partner in marriage, his children and his other relatives, his guests and visitors, his friends and associates, his fellow-travellers, his servants, his partners in business transactions, his brethren in society, and the ruler of his

country. Since al-Ghazālī is writing mainly for people in the Islamic world, the duties towards brethren in society he calls duties towards Muslim brethren. Obligations towards one of these groups of people constitute one set of duties, and although one set differs from another in details, the general nature of all the sets is the same. Each group of duties comprises both positive and negative duties; a negative duty is a duty to abstain from something, e.g. encroaching on the property of one's neighbours.

In each set of duties a distinction is made by al-Ghazālī between the duties of a higher grade and those of a lower grade. In a few cases, e.g. obligations towards partners in business transactions, the two classes of duties are described separately, and in others they are combined. The duties of the lower grade are not only what is required (*wājib*) of man according to Islamic jurisprudence, but something more.[3] The duties which are more than these form the higher grade; they are demanded by the deeper meaning of the Sharī'a and by the spiritual insight of the ṣūfis. The distinction between the two grades can be made clearer by an example: the buyer who pays poor sellers the exact prices of their commodities does a duty of the lower grade, but the buyer who gives them more is doing a duty of the higher grade. The latter action is, of course, not a necessity but it adds to the moral goodness of its agent. Because it is not required of man it may seem to be wrong to call it a duty, but it is named as such by al-Ghazālī on the ground that those who rise to the greatest height of moral excellence consider it necessary, because they have a deeper insight into the meaning of duty, and they occupy a rank in which wider duties are required.

Besides working out a man's specific duties towards his fellow-men, al-Ghazālī also speaks of a general principle (*aḍ-ḍābiṭ al-kullī*) of behaviour to them.[4] This principle he states as follows: "... in all your dealings with people, treat them as you would be pleased to be treated by them, because the faith of a worshipper is not complete until he loves for other people what he loves for himself...."[5] Passages like this are to be found in most of his ethical works,[6] and the general rule of behaviour set forth in them he supports by Qur'ānic verses and prophetic traditions. This principle was also upheld by the ṣūfī al-Makkī and by the philosopher Miskawayh.[7]

There are places[8] where al-Ghazālī expresses this principle more precisely in the light of his division of virtuous people into two categories. He says that an individual should have an attitude of beneficence (*iḥsān*) to others, should show them respect and should

try to fill their hearts with gladness. The higher grade of duties referred to above embodies this form of behaviour. One who is unable to do these must at least refrain from harming others; harm (*ḍarar*) is not limited to damage to life and property; it even includes such an act as looking at someone in a hurtful manner. Not to harm anyone is justice (*'adl*) and uprightness (*istiqāma*), and this is required of everyone.[9] Those who cause harm to others are irreligious and immoral. The following is a passage in which these three ways of dealing with others are briefly expressed by al-Ghazālī:

> "In respect of other men, too, a man stands in one of three classes: (a) with regard to them he may take the place of just and generous angels, namely, by exerting himself for their ends through compassion and the desire to fill their hearts with gladness; or (b) with regard to other men he may occupy the position of animals and inanimate objects, namely, where they receive neither benefit nor harm from him; or (c) with regard to them he may occupy the position of scorpions, snakes and harmful beasts of prey, from which men expect no good, while fearing the evil they may cause. If you cannot reach the sphere of the angels, at least try not to fall from the level of animals and inanimate things to the ranks of scorpions, snakes or beast of prey. If your soul is content to come down from the highest heights, at least do not let it be content to be hurled into the lowest depths. Perhaps you will be saved by the middle way where you have neither more nor less than what suffices."[10]

To abstain from harming others, i.e. to deal with them justly is only possible after one has observed justice within oneself.[11] The sun of justice, writes al-Ghazālī in his *Naṣīḥa,* rises first in a man's soul, then it spreads to the members of his household and to his intimates; then its rays reach others; to expect to find rays without the sun is to expect the impossible. Justice within oneself consists in restraining the faculties of desire and anger so that they may readily obey the dictates of reason and the Sharī'a. If they are controlled to this extent, harm or injustice can hardly be done to others. This view of al-Ghazālī agrees with that of Miskawayh. When discussing individual just and good deeds in social relationships al-Ghazālī shows their link with this control. Indeed, he clearly states that this control (or the good character achieved by it) forms their source (*maṣdar*).[12] In this way good character which consists of the four root virtues (described in the third chapter) is related to conduct

towards one's fellow-men.

The methods of habit formation (*i'tiyād*) by which good character is usually achieved, also operate in the acquisition of good conduct; after a good deed in social relationships is repeated with effort and difficulty for some time, it becomes habitual and pleasant owing to the circular relationship between soul and body; it can now be considered to have been acquired by the individual. This is made explicit by al-Ghazālī when describing the methods of habit formation in connection with the acquisition of good character-traits,[13] and is also indicated by him when he describes duties as habits or customs (*'ādāt*).

The basis on which the fulfilment of duties is justifiable is mainly the good of the individual (taking the form of happiness in the hereafter).[14] Al-Ghazālī explicitly states that the lower grade of duties is connected with the lower grade of happiness to the agent, and the higher grade of duties is meant for the higher happiness. Sometimes observance of duties is linked with 'faith', the fundamental requirement of salvation. It is not directly connected with the promotion of social peace and harmony, although these accrue from it as necessary consequences; establishment of peace in society is, according to al-Ghazālī, appropriate, not to ethics, but to politics, the concern of which is to create such an atmosphere as will enable individuals to live a morally good life. Although the basic motive for carrying out duties is individualistic, a man is not permitted by al-Ghazālī to show any trace of selfishness in his character, for (consistent with his mainly individualistic position) he holds that it is in the service of others that an individual will realize his own good. Where al-Ghazālī differs from a collectivist or universalist is not so much in laying down a different set of rules for daily conduct, but in his view of the goal of moral life. For him it is the individual's own good; for the universalist it is the good of all. In al-Ghazālī's ethics, there are many cases where the sacrifice of individual interests is advocated for the sake of other people; this is justified on the grounds that abandoning self-interest means attainment by the self of greater good in the next life, for by this the self has done something towards the improvement of character. In every act, however altruistic or universalistic it may be, an individual is urged by al-Ghazālī to have the motive of reward in the life to come. Thus it is primarily his view of the goal of moral life that makes his ethics individualistic in nature. The two rules of conduct which he prescribes mainly for individual good, operate in his formulation of

specific duties towards one's fellow-men.[15] The following pages contain a brief description of these duties with, however, no mention of the Qur'ānic verses, prophetic traditions and mystics' sayings, by which al-Ghazālī supports his views. He first deals with that type of social relationship which falls under the general type of Islamic brotherhood, i.e. friendship.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

Friends

Friendship, al-Ghazālī says, may be established between two individuals as a result of their union in school, in travel and in the king's court, and of their living in the same place. Besides this, a man may deliberately make friends with another because of his handsome appearance, pleasant talk or any worldly benefit. But to love someone either in order to obtain from him anything that may be an aid to otherworldly happiness, or for the sole reason that he loves God and obeys Him, is love for the sake of God (*ḥubb li-Allāh wa fī Allāh*) in one or other of its two forms; this love helps man attain nearness to God. Of these two forms the latter is higher in grade because its source is the extreme love (*farṭ al-maḥabba*) or passionate love (*'ishq*) of God possessed by the mystic.[16] In choosing a friend one should be very careful. The qualities that need to be present in a prospective friend are intelligence, piety and good character. Because all these are very rarely combined in one person, a man, in selecting his friends, should look to his motive: if his motive is simply fellowship, he should befriend a man of good character; if it is worldly benefit, he should seek a generous man; if his motive is otherworldly benefit, one who possesses piety and knowledge is the right man to be his friend. A pious man should befriend one who can give him or receive from him any religious assistance. Not to make friends is not a crime, but it is a crime if one does not keep friendship after establishing it.[17]

The duties of friendship discussed by al-Ghazālī are those of friendship for the sake of God.[18] These duties are ten in number. 1. To help the friend with wealth. At the highest grade of friendship a man should regard his friend's right to his wealth as greater than his own; at a lower grade he should regard the rights of both as equal; at the lowest grade he should help the friend with his surplus wealth before he seeks help from him. 2. To help the friend not only

in his need for money but in all other needs before he seeks help, and to stand by him in all his important affairs with a generous disposition and a cheerful countenance. 3. To speak good of the friend and to conceal his faults. If one hears anyone speaking ill of one's friend, one should protest, imagining that the friend is overhearing the conversation. Dispute with the friend should be avoided carefully, and his secrets must not be disclosed even after separation, because this is a sign of meanness. 4. To express to the friend love for him. This makes the friend more confident of one's affection for him. Love for the friend can be expressed by asking him about all his affairs and showing that one is a partner in his weal and woe, by saluting him first and by expressing deep gratitude for the benefit one has received from him. 5. To guide the friend in religious matters of which he may be ignorant; however, if he should neglect this advice, one should try to create the fear of God in his mind.[19]

6. To forgive the friend's faults and shortcomings. If his faults amounts to sin he should be gently requested to shun it; if he persists in sin he is to be admonished secretly; if admonition proves ineffective, severing relations with him secures freedom from his sin, but to continue them is more humane. If this fault is not a sin but only a neglect to fulfil a duty towards one, he must be forgiven. Any excuse that he may make for his faults, even though it is obviously false, should be accepted. 7. While praying to God for oneself, to pray for the friend during his lifetime and also after his death and, likewise, for his wife and children. 8. To fulfil friendship (*wafā'*). This has many meanings such as (a) to take care of a friend's wife, children and friends after his death, (b) to be kind to all those who are the objects of a friend's care and love, be they his friends, children, students or attendants, (c) to preserve politeness to the friend and not to be arrogant if high social status or a high official rank is attained, (d) to preserve the love of the friend all the time and not to cut the relationship for any reason, and (e) to look upon the friend's enemies as one's own enemies. 9. Not to be artificial to the friend. Slight artificiality is a mark of imperfection in love, for befriending someone for God's sake means union with him, and in union there can be no artificiality. 10. Lastly, a man should consider himself neither superior nor equal but inferior to his friend. Without expecting from the friend any worldly thing, he should greatly respect him and give him the utmost care.[20] After thus discussing friendship, al-Ghazālī deals with a general type of relationship, i.e. Islamic brotherhood.

Muslim Brethren

While al-Makkī mentioned ten duties of Islamic brotherhood, which he derived from the oft-narrated Traditions on it,[21] al-Ghazālī enumerates them as twenty seven. The duties of both higher and lower grades are described together, but they can easily be distinguished by their natures. A few of these duties can only be described here very briefly. A Muslim, he says, must not wish evil to other Muslims, nor harm them by word or deed. He should, if he can, do good to them, without making any distinction between the pious and the wicked. He should be polite to them and should tolerate them if they are rude to him. If he gets angry with one of them, he must not break off relations with him for more than three days; after this time, when he meets him he should be the first to extend greetings to him. He should not believe anyone speaking ill of others, but keep away from him.[22]

A Muslim should respect others according to their status. If he is indebted to someone he should pay him more honour. His dealings with others should be according to their intelligence. He should respect the old and be affectionate to children; respect for the former is completed by not speaking in their presence without their permission. He should be kind-hearted, quiet, easy of access, cheerful and friendly to others. Once the Prophet advised Mu'ādh to fear God, speak the truth, fulfil promises, repay debts and be humble. Since breaking promises is the quality of a hypocrite he must keep from this.[23]

A Muslim's great duty is to reconcile, if possible, enmity among others. So necessary a task is this that lying becomes lawful if it is needed in accomplishing it. A Muslim should keep concealed the faults of other Muslims; otherwise his Muslim brother will be put to shame. There is, of course, no harm in disclosing the faults of those who do evil secretly and who then inform others of it themselves (*mujāhirūn*). Investigation into others' secrets and listening to those who do not wish that others should listen to them, are contrary to etiquette, and are acts forbidden in the Qur'ān. A Muslim must not do anything that may lead others to sin. An example of such acts is to rebuke those who worship other than God, because this elicits from such people a rebuke of God. Nor should a man scold others' parents, for this impels them to scold his parents. A believer should intercede for another believer with someone to whom interest is linked; intercession for preventing bloodshed, causing benefit or

driving away anything disapproved, is charity of the tongue.[24]

A Muslim should prohibit others from doing evil and instruct them in welldoing. The necessity of this is proved by reason and the consensus of the Muslims, as well as the Qur'ān and Tradition.[25] There are eight successive stages in prohibiting from evil: to be certain, without spying, of the evil; gently to define it as evil; very kindly to advise the doer to shun it; when these fail, to abuse him; to stop the evil deed by pressure; to threaten him; to strike him with the hand; to use weapons, with the help of others. Each later stage needs to be adopted when the earlier stage proves ineffective. At every stage the necessary limit must not be surpassed. Compassion is the basic requirement, and it is only when it fails that harsh treatment is necessary.[26] In the *Maqṣad*, to have pity on others is included among the attributes of God.[27]

It is also a believer's duty to please others and to meet their needs; this is an act of great moral value. He should associate with the poor and help orphans; the rich commit sin more often, and so association with them makes one sinful; the poor, because they are often in distress, remember God more and so mixing with them makes one pious. To help orphans is the duty of everyone having the means to do so; the effect on the soul of putting hands on an orphan's head out of pity is equivalent to the effect of good deeds equal in number to the hairs covered by the hand. When a believer meets another believer, he should salute him before starting to talk to him and shake hands with him. When one enters a house, one should salute its inmates. Saluting with bowed head is bad; there is no harm if women salute men, and vice versa. Shaking hands is the perfection of greeting.[28]

A Muslim should visit another Muslim in sickness. Correct behaviour for a visitor lies in sitting beside the sick man only for a few minutes, not asking him many questions, expressing deep sympathy for him and praying to God for his speedy recovery; the sick man's correct behaviour, on the other hand, lies in not complaining to his visitors of his suffering, in praising God, in praying to Him for recovery and for patience in suffering, and in trusting, while taking medicine, not in it but in its Creator. Visiting a sick man once is necessary; more than once is supererogatory and this should be after every three days. A Muslim should attend the funeral of another Muslim. The manner of escorting a bier consists in humility, silence, observation of the dead, reflection on death and preparation for it, and in walking before the bier and close to it.

A Muslim should visit the graves of those who have died. The correct manner of this visit consists in bowing, expressing sorrow, talking very little, not smiling at all, praying to God for forgiveness, reflecting on death, and moving his heart by thinking about man's utter helplessness.[29] After thus discussing Islamic brotherhood al-Ghazālī considers duties towards those who have some special relationships with the agent individual, e.g. duties towards neighbours, relatives, visitors and servants.

Neighbours

In order to show how great is the need to fulfil duties towards neighbours, al-Ghazālī quotes the Tradition in which it is said that the Prophet used to emphasize it so much that his companions feared that he might appoint the neighbour of a man as heir.[30] Neighbourliness covers an area of forty houses in all directions. A man may have three categories of neighbours, namely, polytheists, Muslims and Muslim relatives. A polytheists neighbour has a claim on him; a Muslim neighbour two; and a neighbour who is a Muslim and at the same time his relative has three claims.[31]

Al-Ghazālī discusses a man's duties towards his neighbours by bringing them under four broad duties. The first is to refrain from doing harm to neighbours however small it may be. Even throwing a stone at a neighbour's dog is a form of harming him. To build a house, without the consent of neighbours, so high that it will prevent fresh air reaching them, is another way of harming them. The smoke from one's kitchen should not trouble them. If one's children cause them any harm, one should punish them in their presence. One should not treat neighbours harshly if they put things on one's wall, or let water go down beside one's courtyard, nor should one narrow their paths to their houses. If any neighbour does any of these or other harms, one should endure them. Endurance of harm from a neighbour is the second broad duty just as keeping from harming him constitutes the first duty.[32]

The third duty is to pay respect to neighbours. Various ways of respecting them are mentioned by al-Ghazālī. Some of them are to salute them first, not to talk to them too much, not to ask them about the minute details of their affairs, to share in their weal and woe, not to rebuke them, not to peer from the roof of one's house at their secret affairs, not to look at what is carried into their houses, to keep a watch over their houses when they are out, not to listen to

anyone backbiting them, not to look upon their wives and female servants with lust, to speak gently to their children, to offer them a slice of the fruit one might buy for oneself or to eat it secretly if one is unwilling to offer it to them, and to give them part of the ewe offered up in sacrifice.[33]

The fourth duty is to be kindly to neighbours. There are many ways of helping a poor neighbour. Important among them is to lend him money when he needs it. A poor neighbour may be helped by so small a thing as a gift of curry soup. Help is not limited to material things; it includes spiritual help too. All these duties are in addition to those towards Muslim Brethren.[34]

Relatives

Al-Ghazālī says that one who strengthens blood-kinship (*ṣilat ar-raḥim*) is loved by God, and one who severs it is hated by Him. The reward of many virtuous deeds is delayed in this life or postponed until the next, but discharging duties towards relatives is something whose reward is given by God very soon. Its recompense is an increase in the lifetime of its agent, in his sustenance, and in the general welfare of his family. To be excellent in doing the duties of blood-kinship is a quality of one who is excellent in all things.[35] These include all the duties of Islamic brotherhood described in a previous section. There are a few more duties which are emphasized by al-Ghazālī. These are visiting relatives from time to time and inviting them to one's house and entertaining them. All these strengthen blood-kinship. A non-Muslim relative should be treated in the same way as a Muslim relative, for blood-kinship remains the same all the time. In giving, priority should be given to poor relatives, for by giving to the poor, one gets the reward of giving alms only, whereas by giving to poor relatives one gets the reward of both giving alms and fulfilling the right of relatives. If a relative severs a relationship, one should try to repair it; if a relative deprives one of something, one should give it to him, and if he does an injustice one should forgive him. It is better for relatives not to live as neighbours, for quarrelling about rights, which often takes place among neighbours, sometimes goes to the extent of severing blood-kinship.[36]

Parents and Children

Since parents are the nearest of all a man's relatives, he has some

special duties to fulfil towards them. Beneficence to them in their lifetime is not enough for him; he has to perform certain duties after their death too. Beneficence to the mother should be double that of beneficence to the father, for she undergoes more hardship for the children. [37] Duties towards parents include all the duties of Islamic brotherhood and two more. One of these two duties is to obey them in doubtful matters though not in a purely unlawful affair. Thus if a man's parents become displeased when he refuses to eat doubtful food with them, he should not refuse, because to avoid what is doubtful is piety whereas to please them is a command of God. The other duty is not to go abroad, without their consent, for any permissible or supererogatory act. Thus a man should not go on pilgrimage to Mecca in his early life; rather he should stay at home and serve them, for this is his best deed after his belief in God's unity. For the same reason he should not leave, without their permission, for a distant city in order to acquire supererogatory knowledge. Duties towards the eldest brother are nearly the same as those towards the father. [38] Of the duties to be fulfilled after the parents' death, one is to pray to God for their forgiveness. Another is to fulfil the promise which they might have made to someone but could not get time or opportunity to fulfil. A third duty is to respect their friends and to preserve a relationship with all their relatives. [39]

As for a man's duties towards his children, one of them is to celebrate, on the seventh day of a child's birth, a ceremony by giving him a beautiful name, slaughtering as a sacrifice for him a sheep or goat, and shaving his hair for the first time (*'aqīqa*). When he is six years old, parents should begin to teach him about good character and religious practices; (this has been discussed in the chapter on character). They should not curse their children nor wish evil to them. It is necessary for parents to assist their children to obey them; this assistance is given through not doing any evil for which children may disobey them; an evil of this kind is failing to observe equality in offering them gifts and in affection for them. When a boy is sixteen his father should arrange his marriage and then say to him, 'I have given you a good upbringing, taught you and arranged a good marriage for you. I am not responsible to God if you do evil.' [40]

Partners in Marriage

In fufilling the claims of a wife, what is needed for a man is to observe moderation and to show good character. [41] He is not only to

refrain from harming her but must also endure any harm she might cause him and tolerate her when she gets angry with him. He should not oppose her if she likes to satisfy her passions in a lawful manner; he should gladden her by means of making jokes and playing games with her, and in doing these he needs to bring himself down to the level of her intelligence. Of course, this must not be done to the extent that her awe of him will depart; moderation is needed in all this. If he finds her involved in any evil, he needs to treat her harshly. Woman's nature is such that if slight leniency is shown to her, she makes misuse of it; if too much of it is granted, she goes out of bounds; but if she is treated harshly where harshness is needed, she remains within the limit. Woman is generally weak in intellect, and evil predominates in her; the remedy for the predominance of evil is harshness, and the remedy for weakness is kindness; the mingling of harshness with kindness balances her two defects. A husband should first observe his wife in order to determine the degree of these defects in her and then resort to the necessary degree of harshness and kindness. He should not be too jealous (*ghayūr*) of her. This jealousy should be in its proper place, i.e. where there is good reason to doubt her character; in the absence of such a reason he should not imagine evil of her nor rebuke her nor spy on her secret affairs, for all these are strictly forbidden in the Qur'ān. [42]

In the matter of the maintenance of his wife also he should be moderate. Maintenance should be given from lawfully acquired wealth. One who is moderate buys meat for the family every fourth day and sweets once a week. It is a duty of the husband to advise her about the necessary things of religion, if she does not know them. If he himself is ignorant of them, he should seek decisions on them from a *muftī*. If a dispute occurs between husband and wife and it is from both sides or from his side only, two mediators — one from his relatives and the other from her kinsmen — should be called to reconcile them. If the dispute is from the wife only, it is the husband who will make her obey him; first he should treat her with compassion but, if this is ineffective, he must be harsh to her. The same process is to be adopted in urging her to perform devotional acts, if she is lax in them. [43]

As for the wife's duties, she must obey her husband whatever his command, except when obedience to him involves disobedience to God. To emphasize this obedience al-Ghazālī quotes the Prophet's words to the effect that if he were to ask a person to prostrate himself before another, he would have asked a wife to do so before

her husband. Two things, in addition, are strictly required of a wife. One is chastity and the veil; she must seclude herself in the house; if she needs to go out, she can do so with his permission and wearing an old veil which will not attract attention. The other thing is not to claim from him what she does not need or what he is unable to provide; she should caution him against earning livelihood by unlawful means; she should be pleased even if he is incapable of providing her with sufficient livelihood. It is incumbent upon her to keep him away from sin and to encourage him to good. [44]

She should take good care of his wealth. It is unlawful for her to give away anything without his consent. Of course, consent is not needed in giving away perishable food. To manage the household affairs is not a thing disgraceful on her part. When he is out she should feel somewhat distressed and be engaged in acts of devotion, but when he is at home she should be cheerful and try to please him by her words and deeds. If he is ugly to look at, she must not hate him. [45] Some of these and a few other duties of a wife are briefly mentioned in the following passage of the *Naṣīḥa*:

> "A wife will become dear to her husband and gain his affection, firstly by honouring him; secondly by obeying him when they are alone together; and (further) by bearing in mind his advantage and disadvantage, adorning herself (for him), keeping herself concealed from (other) men and secluding herself in the house; by coming to him tidy and pleasantly perfumed, having meals ready (for him) at the (proper) times and cheerfully preparing whatever he desires, by not making impossible demands, not nagging, keeping her nakedness covered at bed-time, and keeping her husband's secret during his absence and in his presence."[46]

Servants

Observance of justice and equality, in al-Ghazālī's view, is needed very much in dealing with servants and slaves. This was one of the things which the Prophet strongly emphasized when he was just departing from the world. [47] One who is unfair to them will be deprived of otherworldly happiness. Miskawayh also felt the need of justice towards servants, but, unlike al-Ghazālī, he emphasized it for the purpose of preserving harmony and concord in society, which is not achieved if the relationship between servants and their masters becomes bad owing to injustice. [48] Moreover he did not explain the

requirements of this. Al-Ghazālī, by contrast, elaborates them by quoting the relevant Traditions. He says that a master should allow his servants to share his food and clothing; he should allow them to eat from the same food as he eats and to wear the same quality of cloth as he wears; if one of them is serving him food, he should ask him to sit with him and eat, or should at least put some of it on his hand and ask him to eat it. To charge servants with work beyond their capacity is inhuman. He must not look at them with the eye of contempt; rather he should regard them as equal to him, for they are his brethren and their souls are like his. Since they are human beings like him, it must not ever happen that he is on horseback and they are running behind him. [49]

Servants' faults should be forgiven. To emphasize the need for clemency to them the Prophet once bade one of his companions to forgive his slave seventy times a day. By nature man gets angry if servants disobey him or cause him harm but he should control himself by the appropriate means described in the fourth chapter. Just as servants should not disobey masters, so, too, the latter should not neglect any advice given to them by the former for their material or spiritual well-being. To advise his master is a laudable act on the part of a servant. One who does so in addition to fulfilling his duties towards God and towards the master is to be included among those who will first enter the abode of otherworldly happiness. [50]

Visitors and Guests

Because al-Ghazālī regards it a man's duty to visit his friends, relatives and Muslim brehtren and also to invite them to be his guests from time to time, he discusses what one's duty is towards visitors and guests. According to him, this duty may, in general, be said to consist in honouring them and gladdening them; this is completed by entertainment with food, by pleasant talk and by cheerfulness at the time of reception, entertainment, and saying good-bye. [51] About the entertainment of visitors his view is that this should be done by the food already present in the house; no trouble should be taken for them. Taking trouble here means preparing for them better food than the usual, or placing before them all the food present in the house; these lead to separation between friends and cause hardship to the family of the host. If he has no food to offer, he need not borrow it from others. If only that amount of food is present which is needed for the family, he need not offer it to the

visitors. If he is willing to entertain them, he should place food before them without asking them whether or not they wish to take it, for asking them is an insult to them. If he is not willing to entertain, he should not speak of it at all. Entertainment of a visitor who is fasting is with perfume, fragrant oil and pleasant talk.[52]

The manner of entertaining invited guests is different from that for uninvited visitors mentioned above. It should be done by taking all possible trouble and even by getting into debt if necessary.[53] Nothing immoral or irreligious should be allowed in the sitting room and dining room, otherwise the guests may be pained. Seats for the female guests should be set on one side. Food should be offered without delay, for this is a mark of respect for guests. Fruit should be served first for this is in accord with medical science. Sweets should constitute the last item. Meat and sweets are two things that make food palatable; entertainment with such food gladdens the guests and brings forth their sincere gratitude to God. The quantity of food to be placed before them should be enough and neither more or less, for the last two are, respectively, affectation and against good manners. The host should eat with him; he should not finish eating before them. When they are leaving he should accompany them to the door of the house in order to see them off; this is a way of honouring them. Cheerfulness, pleasant talk and expression of brotherly feeling are needed from him at this time.[54]

Travelling Companions

Travel in order to learn by seeing the wonders of divine works and the suffering of evildoers, is a Qur'ānic injunction[55] stressed and developed by the ṣūfīs. Al-Ghazālī discusses various aspects of travel, the merits of some of them and the demerits of others, and the rules of that travel which helps the mystic attain nearness to God. He first distinguishes between bodily travel from one's own house and mental travel, which consists in reflecting on one divine work and then on another; he regards mental travel as nobler than bodily travel. Bodily travel is undertaken by the mystic for other-worldly purposes, such as acquiring knowledge and doing good deeds, getting rid of vices and achieving virtues. He is required to follow the rules of this travel, one of which is to fulfil his duties towards his companions. These duties are: speaking kind words, entertaining them with his own food, and demonstrating his good character. Good character in travel culminates in beneficence to

people, assistance to companions and to other travellers. The travellers should indulge only his minimum needs. Unless the desires of the carnal soul are controlled, travel cannot lead men near to God.[56]

Fulfilment of all these duties discussed above is only possible for an individual in a just and peaceful society. Since it is rulers who create such a society, al-Ghazālī maintains that the individual has some duties towards them.

The Ruler

An individual is required to fulfil certain moral duties towards those who rule. Al-Ghazālī briefly discusses these, saying that if a king rules justly, does good to his people and shows mercy to the victims of injustice, his subjects are under an obligation to obey him, love him and never to rebel against him. Failure to fulfil this obligation is ingratitude. To support his views al-Ghazālī quotes the Qur'ānic verse, "Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who hold authority", which means obey God, the Prophet and the princes (*amīrān*).[57] Al-Ghazālī's views have some similarity to those of Miskawayh expressed in connection with his theories of justice and love.[58]

A peaceful society created by rulers is congenial for moral life. For the maintenance of life itself man needs to earn his livelihood, and this leads him to engage in commercial transactions. There are some duties which a man has towards his partners in transactions, e.g. abstention from injustice, doing acts of beneficence and so on. Al-Ghazālī discusses these duties in detail.

Partners in Business Transactions

A business transaction based upon injustice is defined by al-Ghazālī as the one which involves something that causes harm. This harm may be general (*'āmm*), i.e. to general people, or particular (*khāṣṣ*), i.e. to the person or persons with whom one is transacting. Even after fulfilling all the stipulations of sound transactions laid down by the Muslim jurisprudents, a transaction may involve any of these two kinds of harm and be based upon injustice. An individual's duty, in addition to fulfilling those stipulations, is to refrain from behaving in such a way as may cause harm to anyone.[59] Al-Ghazālī does not define harm or injustice; he only describes two

kinds of behaviour in transactions which involve general harm, and four involving particular harm, and says that knowledge of these will enable a man to realize the nature of harm and various other forms of behaviour causing both kinds of harm.[60]

Al-Ghazālī first discusses behaviour in transactions which involve general harm. One form of such behaviour is monopolizing (*iḥtikār*) foodstuffs. Hoarding food with a view to selling it when the price rises is harmful to people. By foodstuffs is meant those things on which people live, and not those which are used to supplement food such as medicine, saffron and so on; there is a controversy as to whether things which are used to supplement food and which meet hunger for a time but on which one cannot live, e.g. fruit and honey, are included in foodstuffs; hoarding these is not free from being undesirable. Hoarding foodstuffs is forbidden only when they are not abundantly available; when they are available and people's need for them is not desperate, hoarding them in the hope of an increase in price and not of famine, is not harmful and so is not injustice; it is, however, undesirable because the hoarder waits for the beginning of harm, i.e. a rise in price, and waiting for a rise in price is like waiting for the harm itself. In time of famine, of course, hoarding of honey, butter, and similar things is forbidden. The other form of behaviour in transaction whose harm is general is passing spurious money. This money passes from person to person, and thus the harm of this behaviour becomes common to all the people in a society.[61]

One form of behaviour in transactions whose harm is confined to the person with whom one is transacting, is to praise a commodity for a quality not really present in it. Another is to hide the defect, if any, of the commodity. This may be done in various ways. Measurement should be the same in both buying and selling a thing. Real justice (*'adl ḥaqīqī*) in measurement cannot be achieved, since one who insists on his exact right tends to achieve more than his due. Therefore safety in selling lies in giving a little more than is due, and, in buying, in taking rather less. Another form of behaviour in transactions where harm is particular is to hide anything about the price of a commodity. Sometimes a trader of a town hastens to meet those approaching the town with their goods, and keeping concealed the price of similar things in town, buys their goods at a low price. There are many other ways of concealing the price.[62]

Refraining from these and similar kinds of behaviour in commercial transactions, is a lower grade of duty appropriate primarily

to the lower class of virtuous people. A higher duty is to behave in such a way that the other person with whom one is dealing is benefited. Such dealing may assume six forms. The first is not to obtain more profit than is usual in the transaction. There is no harm in profiting, for trade is carried on for this purpose, or in taking more than the usual profit, provided it involves no deception, but not to profit more than usual is an act of beneficence. The second form is deliberately to pay the poor seller of a commodity more than its actual price; this is an act better than charity. The third form of beneficence is shown when goods are sold to the poor, or when money is lent to them. Beneficence may here be demonstrated in three ways, namely, by reducing a part of the amount of money to be paid by them, accepting from them defective money, and giving them more time for payment. The fourth form of beneficence is in paying debts; this involves good payment, which means the borrower's going to the lender to repay the debt himself, hastening to pay it as quickly as possible even though the fixed time for payment has not yet come, and giving the lender things better than those borrowed. The fifth is rescinding the sale if the buyer seeks this. The last form of beneficence is selling foodstuffs to the poor on credit, with the intention of not demanding the price from them unless they become wealthy, and of exempting them from the price if they die without paying it.[63]

In addition to doing acts of beneficence, the most devout remain concerned with the hereafter in all their business transactions.[64] The man concerned with this accomplishes several tasks, of which the first is every day to renew his intention in his trade; this intention should be to sustain himself and his family with his own wealth, and to aid with it his religious activities. He resolves to desire for others what he desires for himself, to maintain justice and beneficence, and to instruct others in the good and prohibit them from the evils which he sees in the market. Secondly, he selects for himself one of those occupations which are beneficial to others and abstains from an occupation which is forbidden or undesirable or even one which is permissible but leads to worldly enjoyment. Thirdly, the business of this world does not hinder him from otherworldly business; he spends the first part of the day in the mosque and the rest in the market, or the first and last parts in the mosque and the middle part in the market; in the market he remembers God and remains engaged in His praise. Fourthly, he is not greedy for trade — so greedy that he goes to the market first and comes back last and voyages for business purposes. To avoid falsehood, deceit, oaths,

artifice, perfidy, and other vices usually committed in the market he leaves it as soon as he has made sufficient money for the day and utilizes his time in work of spiritual well-being. Fifthly, he avoids not only the unlawful but also the doubtful; since he is at the greatest height of spirituality, he decides these not by the jurisprudents' opinions but by his own conscience. He does not transact business with persons charged with injustice, perfidy, stealing, usury and oppression, or with their associates and helpers, for transacting with them is to render them help, and it is wrong to help oppressors. Lastly, he keeps watch over every minute detail of his dealings with people in the market, for he knows that he will be asked about his dealings on the resurrection day. [65]

NOTES

1. Al-Ghazālī (*D*, III, 47, 89—99) states that celibacy is usually better for a novice until he is strong in gnosis (*ma'rifa*). For some novices, however, celibacy may be unsuitable at any time; this is the case for those who are unable to control carnal desires. Details of al-Ghazālī's views are more or less similar to those of al-Makkī in *Qūt*, II, 489—528 especially 490, 492, 495, 502, 507, 511, 528—29. As for seclusion, it is not always good according to al-Ghazālī. It has both uses and abuses: six kinds of religious and secular matters which can only be achieved by help from others and by mixing with them, are lost in seclusion (*K*, pp. 350—56); but there are also six benefits in seclusion (*K*, pp. 342—49). The relative value of the two for an individual depends upon his condition: for some people association is better, while for others seclusion for a time is to be preferred (*K*, pp. 342, 356). Those who adopt seclusion should follow its rules, which are stated by al-Ghazālī (*K*, pp. 356—57). His mystical teaching that withdrawal from society is better for some people for a time is opposed to the view of Miskawayh, who stated that acquisition of virtue in seclusion is impossible and saints and ascetics are wholly unjust. For the details of Miskawayh's view see his *Tahdhīb*, pp. 30, 196.
2. *K*, p. 306.
3. *D*, IV, 59.
4. *D*, II, 68.
5. *A. W.*, p. 75.
6. *D*, II, 68; *B*, p. 145; *N*, p. 59.
7. Al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 536.
8. *D*, II, 72.
9. *D*, II, 68, 71, 72; *N*, p. 59.
10. *B*, pp. 110—11.
11. *K*, p. 420; *N*, p. 24; Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 132—33.
12. *D*, II, 292. Also see *supra*, p. 82—83.
13. *D*, III, 51—52.
14. This comes about mainly in the following ways: observance of negative duties

keeps the soul of the individual from being defiled by evil qualities; fulfilment of positive duties produces good effects in the form of purification of the soul from evil qualities and of its adornment with good qualities through the interaction of body and soul; (as a result of perseverance in a humble act, for example, the quality of pride vanishes from the soul and humility is produced); thus the soul is enlightened and improved; such a soul is entitled to happiness in the hereafter. Moreover, a good or evil deed done to others causes good or evil to them. This merit will bring happiness or misery to its agent in the life to come as a reward or punishment; see *supra*, pp. 25, 56

15. An understanding of the points discussed above under the caption 'General Principles' is necessary for the appreciation of al-Ghazālī's views concerning man's moral duties towards his fellow-men. These points are omitted in the works of Umaruddin and Mubārak on al-Ghazālī's ethics. Umaruddin's work seeks to present al-Ghazālī's moral theory in its entirety, but it is not considered satisfactory for various reasons. The arrangement of material is neither logical, systematic nor organized. The principles underlying al-Ghazālī's teachings have not always been investigated. The discussion of problems is often vague, brief and incomplete, making the reader unable to form a clear opinion of al-Ghazālī. The presentation is sometimes confused and sometimes distorted. The mystical aspect of the teachings of al-Ghazālī is often omitted. Al-Ghazālī's ethical ideas have not been carefully distinguished from his non-ethical thought. The points which need emphasis are not adequately emphasized. Mubārak's book does not deal with the entire scope of al-Ghazālī's ethics; it totally omits devotional acts and many other important problems. In Mubārak's book too, the treatment is superficial, brief, and incomplete, but is slightly better. The mystical aspect of al-Ghazālī's teachings is mentioned only occasionally. Sometimes mystical ideas are examined to see if they hinder the economic interests and material progress of the political community; the author seems to have a materialistic bent of mind which causes him to be hostile to the ṣūfīs. (see his *Akhlāq*, pp. 164, 205, 113, 148, 149, 151, 169, 109—111). The two broad grades in al-Ghazālī's ethics are not mentioned anywhere in Mubārak's book. The logical connections among the four principal parts of his ethics, among various virtues, among various vices, and among other elements, are not pointed out. On the contrary, al-Ghazālī's order of presentation is sometimes altered without any justification — a thing which is also found in Umaruddin's work. Nevertheless, Mubārak's book provides the beginner with useful information concerning al-Ghazālī's biography and other matters related to it.
16. *D*, II, 142—46; *K*, pp. 309—10; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 453, 442—43, 469, 451, 454—55.
17. *D*, II, 150—52; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 489.
18. *D*, II, 150, 142.
19. *D*, II, 152—61; cf. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, pp. 160, 161, 162—63, 165—66; al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 446, 453, 457, 458, 464, 474.
20. *D*, II, 161—69; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 446, 448, 450, 456—57, 451—52, 479—80.
21. *Qūt*, II, 288—90.
22. *D*, II, 171—72.
23. *D*, II, 173—75.

24. *D*, II, 176—78.
25. *D*, II, 269, 274. In his exposition of the mystical virtue of satisfaction with divine decree al-Ghazālī shows that, although evil is ultimately decreed by God, prohibition from it is not against this mystical virtue. Following the Qur'ān (3:104, 110; 16:76; 31:17), he regards prohibition from evil and instruction in the good as a basic aspect of Islam. Hence in *D*, II, 274—312 he discusses all aspects of these, namely, the evils from which people should be prohibited, the qualities of those who should prohibit, the people who should be prohibited, and the stages and rules of prohibition.
26. *D*, II, 289—92.
27. p. 68.
28. *D*, II, 173, 179—84; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 483.
29. *D*, II, 185—88.
30. Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Adab, 28; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Birr, 14, 141; at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Birr, 28; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Adab, 4.
31. *D*, II, 188—89; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 477.
32. *D*, II, 188—91.
33. *K*, p. 337.
34. *D*, II, 189—90; *K*, p. 337.
35. *D*, II, 91.
36. *D*, II, 192.
37. *D*, II, 192—93; *K*, p. 338.
38. *D*, II, 194—95.
39. *D*, II, 193.
40. *D*, II, 193—94; *K*, p. 339.
41. *D*, II, 38.
42. *D*, II, 41—43; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 490, 507, 517, 520; Qur'ān 49:12.
43. *D*, II, 43—46; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 513, 516.
44. *D*, II, 52—53; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 406, 415—416, 518, 513—16. For the Tradition quoted by al-Ghazālī see at-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Riḍā', 10; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Nikāḥ, 4.
45. *D*, 54—55; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 514—15.
46. *N*, p. 170.
47. Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, Adab, 124; Ibn Māja, *Sunan*, Waṣāyā, 1.
48. *Tahdhīb*, p. 144.
49. *D*, II, 195—97.
50. *D*, II, 196—97.
51. *D*, II, 17, 14; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 371, 385—87, where the same view is expressed.
52. *D*, II, 10, 11, 13; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 392—93, 380, 385.
53. *K*, pp. 133—34.
54. *D*, II, 13, 14, 15—16, 18; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 377.
55. Qur'ān 3:137; 6:11.
56. *D*, II, 217—18, 223—24, 221, 228; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 477.
57. *N*, pp. 45—56, 104—105; Qur'ān 4:59. Discussion of al-Ghazālī's teachings on an individual's duties towards rulers falls within the scope of his ethics, since discharge of these duties is a part of good conduct. His conception of rulers' duties towards the ruled is of course relevant only to a work on politics.
58. *Tahdhīb*, pp. 120—21, 146—47.

59. *D*, II, 66; *K*, p. 272.
60. *D*, II, 68; cf. Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 114, where justice in transactions is regarded as a kind of distributive justice and the way in which it can be determined is also described.
61. *D*, II, 67—68; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 542—43, 546.
62. *D*, II, 69—70, 60—82; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 574, 536, 544—46, 551—52.
63. *D*, II, 72—75; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 448—50.
64. *D*, II, 77.
65. *D*, II, 75—79; *K*, pp. 283—87; cf. al-Makkī, *Qūt*, II, 574, 535, 537—38, 539—42, 545, 552—56.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to present al-Ghazālī's ethical theory as set forth in those of his books which are universally accepted as authentic. The study of this theory may be concluded by mentioning some of our most important findings. The scope of al-Ghazālī's ethics has been found to be very wide, for it embraces all aspects of man's life except the political; it does not include politics although it obtains support from it. Al-Ghazālī's ethics is by and large individualistic, since it encourages personal morality for the purpose of improving the individual soul, although it includes the traits of character and forms of behaviour which are usually advocated in universalistic and altruistic ethics. Al-Ghazālī's ethics may also be described as teleological for it evaluates acts by their consequences — an act is good if it produces in the soul such an effect as would promote happiness directly or indirectly. Al-Ghazālī recognizes the importance of reason, revelation and mystical intuition in moral life. A distinctive feature of his ethics is its composite nature. In the systematization and development of ethical ideas derived from different sources and in mingling them with his own ideas and experiences, the mystical element remains dominant so that his ethics may be regarded as constituting a mystical theory of ethics.

As regards the relationship between the works of al-Ghazālī and those of other writers on morals, it has been found that the statements he made in the *Munqidh* concerning the sources of his views are true. For the most part, those of his views which are similar to the teachings of the philosophers are present, though in a less elaborate form, in the works of al-Ghazālī's ṣūfī predecessors, especially al-Muḥāsibī and al-Makkī. Some of these views are also present in the Qur'ān and Tradition. However, a few of them — e.g. the definition of character, the scheme of the four root virtues and their sub-divisions — are found only in the ethical works of the philosophers, and we have mentioned in what sense al-Ghazālī is correct in saying that such views are the products of his independent reflection. It has also been found that wherever he agrees with the

philosophers' works on ethics it can only be partially, for he rejects some of their views as false.

Al-Ghazālī bases his ethical teachings upon his psychological and metaphysical conceptions. The basic theory is that the soul is the real man and the body is merely its instrument, necessary for acquiring provision for eternal life. This dualistic or instrumentalist theory of mind and body, and also the theory of a circular relationship between soul and body, are found in most of his moral teachings. Concepts relating to the elements in man's constitution and the faculties of the soul are fundamental to his theories of virtues and vices. The most fundamental of his views concern the nature of the soul, the place of its origin and the reason why it descended to the world of the body.

An emphasis upon the next life is very strong in al-Ghazālī's ethics. The present life is only a preparation for that life. Man's moral aim is considered to be happiness in the hereafter, which is depicted as having a lower and a higher level. Since it is the condition of the soul which brings happiness or misery, the improvement of the soul is so much emphasized by al-Ghazālī that his ethics may be called both a system of ethics for the soul and a 'happiness theory'. The nearest means to happiness are 'goods' of the soul, which are reduced to knowledge and action. 'Faith', a form of knowledge, is included in ethics. There are two broad grades in faith, and the same is true of action. Thus al-Ghazālī's ethics teaches two levels of morality corresponding to two levels of happiness in the next life. This concept of gradation is consistently maintained throughout his ethics. Action and knowledge, including faith, are man's provision for his eternal life. Perfection in the sense al-Ghazālī understands it is only attainable by 'the few'. It is identified with nearness to God and resemblance to the angels. Knowledge and action are only means to love of God and intimacy with Him. This love is the moral ideal to be realized in this life. The more one realizes this ideal the greater will be one's happiness in the hereafter. At the stage of the higher grade of love, man experiences the state of 'annihilation'. Al-Ghazālī maintains that cultivation of this higher grade of morality by *all* people is not desirable, for in that case the order of the world would be paralyzed. Those who are at this higher level remain content with bare essentials, and devote all their time to remembrance of God.

'Action' includes making the soul beautiful with good qualities, its purification from vices, performance of devotional acts, and

fulfilment of duties towards one's fellow-men. The acquisition of the four root virtues is a part of making the soul beautiful. In al-Ghazālī's ethics good character is formed by these virtues, and in the doctrine of character the concept of the mean is all-important. It is made explicit that the determining factors of the mean are both reason and the Sharī'a. The usual methods of acquiring good traits are habit-formation and association, but divine grace as a separate element is always present. Purification of the soul from vices is achieved when the root vices are totally banished. These vices are presented in the form of an ascending scale, with pride as the greatest of all the vices. These vices constituted obstacles on the path to God, and they must be removed if the novice is to traverse the stations on the path. The principle of the removal of a vice finally emerges as opposition by knowledge and action. The aim of self-training here is to achieve the mean. This training cannot be accomplished without divine aid. The task of making the soul beautiful is completed by the acquisition of the mystical virtues, which, in their perfect form, belong to the higher level of morality and are meant for the special purpose of attaining nearness to God. The division of these virtues into a means-group and an ends-group is of great importance. These virtues are presented in the form of an ascending order ending with love of God, the highest virtue, the ideal in life. All the virtues below love — and indeed all moral efforts — are only a preparation for love.

Devotional acts in their inward aspect are linked with mystical virtues, since they are regarded as proceeding from some of these virtues. The final aim of devotional acts is to produce in the soul love of God and intimacy with Him, and to remove from it love of the world. Their aim is not to draw forth the divine aid needed in working for happiness. It is made explicit that men may receive divine aid irrespective of their deserts and that this aid is necessary for any form of preparation for happiness. In some passages, however, there is a suggestion that imploring God for aid is a means of obtaining this aid. Thus al-Ghazālī does not seem to be clear on this question of the means by which divine aid can be obtained.

In al-Ghazālī's ethics strong emphasis is laid upon the fulfilment of duties towards one's fellow-men; it is made an essential requirement of a true ṣūfī. The general principle of behaviour to others is 'to treat them as you would be pleased to be treated by them', or 'to desire for others what you desire for yourself'. This rule is explained in the light of two levels of morality: beneficence to others is the

higher ideal, while abstention from harming them is the lower ideal. The duties or good actions directed towards others are connected with good character, in the same way as devotional acts are linked with mystical virtues. In this way man's outward self is linked up with his inward. In al-Ghazālī's ethics, this link is of great importance.

Al-Ghazālī considers morality and religion as interdependent. There are many elements in his ethics which lead one to arrive at this conclusion. The concept of gradual progress in the moral training of the novice is clear in al-Ghazālī's teachings. Such progress lies in performing devotional acts, in giving up the evil acts of the body, in the fulfilment of duties, the acquisition of the four root virtues which form good character, the purification of the soul from the root vices, and finally in making the soul beautiful with mystical virtues. With the acquisition of mystical virtues the novice becomes a ṣūfī, a perfect man, attains nearness to God and extreme love of Him, and occasionally experiences the state of 'annihilation'. This is the highest stage of moral life and this will lead to the highest happiness in the hereafter.

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(The Arabic article *al-*, with its variants such as *an-*, *ash-*, etc., is disregarded in the alphabetical arrangement. The article 'the' before English language titles is also not taken into consideration. Journals, encylopaedias and al-Ghazālī's works are listed by their abbreviations; the meaning of these abbreviations is given on pp. 13-14. Page numbers in italics refer to major treatment of topics).

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